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Chapter 1
Introduction
“If we do not learn from history, we are unlikely to fully recover from it.”
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (FCIC) (2011)
1.1 Background of the Study
Polarising views about securitisation — a process generating Asset-Backed Securities (ABS)
— were advanced in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). However, it should
not be taken as a bad or good development in the financial markets, as it has certain costs
and benefits. This point of departure may stand in contrast with the views prevailing in the
market after the GFC. This study compares ABS and Covered Bonds (CBs). CBs are selected
to compare with ABS as they are close counterparts and most of the blames that are placed
on securitised products do not apply to them. The study performs an economic analysis of
the regulations of these two instruments in the first place and then an empirical analysis has
been performed in order to further evaluate these regulations. These regulations have been
critically reviewed at the end of the study on the basis of this empirical analysis.
Securitisation was considered having a benign impact on the banking system, until the
unfolding of the sub-prime crisis of 2007 (Reinhart & Felton, 2008). It was perceived to
support the financial system and economy through various channels. A bank may reduce its
funding cost and use its capital in a more economised manner by the virtue of securitisation
(Duffie, 2008). A better risk diversification becomes possible as risk is distributed among
different classes of assets (through tranching process), instead of being concentrated in the
one market segment (Jiangli, Pritsker, & Raupach, 2007; Segoviano, Jones, Lindner, &
Blankenheim, 2013). The transformation of illiquid loans into tradable securities and an
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economised use of the capital resulting from the transfer of assets from a bank’s balance sheet
result into an increase in the flow of funds in the economy.1
A knee-jerk reaction was seen right after the GFC and securitising banks were considered
having an occult malevolence associated with securitisation. It was believed that banks did
not properly estimate their resilience in the macroeconomic downturns while securitising
(Kara, Marqués-Ibáñez, & Ongena, 2015). Large-scale securitisation of loans increased
banks’ exposure to the losses emanating from the elevated credit risk (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru,
& Vig, 2010; Keys, Seru, & Vig, 2012).2 Surti (2010) explains two prime reasons for this
wider exposure to losses. At the lending node, securitisation eroded incentives of the banks
to screen their borrowers and underestimated their default propensity. At the funding node,
market participants did not properly perform the pricing of the risk. The loan performance
largely deteriorated allegedly causing the collapse of securitisation market.3
Anumber of researchers argue that banking problems during theGFC can be sourced to the
debacle of the securitisation market (Acharya & Naqvi, 2012; Battaglia, Gallo, & Mazzuca,
2014; Carbó-Valverde, Marqués-Ibáñez, & Rodríguez-Fernández, 2012; Pagès, 2013). The
literature widely documents that securitisation distorted banks’ incentives for monitoring and
screening their borrowers (Cerbioni, Fabrizi, & Parbonetti, 2014; Demiroglu & James, 2012;
Keys et al., 2010, 2012;Nadauld&Sherlund, 2013). Rating agencies underestimated the credit
risk of securitised loans and the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework exacerbated
the incentive alignment problem (Guo & Wu, 2014; IOSCO, 2012; Keys, Mukherjee, Seru,
& Vig, 2009).
As a result of the above understanding, securitisation became the beˆte noire of the financial
industry. The confidence of investor was largely traumatised making it harder for the banks
to use securitisation as a mean of financing their credit line and manage their liquidity needs.
A decline of 51% in the issuance of ABS was observed right after the GFC during 2009 in
Europe that is continued till today and reached up to 80% during 2013.4 Moreover, a small
fraction of the issued securities was placed with investors and rest of them were retained by
1Banks can issue limited amount of loans because they are required to hold capital against their assets.
Securitisation helped banks overcome this barrier as loans were moved out of the balance sheet resulting into
free capital. Securitisation in this way increases the lending capacity of banks that is otherwise restrained
because of the capital constraints.
2Securitisation resulted in lax lending standards. As a result, banks issued large scale loans. This increased
the credit risk for these banks. This is a major blame placed on the securitisation.
3The off-balance sheet nature of securitisation is often linked with lax lending and monitoring standards. It
is generally perceived that as the loans are transferred out of the balance sheet, banks might not have incentives
to properly screen and continuously monitor their borrowers.
4These figures have been calculated on the basis of data collected from Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association (SIFMA).
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the issuers (AFME, 2014).5 The shifting of banks to alternative sources of financing, like
repo market,6 turned to be expensive because of increasing haircuts7 and repo rates8 during
this period. Funding and liquidity crises spawned out of this situation (Gorton & Metrick,
2012) — resulting in serious implications for the profitability and stability of the banks. This
baseline scenario stipulated the amelioration of incentive problems for better risk management
and stimulating future growth of the financial sector on a stable footing. The collapse of the
securitisation market prompted many market commentators to emphasise that banks should
look for the alternative means to finance their credit lines and to meet their liquidity needs
(Kreitzer, 2012; Larsson, 2013; Schwarcz, 2011). However, it is important to preserve benefits
of the securitisation framework while looking for an alternative.
The financial crisis in 2007 and concerns related to Sovereign Debt Crisis (SDC) in Europe
diverted the attention of banks towards the issuance of CBs to meet their financing needs.
The unsecured funding market — the substratum of banks — was frozen, especially after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers and remained strained for a long period afterwards. CBs market
emerged as a key funding source and an antidote to the problems emerging after the GFC. The
market participants and regulators started considering that CBs can resuscitate the freezing
funding market for banks as they can use these bonds to obtain funds to finance the mortgage
loans and provide liquidity to banks (Pinedo & Tanenbaum, 2010).9 Despite the existence of
some structural differences in ABS and CBs, they are expected to provide similar economic
benefits (Dinca, 2014; IOSCO, 2012; Murphy, 2013).10 However, the holders of CBs have
a preferential claim over the collateral assets in case of default of the issuing bank. Hence,
CBs provide a high level of confidence to investors as compared to ABS. Banks using covered
bonds for funding their credit line and to meet their liquidity needs may enjoy a stable source
5A number of loans were generated with a view to securitise them but securitisation ability was largely
hampered by the collapse of the securitisation market during the GFC. The banks were not able to sell the already
issued securities and they were being retained by them as investors were not interested in these securities. Hence,
the risk that was supposed to be transferred stayed on banks’ balance sheets.
6Repo is short of repurchase agreement. This is a market used for overnight borrowing against collateral of
securities. The holder of securities sells them to a lender and agrees to purchase them a later period.
7Securities are generally devalued when they are used as collateral because lending parties need a cushion
to compensate for decline in the market value. The haircut is the difference between the market value of the
securities and amount of loans obtained against these securities.
8Repo rate is the rate charged on the funds borrowed from the repo market.
9Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) was introduced by the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2009
under this understanding.
10Both types of instruments are issued against specific assets generated by a Financial Institution (FI). The
cash flows generated from the underlying assets are used to satisfy the claims of the holders of these securities
and bonds. Both instruments provide the benefits of creating liquidity, controlling funding cost and transferring
risk (except credit risk in case of CBs).
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of financing mortgage loans (Rosen, 2008).
CBs are more appealing instruments because of their on-balance sheet structure. They
provide access to capital the market funding along with the on-balance sheet credit risk
management. The incentive problem can be controlled with the help of CBs because of their
on-balance sheet nature. Prudent underwriting is the primary benefit of CBs but it is not a
free lunch. CB issuers are required to outlay a larger capital relative to the securitisers. One
of the primary benefits of securitisation is the risk distribution. The same benefit is provided
by CBs also but credit risk is originally retained by the issuer (Packer, Stever, & Upper, 2007).
Moreover, the issuance of CBs might lead to an increase in the capital cost for the issuers as
assets held in the cover pool are maintained on the balance sheet and the issuers are required
to hold capital against these assets. Resultantly, the borrowing costs may rise in the home
purchase market (Surti, 2010). The efficient distribution of risk to market participants, most
willing and able to absorb it, is an important argument made in favour of the securitisation.
The interest in CBsmainly arose because of their stable performance in Europe where they
were juxtaposed with unsecured bonds and ABS for many years. The evidence of this stable
performance can be seen in many European countries. The different protection provisions
provided to CB holders helped maintaining the investors’ confidence in this market. The
interest in this asset class was also incited because of the regulatory reforms. A favourable
treatment was offered to CB holders in the regulations devised after the GFC. The US proposal
for the mortgage market reforms assumes that the issuance of CBs is a way to address the
problems resulted by the issuance of securitisation (Boyce, 2008; IOSCO, 2012). The demand
for a safe collateral increased in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets. The liquidity
requirements were better met through the issuance of covered bonds. Keeping in view all
these features of CBs, they became less risky for the investors and issuers were also able to
borrow long terms funds at a cheaper cost (Anand, Chapman, & Gai, 2012).
Currently, CBs receive a favourable treatment, as they exhibited their resilience and
avoided shocks during the GFC when other funding sources remained frozen for the banks.
For these reasons, the issuance of CBs has been highly incentivised. The focus of issuers and
investors significantly shifted to this market. However, the adoption of CBs as an alternative of
securitisation can be questionable for many reasons (AFME, 2014; Anand et al., 2012; Boyce,
2008; EBA, 2014). A higher focus on CB market — possibly incited by these regulatory
reforms— is likely to cause encumbrance of high-quality assets of banks. Depositors (unless
they are covered by deposit insurance) and other unsecured bond holders are treated as
subordinate to CB holders. This situation is likely to give rise to a tension between the
claims of CB holders and depositor/unsecured creditors. Therefore, securitisation should be
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continued as an alternative mean of funding to reduce the over-reliance on CB issuance (IMF,
2011).
It is imperative for regulators to evaluate the merits of a reformed securitisationmarket and
its effects on other markets. The regulators should play an important role in creating a balance
between the issuance of CBs and ABS. The positive role of securitisation in increasing the
flow of funds in the economy is recognized by regulators and efforts are being made by them
to restart this market. However, many of strict regulations are still hindering the revival of the
securitisation market. Regulators have been trying to follow two somehow competing goals
i.e. mitigating risks in the banking system and ensuring the flow of credit in the economy.
However, in pursuit of the former goal, the latter is likely to be jeopardised. Making the
balance right is currently a great challenge for regulators.
1.2 Problem Statement
Regulators on both sides of the Atlantic were criticised after the GFC for a lax treatment
given to securitisation. Frantic efforts by the regulatory authorities were ensued to control the
alleged negative externalities generated by the securitisation market. These efforts resulted
into strict regulations for securitisation causing further shrinkage of this market (Anand et
al., 2012; Avesani, Pascual, & Ribakova, 2007; IMF, 2011; Murphy, 2013; Segoviano et al.,
2013), as investors and issuers lost interest in this market. However, most of the allegations
placed on securitisation are largely challengeable and so are the regulations based on such
allegations. CBs are close counter parts of ABS, but allegations placed on ABS are not
applicable to CBs.
CB market did not face a collapse similar to the one experienced by the securitisation
market. For the reasons such as above, a relatively favourable treatment in regulations
is provided to CBs. However, market stakeholders became concerned that a favourable
regulatory treatment given to CBs may result in a higher focus of issuers and investors on the
CB market that may have unintended consequences for the banking and financial system.11
CBmay prove to be a more secured investment for the investors but it should also be evaluated
how they are likely to affect the issuers and financial system in the wider spectrum. The
favourable regulatory treatment of CBs should not be solely based on the retention feature
and resilience during the GFC (Surti, 2010).
11The new regulations being implemented in the banking system, as laid out in Basel III, Capital Requirement
Directive (CRD) IV and Capital Requirement Regulations (CRR) (EU) are likely to affect incentives of banks to
get involved in a particular market.
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Despite numerous efforts, regulating securitisation still remains a challenge for the regu-
lators. Regulators are attempting to restart the securitisation market in Europe but relatively
strict regulations are one of the potential barrier in the resumption of this market. The reg-
ulations for CBs have also been subject to market criticism and there have been many calls
to revise these regulations. CBs, because of their similarities with ABS, serve as a good
candidate to evaluate the authenticity of the allegations placed on ABS. On the one hand, their
comparison can evaluate if criticism on securitisation can be justified and on the other hand,
it will also help understand if CBs deserve a favourable treatment in regulations.
1.3 Research Questions
The background and the problem explained above highlight that regulating securitisation
is a challenging task for the regulatory bodies and regulators are still struggling to devise
an effective regulatory framework for this market. The study addresses the basic question:
How markets for CBs and ABS should be regulated? In order to answer this question, it is
imperative to comprehend the nature of problems in these markets. This understanding along
with a review of the current regulations will provide a basis for rethinking regulations. To
this end, this study develops the below 4 research questions.
1. What are themisalignments between the regulations of securitisation and covered bonds,
and their intended objectives?
2. What is the impact of securitisation and covered bond on the credit risk taking behaviour
of banks?
3. What are the effects of securitisation and covered bonds on bank stability?
4. How should regulations of securitisation and covered bonds be redefined to promote
the financial stability?
The first question here is about the possible misalignment of regulations devised for ABS
and CBs with the intended objectives of these regulations. This question can be divided in
some sub questions. For instance, the first legal question is what are the regulations introduced
for ABS and CBs? What are the premises of these regulations? Are there any substantial
differences in regulations of these two markets? If yes, how can these differences affect
these two markets? To answer these, this study describes the recent regulations in Europe.
The intended objectives and premises of these regulations are explained and it is assessed to
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what extent these premises can be justified and the regulations have the potential to meet the
intended objectives. The possible discrepancies in the premises and misalignments between
regulations and intended objectives have been highlighted. The regulations concerning both
markets (ABS and CBs) have also been reviewed and compared. The asymmetries in the
regulations of these instruments have also been elucidated. The explanation helps understand
how CBs are getting a favourable treatment in the recent regulations.
The second question is motivated by the widespread allegations placed on securitisation.
A major allegation on securitisation is that it leads to the lax lending behaviour of banks.
Securitising banks do not screen and monitor their borrowers, as they do not maintain a ‘good
skin in the game’ because of the off-balance sheet nature of the securitisation activity. Many
regulations are also premised on this understanding. This question has been framed to test
this understanding. I make a comparison of ABS and CB issuing banks as CB issuing banks
have strong ‘skin in the game’ because of the on-balance sheet nature of CBs. Hence, these
banks cannot be subject to the same criticism. The answer of this question helps evaluate the
regulations based on the above explained understanding.
One of the major goal of the regulators is to increase banks’ stability. The strict regulations
have been devised for the securitisation, as it is perceived to negatively affect the bank stability.
Therefore, the third question has been devised to test if the issuance of ABS andCBs is likely to
affect bank stability. However, this study goes one step further in this analysis and investigate
this relationship beyond linearity. The study argues here that this relationship may not be as
simple as it is perceived by some of the previous studies. If this belief is correct, then flat
regulations may not be suitable to overcome the problems in these markets and to promote
financial stability.
The last question is the ultimate objective of this study. This question is answered in the
light of the answers of prior questions. The answers to the first three questions provides the
foundation to answer the last one. To this end, the recent regulations concerning securitisation
and covered bondmarkets have been revisited in the light of the prior investigation. The answer
to this question is extremely important as current regulations are actively revised and subject
to widespread market criticism for not being aligned with the actual market dynamics.
1.4 Rationale of the Study
Regulating securitisation has always been a hot potato for regulators in the US and Europe.
Securitisation faced an Armageddon after the GFC and many attempts were made to regulate
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this market. These regulations are considered hampering the revival of securitisation market
that is already comatose. Most of the benefits previously associated with securitisation may
not be accessible after compliance with these new regulations Schwarcz (2013b). These new
regulations are considered encouraging the issuance of CBs as they are receiving a preferable
treatment. Regulations are highly influenced by the criticism made on securitisation after
the GFC. However, this criticism is controversial and so are the regulations. The current
regulations must be reviewed if CBs cannot help banks to achieve stability as compared to
securitisation.
The interest in theCBmarketwas incited by the fact that thismarket sustained the economic
shocks of the GFC and showed a stable performance (although, some market analysts are of
the view that this market sustained because of the CBPP of the ECB in 2008). The investors’
confidence was well maintained in this market and investors from securitisation market also
shifted to the CB market. However, the impact of CBs on issuers has not been evaluated.
Therefore, the overarching motivation of this study is to uncover effects of CBs in conjunction
with securitisation on the banking and financial system. Gorton and Metrick (2010) highlight
that attributes of the recent financial crisis are like the previous crises when safe instruments
suddenly appeared to be vulnerable. CBs are also considered highly safe instruments by the
different stakeholders in the banking system. It is quite imperative to perform a comprehensive
analysis of its various aspects before it becomes the next “next thing”.
1.5 Significance of the Study
Most of the literature focusing on securitisation after the outburst of the financial crisis argues
that securitisation distorted banks’ monitoring incentive that ultimately led to the collapse
this market. This situation is mainly ascribed to the absence of so-called ‘skin in the game’.
Other allegations on securitisation also stem from this main issue. This study evaluates the
situation by making a comparison of ABS with a similar instrument, CB, in which banks have
a strong ‘skin in the game’. The study helps understand if the ‘skin in the game’ in form of
the on-balance sheet retention makes some difference.
Schwarcz (2011) is of the view that CBs have been given an undeserved aura of innocence
by the regulators and market analysts. There are widespread concerns that a discriminatory
treatment of securitisation as compared to CBs may not be justified. The higher focus on
CBs may provide safety to investors but it might increase the financial fragility of the banking
sector. Against this backdrop, this study attempts to identify some flaws in the current
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regulations and evaluates the financial stability implications of securitisation and CBs on the
banks in the European market. In pursuit of this aim, the present study is expected to make a
fourfold contribution to the literature.
Firstly, the study helps understand the rationale of various regulations devised for the
securitisation and CB market and how these regulations are affecting the banks’ incentives for
issuing ABS and CBs. Secondly, the study attempts to evaluate if the allegations placed on
the securitisation are justifiable. Thirdly, the study attempts to identify some real problems
involved in the market from the perspective of bank stability. Lastly, this study elucidates if
there is a need to review the current regulations pertaining to securitisation and CBs based
on the analysis performed here. It highlights how regulators should make adjustment in the
current regulatory framework to develop a stable financial market.
1.6 Research Gap
There are a number of articles explaining the causes of the financial crisis and the role
of securitisation in it. On the contrary, CBs did not receive a significant attention in the
financial press and academic research, despite a large size of the market and increasing
interest of investors, issuers and regulators after the denunciation of securitisation. Most of
the information is available in different surveys, European Covered Bond Council (ECBC)
fact books, and research by some banks and rating agencies etc. Besides, the available studies
about CBs are mostly written by authors with an axe to grind, or about interest of investors
ignoring issuers and market. Therefore, a significant gap is existent with respect to CBs.
Moreover, most of the academic research on securitisation focuses on the US market and the
European market is still under investigated. There is a need to conduct a study explaining the
differences between ABS and CBs in details, evaluating these two important funding sources
from issuers’ perspectives and their role in the financial stability in the light of the recent
regulatory interventions. The present study is intended to make some contribution to fill this
gap.
1.7 Classification of the Study
The study is classified under article 5850 of Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics (ELE).
Heremans (1999) explained in his paper in theELE that awave of deregulationwas experienced
after 1996 with a motive to increase the efficiency that ultimately affected the motive of
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stability. The dynamic evolution of financial systems poses great challenges for the regulators.
The changing market conditions require updating regulations for banks and financial markets
on a continuous basis. He emphasises that a stable system of payment is crucial for the
stability of the whole banking system that plays a vital role in the stability of entire financial
and economic system. Therefore, regulations should keep in view all aspects of the whole
framework for controlling the volume and means of transactions of payments. The current
study is also focused on providing a basis for regulating two important financial instruments
widely used by banks in these days.
1.8 Scope of the Study
The CB market in the US is in its nascent stages and many of the investors are still hesitant
while entering this market because of the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework.
Contrarily, this market is strongly rooted in Europe and CBs are juxtaposed with ABS.
Therefore, the present study is focused on the banking system in Europe. The study focuses on
the major financial markets in Europe that have been involved in the issuance of both financial
instruments targeted in this study i.e. CBs and ABS. The study excludes the developing and
emerging economies as the collection of data can be a challenging issue in these markets
because of their immaturity.
1.9 Snapshot of the Research Methodology
The study raises both theoretical and empirical questions. Therefore, a pure qualitative or
quantitative research methodology cannot be followed in this study, rather a mixed method is
more suitable approach. A mixed method research employs the combination of quantitative
and qualitative approaches. This type of research is becoming increasing popular as it uses the
strengths of both quantitative and qualitative research. Mixed methods are also more suitable
because of the interdisciplinary nature of this research.12
The main questions being addressed by the current study is a complex one: How markets
for CBs and ABS should be regulated? This question is normative in nature and not readily
subject to the scientific investigation because of the opacity and complexity of the ABS
and CB markets. There is a need to answer many positive questions before answering this
normative question.The subsequent questions as raised under the section 1.3 stem from this
12See (Creswell, 2009, Chapter 10) for further details about mixed methods research.
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main question. These questions involve lot of complexities. The use of a single methodology
might not be adequate to resolve this complexity. The nature of the research questions in this
study calls for a separate research design for the each question.
I follow a systematic approach in this study to answer the main research questions about
the optimal regulations. It is imperative to understand the structure and various characteristics
of these securities before moving to the economic or legal analysis. The answering of the
main research question requires a thorough understanding of both markets (ABS and CBs),
their regulations, and the actual underlying problems. I attempt to cover all these aspects
before thinking about the optimal regulations.
I start with a detailed description of ABS andCBs. This description helps in understanding
the complexity of the ABS and CB markets. After explaining ABS and CBs, I review the
recent regulatory developments in both markets. I perform an economic analysis of the recent
regulations against their intended objectives and premises. This analysis is performed in the
light of the prior theoretical and empirical studies. This analysis helps evaluate the premises of
these regulations and raises some questions on them. These questions motivates the empirical
investigation. One of the important question is about the impact of ABS on credit risk taking
behaviour of banks, as regulations are based on the perception that securitisation leads to lax
lending standards resulting into the issuance of risky loans. CB is a good candidate for the
comparison with ABS, as the allegations placed on ABS are not applicable to CBs. The other
important question is about the impact of these two instruments on bank stability. The answer
to these two questions is important to propose optimal regulations.
The empirical investigation entails a number of challenges. The most important challenge
in this investigation is dealing with the endogeneity in the decision of issuing ABS and CBs.
An ideal situation to deal with this endogeneity problem is to perform a natural experiment.
It is also known as “shock-based design”.13 A situation or event is required in this research
design that can randomly assign the elements of the study population to different groups.
In this way, the natural experiment mimics a situation akin to a randomized experiment.
However, finding a shock or a situation in observational studies is a challenging task because
of the exogeneity requirements of this shock.
This study deals with two financial instruments concurrently. Despite both instruments
have many similar characteristics, they performed differently during and after the GFC. The
market for CBs remained active when the ABS market was frozen. Moreover, these two
instruments are structured differently (ABS are off-balance sheet whereas CBs are on balance
13See Atanasov and Black (2014) for further details about the “shock-based causality”
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sheet instruments).
I use Propensity Score Methods (PSM) in the first empirical investigation about credit risk
taking behaviour of banks. The use of PSM is increasing in accounting and finance literature
to deal with the problem of endogeneity. A major criticism on PSM is that it is based on
observable factors and does not take in account the unobservable factors. However, I have used
Difference-in-Differences (DID) approach along with PSM to control for the time-invariant
unobservables. Moreover, I have used Covariate Balancing Propensity Score (CBPS) that is
more robust than traditional PSMs.14
The second empirical study investigates the relationship of ABS and CBs with the bank
stability beyond the setting of a linear relation. It starts the analysis with a simple quadratic
model and then extends it to more sophisticated techniques. The analysis is later performed
using Tobit and Generalised Additive Model (GAM). Multiple methods have been used to
add rigour thereby ensuring that results are not driven by a particular method. The data is
also divided into subsets with respect to the bank size. This division helps making a deeper
investigation. Moreover, multiple measures of bank stability are used in this analysis. These
measures include both market and accounting measures of stability.
Up to this point, the detailed description of ABS and CBs, review of regulations and
empirical investigation provide the foundation to revisit the regulations reviewed earlier. The
merits of the recent regulations are evaluated on the basis of all this information, especially
on the basis of the empirical findings. The normative question raised in the section 1.3 about
the optimal regulations for the securitisation and CBs is addressed at the end. This question
is answered on the basis of the positive analysis performed earlier in the study.
1.10 Structure of the Study
This study performs a de-constructed analysis of securitisation and CBs. The structure of the
remainder of the study has been provided below.
• Chapter 2: Securitisation and Covered Bonds
This chapter explains the securitisation and covered bonds in detail. It sheds light on
the history of securitisation and CBs and explains how transactions in securitisation and
CBs issuance take place. The various parties involved in these transactions are identified
here and their roles are explained. The various features of both instruments have also
14See chapter 4 and Imai and Ratkovic (2014) for further details about CBPS.
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been explained. At the end of the chapter, a brief comparison of both instruments has
been made that highlights their similarities and differences.
• Chapter 3: Regulatory Overview of Securitisation and Covered Bonds
This chapter provides a complete description of the regulations governing both types
of transactions. The recent legal developments in the regulatory frameworks for them
are discussed in this chapter. The chapter provides the initial economic analysis of the
regulations. The potential outcome of the regulations has been identified in this chapter.
• Chapter 4: Securitisation, Covered Bonds and Credit Risk Taking Behaviour of
Banks
This chapter empirically investigates the impact of ABS and CBs on credit risk-taking
behaviour of banks using data of 253 banks from 7 European countries for the period
2000-2014. The analysis has been performed using the covariate balancing propensity
score methodology for the analysis. Results show that European banks do not securitise
for credit risk transfer, rather the main motive behind securitisation and CBs is liquidity
generation. The impact of ABS and CBs on credit risk-taking behaviour is examined
in the short and long-run. Results do not show a significant impact of securitisation on
credit risk-taking behaviour of banks. Results also negate the perception that securitising
banks under-price their risk. However, a significant positive impact of CBs on credit
risk-taking in the long run is visible. These results are attributed to the recourse provided
in securitisation transactions, competitive pressure and asset encumbrance in case of
large scale CB issuance. The results suggest that European banks use securitisation as
a funding tool instead of a tool for risk management. The ‘skin in the game’ in form of
on-balance sheet retention does not help reduce credit risk-taking.
• Chapter 5: Effects of Securitisation and Covered Bonds on Bank Stability
This chapter empirically investigates the relationship ofABSandCBswith bank stability
and highlights that this relation varies with the level of a bank’s involvement in a
specific instrument. The data come from 46 securitising and covered bond issuing
listed banks in Europe for 2000-2014. The initial results show that some banks have
been heavily involved in the securitisation activity, while banks cannot issue CBs beyond
a certain limit. The results obtained using a quadratic model and a GAM showed a
U-shaped relationship between securitisation and systemic risk of banks. However,
this relationship is reversed for covered bonds. Small issuances of these bonds fail
to provide the intended benefits and increase the bank’s risk. Further investigation
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revealed the presence of a strong size effect. The systemic risk of smaller banks is
found increasing after issuance of covered bonds, while that of larger banks remains
unaffected. The results obtained in this chapter do not support imposing uniform limits
on the CB issuance, instead such limits should be linked with the bank size. On the
contrary, some framework is needed to limit the banks’ involvement in securitisation.
• Chapter 6: Critical Review of Regulations of Securitisation and Covered Bonds
This chapter revisits the key regulations concerning securitisation and CBs in the light
of economic analysis performed in the earlier chapters. The economic analysis provides
a foundation for this analysis. After the crisis, there are many regulations introduced
in EU and US market to address the shortcomings of securitisation market. However,
the current study is only focused on EU. This chapter elucidates how regulators need to
make adjustments in the current regulatory framework of ABS and CBs.
• Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations
This is the final chapter of the thesis that concludes the book and provides some
recommendations for the future researchers.
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Chapter 2
Securitisation and Covered Bonds -
Characteristics and Participants
Capitalism must be constantly updated through innovation in order to be suc-
cessful in its purpose of achieving society’s goals.
(Shiller, 2013)
This chapter explains the characteristics of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) and Covered
Bonds (CBs) in detail. It explains how these two financial instruments are structured and
identifies participants involved in these transactions along with their respective roles. At the
end, this chapter explicates the similarities and differences between these two products that
help understand how these two financial instruments become competing products.
2.1 Securitisation
The financial innovation during the last few decades brought major transformations in the
banking system. Traditionally, banks were meant to perform the role of financial intermedi-
aries, i.e. taking deposits and distributing the same to cash starved individuals in the market
(Diamond, 1984). Banks were supposed to retain loans until maturity and their growth was
mainly dependent on deposits. Banks had lending officers looking for lending opportunities
in the market. The loans issued against these opportunities were financed by deposits and
banks used to hold these issued loans till maturity. This model of the banking business was
termed as “Originate-to-Hold (OTH)”.1
1Most of the originated loans under the OTHmodels are illiquid and banks have to retain these loans on their
balance sheet till their maturity.
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Securitisation, the most protuberant financial innovation of the modern era (Gorton &
Metrick, 2013) that gained popularity during 1990s in the financial markets across the globe,
reshaped the banking business. It appeared as a red-hot financing technique for the Financial
Institutions (FIs). It enabled banks to decrease their reliance on deposits and provided them
with a financial independence through the sale of loans. This model of the banking is termed
as “Originate-to-Distribute (OTD)” (Buchanan, 2014).2 The OTD model gained popularity
during the 2000s. Securitisation is a part of this OTD model, but not all securitisation
transactions fall under the definition of OTD model.3 Securitisation market experienced a
massive and rapid growth till the outburst of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This growth
started from the USA and spread to other countries across the globe. Banks have been
extensively involved in securitisation to mainly ameliorate their credit risk management, meet
their liquidity needs and stimulate lending activities while controlling the capital requirements
(Cerasi & Rochet, 2014).4
Securitisation is meant to turn illiquid assets of a financial institution into marketable
securities. The process of securitisation is shown in Figure 2.1. It starts with isolation of
assets from the balance sheet of a bank in a separate pool. This bank is known as originator
in the process. The assets placed in the pool are generally homogeneous with respect to their
risk profile and characteristics of cash flows. This pool of segregated assets is sold to an
artificial firm that is called a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or Special Purpose Entity (SPE).
This entity issues securities, called asset-backed securities (ABS), against the assets held in
the pool purchased from the originator. These securities are sold in the secondary market
and proceeds generated from their sale are used to finance the purchase of assets from the
originator. The cash flows generated from the underlying assets are used to make payments
to investors (OSFI, 2004).
These securities are classified into different classes known as tranches and are ranked with
respect to their seniority. Mainly, there are three classes of tranches i.e. senior, mezzanine
2Banks were no longer supposed to hold the originated assets on the balance sheet till maturity because of
securitisation. These illiquid assets were sold to a separate entity that issued securities backed by these assets.
These securities were sold in the market that were generally called ABS. These securities were also called
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) if they were backed by mortgage loans. Securitisation did not only provided
banks with a mean of generating the liquidity but it also resulted in an increase of credit supply in the market.
3The motive of banks behind originating loans in the OTD model is to securitise them after the origination.
Therefore, banks issued many loans with a view to securitise them at a later stage. Hence, it is argued that a bank
may have a little or no economic interest in these originated loans (Segoviano, Jones, Lindner, & Blankenheim,
2015). However, all loans used in securitisation transactions are not issued with a view to securitise them later
on.
4The assets backing the issuance of securitisation are transferred from the balance sheet of the originator.
Therefore, banks are not required to hold capital against these assets.
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Figure 2.1: The Securitisation Process
and junior tranches. Junior tranches are the riskiest ones. Any possible losses against the
underlying pool are initially absorbed by these tranches.5 There are number of participants
involved in this process. The role of each participants has been discussed in the subsequent
sections in detail. The involvement of these various participants in securitisation makes it a
highly complex process.6
5Senior tranches only face losses when the losses exceed the amount of the junior tranches. Therefore,
thickness of the tranches is an important element that must be considered while evaluating the riskiness of a
particular class of ABS.
6Many participants might have overlapping roles. A single entity can be playing the roles of multiple
participants. For instance, an originators also plays the role of servicer and sponsor in most of the cases.
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2.1.1 History of Securitisation
The early precedents of securitisation are found during 1860s when farm rail-road mortgage
bonds were issued in America (Riddiough & Thompson, 2012). These bonds were issued
against the mortgage loans with an adjustable rate7 and backed by farm properties. These
loans had a maturity of 3 to 5 years. The banks issuing these mortgage loans were called
Mortgage Guarantee Houses (MGHs). However, there was no secondary market at that time
and investors were supposed to hold these bonds till maturity (McConnell & Buser, 2011).
This form of securitisation was visible till the Great Depression of 1930s when real estate
market faced a collapse resulting in failure of MGHs in redeeming their outstanding bonds.
Consequently, these bonds disappeared from the market during the panic of Great Depression
and a great funding source for real estate markets was frozen (Klaman, 1961).
The modern form of securitisation is a quite recent development. Its present form took
birth in the USA. The Government Sponsored Mortgage Enterprises (GSMEs) in the USA
played a major role in the evolution of this market. There are three most prominent GSMEs
who laid the foundation of the modern-day securitisation i.e. Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA), Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) and Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). FNMA, colloquially known as Fannie Mae,
was established in 1938. Its main role was to provide federal funds to banks for promoting
the house ownership and facilitating the affordable housing. Fannie Mae was privatised in
1968 as a shareholder owned enterprise. After its privatisation, GNMA, colloquially known
as Ginnie Mae, was established. FHLMC, known as Freddie Mac, was established in 1970
to compete with Fannie Mae for developing a robust and efficient secondary market. These
GSMEs started pooling mortgage loans and using them as collaterals for the securities issued
against them. The objective was to channelise the flow of funds from global investors to
facilitate the affordable housing (Davidson, Sanders, Wolff, & Ching, 2003, p. 75)
Ginnie Mae guaranteed the first private issuance of MBS in 1968. The first issuance of
MBS by Ginnie Mae itself took place in 1970 with a face value of $ 70 million. Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae issued their first MBS in 1971 and 1981 respectively. The securities
issued by Freddie Mac were called participation certificates. The underlying collateral pool
of these participation certificates was comprised of private mortgages. All these securities
were pass-through in nature.8 The investors buying these securities were entitled to receive a
7An adjustable-rate is a type of interest rate that is applied to mortgages loans. The applicable interest varies
on the outstanding balance throughout the life span of the loan. Mostly, the interest rates is fixed for a short
initial period and it changes afterwards on pre-set values after every year and even every month in some cases.
8The monthly payments against the underlying assets are collected by the servicer. The servicer takes its fee
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pro rata amount of principal and interest from the underlying loan collaterals. The mortgage
loans in the collateral pool were originated by banks and they were servicing these loans till
the maturity of these securities.
The securitisationmarket started gaining a boom during the 1990s. This was fuelled by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Ambrose, Lacour-Little, & Sanders, 2005). This act included Real
Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC)9 provisions, enabling the issuers to structure
the bonds and securities with multiple maturities and varying risk profiles (Davidson et al.,
2003). The growth of investments funds and entry of other institutional investors including
insurance companies and pension funds in the secondary market further conflagrated this
growth. The securitisation structure started getting more sophisticated during this time when
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae issued their Collateralised Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) for
the first time in 1983 and 1985 respectively.10 FIs started securitising commercial mortgages
and many other countries devised securitisation friendly laws.
The regulatory capital relief created through transfer of assets to off-balance sheet vehicles
was an appealing factor for many of the FIs who started other forms of securitisation. The
first securitisation of auto-mobile loans and receivables against credit cards took place during
the midst of 1980s. The first Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) was also developed
during this period.11 All these activities were off-balance sheet resulting into free regulatory
capital (Cetorelli & Peristiani, 2012). British banks also started issuing MBS by structuring a
collateral pool comprised of residential mortgage loans and the securities issues against these
loans were Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS).
The expansion in the consumer culture through credit access for buying houses, cars, and
other utilities elevated the volume of the securitisation market. Apart from the commercial
and saving banks, many other FIs started securitising their assets to finance their activities.
The entry of many unregulated players in the market increased the competition that is thought
to be resulting into lax lending standards (Bronzwaer, 2012; Dübel, 2013). The first issuance
of securities against subprime mortgage took place during early 1990s that kept on growing
till the outburst of the GFC (Watkins & Alley, 2008).
During the last two decades, the financial markets across the globe were bombarded with
securitised products. Several complex forms of securitised products were seen during this
period. The complexity of the securitisation was amplified when the issuers started layering
and pass on the principal and interest payment to the securities holders through the SPV.
9A REMIC is an entity that holds the pool of assets and issues multiple classes of interests to investors. It is
used for the pooling of assets and issuing securities against them.
10See section 2.1.5 for details about the CMOs
11See section 2.1.5 for details about the ABCPs
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various transactions with swaps, report and credit support. It became unclear during this
period that who is ultimately bearing the risk associated with these transactions. The workout
situations also became complicated because of this complexity. These factors are jointly
considered to be contributing towards the collapse of the securitisation market during the
GFC (C. Calomiris & Calomiris, 2009; Chamley, Kotlikoff, & Polemarchakis, 2012; IOSCO,
2011; Petrus, 2013). The pooling process was not limited to the assets originated by banks but
many non-banking institutions also entered into the market (Bank of England, 2014; Nassr &
Wehinger, 2014). Moreover, many securitised instruments were also placed in the pools used
for the securitisation.12 These factors further increased the complexity of the securitisation
process.
2.1.2 Legal Structure of Securitisation
The securitisation process entails a legal isolation of the originator’s assets from its balance
sheet. The reason of such an isolation is the creation of a structure that should be independent
of the credit situation and not be affected by the financial health and existence of the originator.
The securities are rated on the own strength of the underlying pool of assets. For this, it is
important that assets must be distanced from the originator. Therefore, this legal isolation
provides a foundation for the rating of issued securities. This isolation takes place through a
transfer of the assets from the originator to a separate entity through a true sale. The originator
sells its assets to this separate entity and records the sale in its books of account.
The transferee entity is mostly known as the SPV that is only created for holding the assets
transferred by the originator. This entity cannot perform any other business activities and
does not have any assets, liabilities or income/losses. Hence, the quality of issued securities
is solely determined on the basis of the quality of underlying assets. The SPV is a bankruptcy
remote entity meaning that it is not affected by the bankruptcy of the originator. For these
reasons, the rating agency does not consider the credit quality of the issuer while rating ABS
and only the credit quality of assets is assessed for the rating purpose. This is only possible
because of the special nature of the SPV. The situation would be different if the SPV has
assets/liabilities and income/losses.
There are numerous legal issues involved in the securitisation structure explained above.
A significant legal challenge is to identify if the assets are isolated from the originator through
an actual commercial sale of assets or it is just a ruse for dedicating specific set of assets to a
group of investors andmaking them unavailable to other creditors of the originating institution.
12It is referred as ‘re-securitisation’.
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This differentiation becomes very important during the bankruptcy state of the originator. A
bankruptcy judge tries to ensure the fair distribution of losses. Every stakeholder is affected
during the bankruptcy and distribution of losses is more difficult than distribution of profits.
The ABS investors claim that they are immune from the losses more than the dedicated set of
assets. The question of true commercial sale arises here and the judge has to evaluate if the
asset isolation was achieved by a true commercial sale or it was just a manoeuvre (Gorton &
Souleles, 2007).
The true sale is often assailed because of lacking the commercial reality. It does not
entail the complete transfer of risks and rewards in many instances. The investors in a
securitisation transaction are entitled to receive a pre-fixed rate of return that is backed by
credit enhancements which shows the level of risk retained by the originator. The excess
return from the collateral pool over the pre-fixed return promised to investor is the residual
return for the originators. The notion of form and substance is often discussed by the lawyers
here. An utter reliance on form for all the transactions that looks like securitisation may
negate the role of courts completely. However, the evaluation of substance may animadvert
that all the transactions are some form of funding. However, the form vs substance question
is highly subjective in nature and a court may not be able to remove this subjectivity. Hence,
a bankruptcy judge will always look for a mid-point (Kothari, 2006). The nature of the SPV
also creates many issues. The SPV, as explained earlier, is a company created for purpose of
securitisation only and it has no assets, liabilities, net worth, income and losses, employees,
or physical location. Hence, it is virtually nothing and sale to nothing is itself nothing and if
it is a substantive entity then it cannot be bankruptcy remote.
2.1.3 Participants in Securitisation
There are various participants involved in the securitisation process with defined roles. An
overview of the parties involved in the securitisation process and their roles and duties have
been provided below.
Borrowers
Borrowers are liable for making payments against the loans held in the collateral pool.
Therefore, the performance of ABS ultimately depends on borrowers. However, borrowers
are often not aware of the fact that their loans have been sold. The originator is responsible
for maintaining customer relationship. These borrowers are placed in various classes by
banks depending on their credit histories. The borrowers with a primeval credit history are
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placed in A and ones with a shoddier credit history are placed in D category. However, this
classification is not very rigid as a borrower may have different credit histories with different
banks.
Originators
The institutions that create the assets used in the collateral pool of ABS are known as
originators in the securitisation process. Originators may include commercial banks, finance
companies, securities firm, thrifts and many other institutions. However, this study is only
focused on banks. Banks issues loans to borrowers that are placed in a pool together. This
pool can be comprised of mortgage loans, credit card receivable, auto loans or business loans.
However, most common loans used in securitisation process are mortgage loans and securities
issued against them are known as Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS). These loans are sold
to an SPV.13
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) is a legal entity created
for carrying out a set of demarcated activities. It is created by an independent firm that is
known as sponsor or originator. An SPV does not perform any other activity apart from the
purpose for which it is created. This is a remote entity that does not have any physical location,
staff, assets, liabilities, net worth and income/losses.14 This entity purchases the assets from
the originator and issues ABS against them. The proceeds generated from the sale of ABS
are used to finance the purchase of assets from the originator.
Legal Structure of SPV Legally, SPV can take a form of limited partnership, a trust,
a limited liability company or a corporation. It can be established as a subsidiary of the
sponsoring firm or as an orphan entity that is not entitled to consolidate with the sponsoring
firm. Mostly, it takes the form of a trust in the securitisation process.
Bankruptcy Remoteness Bankruptcy remoteness is an important feature of an SPV. It
implies that a possible bankruptcy event of sponsoring firm will not affect the SPV. The
creditors of the sponsoring firm cannot have claims over the assets held by SPV. The simplest
way to achieve this bankruptcy remoteness is waiver of SPV’s right for filing a voluntary
13The originator records the gain or loss on the sale in its books of accounts.
14See Gorton and Souleles (2007) for further information about SPV.
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bankruptcy (Klee & Butler, 2002). The activities of the SPV are highly restricted to ensure
the bankruptcy remoteness. These restrictions are related to its obligations, liquidation and
transfer of assets, amendments in incorporation documents, consolidations, and merger etc.
Simply, an SPV cannot go beyond the purpose for which it is established.
Trust
Gorton and Souleles (2007) explains a risk related to bankruptcy remoteness of the SPV. A
judge may re-characterize the true sale of assets to the SPV as a secured financing that may
result into transfer of assets back to the balance sheet of the sponsor. A consolidation of
SPV and sponsor’s assets may also take place. One such incident was seen in the case of
LTV Steel’s bankruptcy when the judge allowed LTV Steel to consolidate SPVs’s assets to its
balance sheet and an uncertainty was created about the bankruptcy remoteness.15 However,
this risk is mitigated by following a two-step process using two SPVs. After purchase of
assets from the originator, these assets are transferred to a trust, often called a Qualified SPE
(Qualified Special Purpose Entity (QSPE)). This trust is responsible for issuing securities to
investors in the market.
Servicer
The originator, in most of the cases, also acts as a servicer who continues to service the
collateral pool sold to the SPV. Servicing contracts are also made with third parties in case
of a pool comprised of mortgage loans. The servicer is responsible for providing customer
15The bankruptcy case of Loan-to-Value (LTV) Steel Co., a major steel manufacturer in USA, created a panic
in the securitisation industry. The company had two securitisation transactions. These transactions were carried
out with two different banks groups and one was backed by inventory and other was backed by receivables. The
assets were transferred to an SPV and this transfer was marked as a true sale in the light of opinion given by a
law firm. However, during the bankruptcy procedure, LTV claimed that these transactions were not subject to a
true sale but the financing was arranged “to deprive the Debtors’ unsecured creditors of the ability to realize any
meaningful recovery from the lenders’ enormous equity cushion, and to enable the lenders to exercise remedies
without any accountability to this court or any other parties in interest.” It was further asserted by LTV that
“through a bewildering and complex array of documents . . . the lenders have conjured the illusion that the
debtors do not own their inventory, do not own their accounts and are not in the business of manufacturing and
selling steel products.” LTV was allowed to use the cash proceeds of transferred assets as “cash collateral” on
an interim basis. The agent banks also showed their agreement to this order. However, the largest lender in the
receivable transaction filed an emergency motion and argued that the assets were transferred as a true sale to
the SPV and the transaction was based on the understanding among all parties that SPV is bankruptcy remote.
Hence, the assets were not part of bankruptcy estate of LTV. However, this motion was denied by the court and
it emphasised that cash collateral order was necessary to enable the debtor meet its obligations. This case raised
serious concerns among the securitisation industry about the bankruptcy remoteness of SPVs. See Klee and
Butler (2002) for further details.
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services and receiving payments from the borrowers and transferring the same to the trust for
the onward transfer to investors. All these activities are performed per a set of provisions laid
out in the servicing agreement. The servicer is also responsible for liquefying the collateral
against the loss in case of a default by the borrower. The servicer receives a fixed amount as
servicing fee. It also prepares reports, usually on monthly basis, about the performance of
securitised pool for the trustees and current disposition of the assets held by the trust. These
reports are also provided to the credit enhancer, rating agencies and investors through trustees.
Trustee
A trustee is a third party that acts in a fiduciary capacity. It administers all the transactions
performed by the trust for a fee. It ensures that all the transactions are being performed as per
the terms and procedures laid out in the pooling and servicing agreement in a cost-effective
manner. Its main job is to safeguard the interest of investors. For this purpose, it works in
a close connection with the servicer and the issuer. All the responsibilities of the trustee
are laid out in a separate agreement. It is pertinent to note here that this trustee must be an
independent entity who is appointed to safeguard the interest of investors and to eliminate
any conflict of interests. It continuously receives information from the originator and servicer
about the performance of the underlying collateral and evaluates if the collateral is generating
adequate cash flows to meet the claims of ABS holders. It also has the authority to replace
the servicer if it fails to make a compliance with the defined terms and conditions (Cetorelli
& Peristiani, 2012).
Underwriters
The underwriter is responsible for advising the issuer of securities about structuring, pricing,
marketing and appropriate credit enhancement of securities. The selection of the underwriter
is based on its market experience, relationship with the institutional investors and experience.
The underwriter has a good knowledge of themarket and relevant regulations. The underwriter
also oversees the sale of securities by acquiring securities from the QSPE. Hence, they are
also prone to the risks linked with these transactions. Traditionally, investment banks have
been playing this role.
Investors
The securities issued by the trust are purchased by the investors. Largest purchases are made
by the institutional investors including pension funds, insurance companies and commercial
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banks. The high rate of return is the most inciting feature of ABS for the investors. However,
it is pertinent to note here that there are no retail investors in this market. These securities are
not suitable for trading in the open market because of their high level of complexity and retail
investors cannot understand the structure of these securities.
Rating Agencies
Rating agencies are responsible for assigning rating to the securities issued by the trust.
For this purpose, they evaluate the structure of transactions, the quality of the assets held
in the collateral pool and their expected cash flows along with various forms of the credit
enhancement provided for the securities. The rating is mainly assigned on the basis of quality
of the underlying collateral and structure of the transaction. The level of protection against
the possible losses is evaluated on the basis of various loan loss models and performance of
the underlying loans is continuously monitored by them to update the rating of ABS.
Credit Enhancers
The issuers of ABS provide credit enhancement in some form to signal about the quality of
issued securities and to provide a vent against the possible losses. It is not only provided
internally but externally as well. The insurance companies and commercial banks provide
this credit enhancement in various forms.16
Credit Default Swap Counter Parties
The holders of ABS can protect themselves against any of potential losses by purchasing
Credit Default Swap (CDS). These contracts provide an insurance against the possible default
of a security. The buyers of these contracts agree to pay a periodic fee to the seller of CDS
and seller in return promises to cover any losses arising out of default of the bond or tranche.
CDS became extremely popular instrument used for hedging in the period close to the crisis.
According to a rough estimate, the gross amount of outstanding CDS in USA was around $62
trillion (Brunnermeier, 2009).
2.1.4 Features of Securitisation
The most important features of securitisation are being discussed as follows:
16See section 2.1.4 for the various forms of credit enhancement.
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True Sale
The securitisation process starts with the sale of assets. An originator sells its assets to an
SPV. This sale is recorded in accounting books of the originator. The SPV finances the
purchase of these assets by issuing the securities against the same assets. These assets, in this
way, are detached from the originator’s balance sheet. The originator does not have access
to these assets and it cannot use them for any other purpose. The originator also records any
gain on the sale of these assets in its books of account.
Credit Enhancement
Credit enhancement is a common feature of ABS. This feature makes these securities distinct
from conventional unsecured corporate bonds. This credit enhancement improves the credit
worthiness of ABS that attract investors to these securities. It reduces the default risk and
improves the credit rating of issued securities. This credit enhancement is performed in various
ways through internal or external credit support. The various forms of credit enhancements
are discussed below.
Internal Credit Enhancement The various forms of the internal credit enhancements are
described below:
Tranching This is a very common form of the credit enhancement in securitisation. The
issued securities are divided into various tranches in a hierarchical order. Usually, there are
three classes of tranches known as senior, mezzanine and equity tranches. Equity tranche is
the lowest class of ABS. The lower tranches provide a protective layer to the upper tranches
of ABS. The losses in case of default in loans from the collateral pool are initially absorbed
by these subordinated tranches. The upper tranche remains unaffected unless the loss exceeds
the value of lower tranches. These senior tranches carry high rating and lower classes have
lower rating but they are high-yielding securities.
Excess Spread This is the first layer of protection for the upper tranches. The average
amount of coupon against the underlying loan collaterals is higher than the fee to the servicer
and average coupon payment to the ABS holders. The difference is known as excess spread
that is used to absorb the losses at the first place before they are spread to other forms of the
credit enhancement. This excess spread helps ensure the payment of coupon to investors even
when some of payment against underlying loans are late or default.
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Over-collateralisation The amount of the financial assets held in the collateral pool
exceeds the amount of securities issued against them. Hence, any incurring losses are covered
by the excess assets in the collateral pool. This over-collateralisation is provided to address
investors’ concern about the possible deterioration of assets in the underlying pool.
Reverse Fund The issuer creates a separate fund for the reimbursement of losses to the
trust. The funds remaining after various expenses including payment of interest and principal
to investors and servicer’s fee are accumulated in this account. These funds are used in case
of delays in some payments from the borrowers. This form of credit enhancement is often
used in combinations with others.
External Credit Enhancement Apart from the credit enhancement through internal credit
support, third parties are also engaged for providing credit enhancement. Mostly, credit rating
of the securities in the case of external credit enhancement depend on the rating of the third
party providing credit enhancement. It may take the following forms.
Parental or Third Party Guarantee The parent company of the issuing entity or a
third party i.e. usually a recognised insurance company provides a guarantee to reimburse the
losses up to a specific amount to the trust. The guarantor may also promise to buy back the
deteriorating loans.
Surety Bond Surety bond is also a form of guarantee that is issued by a well rated
insurance company for the reimbursement of losses incurred on ABS. This bond is usually
issued against ABS having rating equivalent to BBB/Baa. However, other levels of credit
enhancement are also established before losses come to the insurance company. These insured
ABS are rated per the rating of the insurance company.
Letter of Credit (LoC) This form of credit enhancement is provided by banks. These
banks receive a fee for issuing the LoC and promise to reimburse a specific amount to the
trust in case of any losses incurred on ABS.
Cash Collateral Account (CCA) The issuing entity borrows the amount required for
credit enhancement from a commercial bank that is invested in highly rated short-term secu-
rities. The losses are covered up by the liquidation of this investment.
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Credit Rating
All the securitisation transactions are rated by an independent rating agency. These ratings
are initially assigned on the quality of assets in the collateral pool and level of the credit
enhancement. The rating agencies are supposed to continuously monitor the performance of
securities. The rating is updated in case of deterioration of assets in the collateral pool and
changes in the credit enhancement structure or changes in the rating of credit enhancement
providers. The investors’ decisions are based on these ratings. The mechanism of rating ABS
creates two important problems. Firstly, the originators, to get a better rating for the issued
securities, may place the highest quality assets in the collateral pool or may provide excessive
credit enhancement. This will affect the risk transfer incentive of securitisation. Secondly,
the investors’ decisions are based on this rating and they may not perform any due diligence
for evaluating the quality of the securities and rely on the assigned ratings.
2.1.5 Forms of Securitised Instruments
The securities issued in the process of securitisation can be classified in various ways. This
classification is based on the structure of securities and underlying pool of collaterals. The pool
of the collateral can be comprised of different assets that can be mortgage or non-mortgage,
commercial or residential, amortising or non-amortising, and tangible or intangible assets.
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
The securities issued against the mortgage loans are called Mortgage-Backed Securities
(MBS). The most basic form of MBS is pass-through securities. These pass-throughMBS are
also called participation certification. The servicer is responsible for collecting the principal
and interest payments from the borrowers of mortgage loans that are passed to MBS holders.
These securities can be structured with different maturities and payment structures. The
mortgage loans may carry a fixed or a floating rate of interest. The issuers enjoy a greater
flexibility in structuring these securities.
The collateralised pool of mortgage loans can be comprised either of residential mortgages
or commercial mortgages. The securities issued against residential mortgage loans are called
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) and securities issued against commercial
mortgages are called Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS). MBS are usually
highly rated securities because of the property securing the mortgage payments. Therefore,
they can be sold to a wider base of investors. However, CMBS carries some additional risks
28
as compared to RMBS because these securities are backed by commercial tenants whose
business or commercial land is prone to the market and economic shocks (Slaughter and
May, 2015). The value of a commercial property may decline if the market is in a downfall
situation.
Non-Mortgage Asset-Backed Securities
Non-mortgage ABS follows the structures like MBS. However, they are backed by a pool
of non-mortgage loans. These securities are backed by multiple classes of assets generating
interest and principal. The structure of these securities might be non-amortising in most of
cases that is otherwise a distinguishing feature of MBS. Some of these assets might also have
a revolving payment structure. The pool of assets backing these securities can be comprised
of credit card receivables, auto loans, consumer loans, trade receivables, lease financing, ship
loans and business loans. An increasing number of securities backed by these assets have
been offered with a floating rate instead of a fixed one during the recent few years. These
floating rate securities have been very attractive for the investors wanting to avoid a mismatch
in the cash flows because of changing interest rates in the market. This mismatch is inevitable
in the fixed rate securities.
The asset pool backing these securities has a more granular nature. These assets are
associated with several unrelated obligors and each of them represents a small percentage in
the entire collateral pool. The evaluation of these securities is a challenging task for the rating
agencies and investors. It is hard to predict the default of individual obligors. The assessment
of default characteristics of every single borrower is a cumbersome job. Therefore, it is
generally believed that the pool as a whole will tend to show a consistent performance. These
securities are considered riskier as compared to MBS, especially the securities backed by
business loans as these loans are difficult (Loutskina, 2005) and entail greater associations
with the market and economic conditions.
Collateralised Mortgage Obligations (CMOs)
CMOs are multi-class securities. They are backed by either a pool of mortgages or MBS.
The issuer of CMO structure it in a way that cash flows generated by the pool of collaterals
is distributed among the different tranches of securities. There are minimum two tranches
in every CMO transaction. Each of the tranches has a specific expected maturity and cash
flow characteristics. CMOs are structured to meet the objectives of different investors. The
maturity of CMOs may vary from 2 years to 20 years. Therefore, they cater the investment
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objective of many investors.
The basic form of a CMOs is called plain vanilla bond.17 This type of CMOs follows a
sequential payment structure. The payment received against the assets held in the collateral
pool are transferred to investors. However, a segregation is made in payment of interest and
principal. The interest payment is made to all tranches with respect to their pro rata coupon
rate, but the all the scheduled payments of principal and unscheduled prepayments are firstly
made to first tranche and all other tranches are paid subsequently. Thus, the payment of
principal follows a sequential structure in CMOs. This sequence is continued till the last
tranche in order and the one with longest maturity are retired.
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs)
The asset pool transferred to an SPV in a CDO transaction is comprised of a set of debt
obligations owed to the originating institution. These obligations can be in form of a loan
and securities issued against them are called Collateralised Loan Obligations (CLOs) or bond
and securities issued against them are called Collateralised Bond Obligations (CBOs). The
receivables on these debt obligations are used to make payments to investors. These CDOs
can follow multiple structures with respect to the maturity and type of the assets held in the
collateral pool. Some of the CDO transactions also follow a hybrid structure where collateral
pool can be comprised of a mixture of loans and various bonds.
An originator may use multiple loans for constructing the collateral pool. The investors in
this transactionmay receive a greater yield on CLOs alongwith a high risk emanating from the
failure of businesses in paying the loans backing the CLO transactions. The losses can mount
enormously in case of syndicated loans backing the CLOs.18 The rationale behind CLOs
was to support the growth of businesses by creating a greater availability of funds. CLOs
also follow a tranche structure where each of the tranche receives higher interest payments as
compared to next one but a higher risk as well.
The collateral pool in a CBO transaction is comprised of bonds. These bonds can be
investment grade bond (high quality bonds having low risk of default) with lower yield or
speculative grade bonds (low quality bonds having a high risk of default) with higher yield.
Most of the CBOs are backed by junk bonds that are low rated bonds offering a higher yield.
17Plain vanilla is the most basic form a bond. It has a maturity date and a strike price. There are not additional
features associated with this kind of bond.
18A syndicated loan is provided by a group of lenders. There are multiple banks involved in such loans and
usually one bank plays the leading role that is called lead arranger. The lead bank retains the agent responsibilities
and keep on servicing the syndicated loans.
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However, the bonds are pooled in a way that they offer a diversification and reduce the risk
of CBOs but offers a high yield to investors. CBOs are attractive for risk oriented investors
looking for a higher yield. Like CLOs and CMOs, CBOs are also issued in tranches with
varying levels of risk and return. Hence, the risk inherent in the bonds backing CBOs is
further diversified through tranching.
Asset-Backed Commercial Papers (ABCP)
ABCPs are short term securities usually issued for a period less than 270 days. ABCPs are
different from a traditional Commercial Paper (CP) in the respect that they are backed by a
set of assets. They are either issued with an interest-bearing structure or on a discount. The
vehicle used for the issuance of ABCPs are known as ABCP conduits. These conduits are
thinly capitalised SPVs. These CPs are issued for obtaining interest in different assets. The
proceeds generated are usually used to finance receivables, auto and equipment loans and
CDOs. The ABCPs conduits usually take positions in revolving pools of assets. They may
also invest in MBS and other forms of ABS. The repayment of these ABCPs is based on
collection received from the assets created as a result of proceeds from the ABCP issuance or
by the issuance of new CPs.
2.1.6 Securitisation in Europe
The securitisation experienced a rapid growth during the last decade in Europe, before the
outburst of the financial crisis. The regulators, academicians and practitioners showed a high
level of interest in this market. Special attention was given to this market by regulators after
the GFC when it was considered culpable for spawning the financial crisis. An unprecedented
decline in the value of shares of banks was experienced during this period. The banking
system in Europe and the United States experienced an erosion of 3 trillion Euros from the
capital market. The overall decline in the value of the banking system was around 82% from
the period of May 2007 to March 2009 (Battaglia & Mazzuca, 2014).
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Table 2.1: Securitisation Issuance in Europe - USD Millions
Year Auto Consumer Credit Cards Leases Other CDO CMBS Mixed RMBS SME Other Pubs Total
1991 390.83 502.53 4,877.67 5,771.03
1992 279.72 1,483.12 1,762.84
1993 745.44 1,128.75 284.35 140 108.24 478.61 1,564.57 4,449.97
1994 905.85 371.59 382.07 278.22 364.9 841.76 6,108.83 9,253.22
1995 1,116.59 932.98 270 200 713.14 2,475.36 498.92 393.42 6,600.41
1996 1,354.16 1,417.37 824.14 1,462.50 2,626.08 11,558.57 1,609.19 4,113.36 132.52 25,097.89
1997 420.29 415.19 658.46 613.81 383.13 3,442.88 9,284.08 8,965.75 1,448.64 25,632.23
1998 1,151.76 1,594.33 2,287.67 1,106.51 3,051.02 4,761.94 1,097.40 942.92 14,152.49 2,386.55 685.88 1,057.93 34,276.40
1999 2,690.56 2,516.16 2,198.78 1,267.29 12,110.34 8,543.86 5,872.12 117.58 26,461.11 7,506.48 2,867.79 2,190.45 74,342.50
2000 1,909.17 2,574.95 3,711.88 910.05 3,742.71 15,704.72 10,476.48 41,756.03 1,262.69 1,294.73 2,655.38 85,998.78
2001 3,760.35 4,118.24 1,374.57 3,435.27 19,556.22 25,537.11 13,608.77 1,300.71 50,950.32 10,053.02 4,484.74 184.7 138,364.02
2002 7,875.83 4,061.48 5,144.47 6,772.36 6,774.40 14,030.01 14,973.96 7,331.15 66,386.13 6,700.01 6,534.20 3,915.19 150,499.19
2003 4,680.37 14,342.73 7,824.91 3,427.17 7,328.53 25,327.49 14,104.52 837.15 136,788.27 10,037.12 14,157.77 6,919.52 245,775.56
2004 9,530.89 2,490.38 8,234.03 10,989.35 25,514.02 43,302.33 26,019.81 56 154,201.87 14,742.56 6,975.06 2,795.62 304,851.93
2005 7,956.32 4,017.78 14,641.28 9,372.60 23,427.50 51,117.37 55,313.32 7,241.74 192,299.82 40,567.39 10,713.41 4,796.71 421,465.25
2006 14,824.73 16,074.60 3,785.70 8,879.74 29,260.59 79,160.20 79,359.56 2,936.87 322,441.43 35,583.06 10,832.38 3,580.08 606,718.94
2007 19,365.28 11,531.61 613.29 6,101.71 12,891.36 84,229.39 67,917.79 3,535.83 495,425.94 107,416.67 10,160.08 676.6 819,865.54
2008 18,630.48 36,690.13 18,210.58 19,178.73 5,513.66 130,650.01 8,123.70 7,274.43 897,020.54 67,958.30 1,209,250.57
2009 21,365.86 28,786.06 1,647.64 9,476.23 13,736.28 66,591.42 27,430.12 12,308.43 317,108.70 88,479.86 2,605.51 589,536.11
2010 18,847.18 10,102.87 7,584.18 2,459.29 3,023.88 37,296.03 8,572.25 841.44 361,033.06 53,090.87 5,904.89 508,755.94
2011 32,412.33 25,057.82 10,814.34 21,314.81 12,029.71 13,593.25 3,228.80 1,970.51 308,270.47 86,336.36 4,484.90 519,513.31
2012 34,513.36 16,038.09 10,728.04 2,549.71 3,403.71 17,799.75 6,545.81 171,542.06 57,592.10 4,760.70 325,473.32
2013 38,091.81 26,670.25 14,128.60 4,326.96 12,658.21 12,338.69 11,737.78 85,820.54 26,540.43 7,237.43 239,550.69
2014 38,950.52 8,714.78 9,903.23 3,603.37 1,851.02 19,602.04 8,198.37 148,148.33 44,132.82 5,037.17 288,141.66
2015 32,032.02 23,336.13 11,698.08 2,998.40 1,030.16 15,789.60 6,535.15 0 112,079.94 29,461.92 850.2 0 235,811.60
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)
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Table 2.2: Country Wise Securitisation Issuance in Europe - USD Millions
Year Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain UK Total
1991 5,771.03 5,771.03
1992 1,376.94 1,376.94
1993 561.03 140 98.55 3,449.97 4,249.55
1994 3,268.74 402 621.03 4,097.57 8,389.34
1995 2,321.99 96.32 482.17 470 336.24 391.53 1,843.24 5,941.49
1996 718.96 10,314.13 666.05 560 303.62 2,136.45 9,290.19 23,989.40
1997 1,544.83 3,696.21 557.56 1,693.44 868.06 16,809.00 25,169.11
1998 1,796.63 3,772.53 5,776.85 583.6 1,152.32 1,878.05 244.44 3,301.71 10,894.81 29,400.95
1999 821.58 6,487.34 13,281.95 1,213.93 8,514.62 6,064.43 1,111.69 7,095.42 25,046.93 69,637.90
2000 213.55 2,942.14 5,103.10 1,194.27 1,538.63 9,898.53 5,583.38 419.7 7,319.19 35,532.94 69,745.42
2001 153.52 4,295.86 3,299.56 316.2 1,620.89 30,006.25 13,773.18 2,355.65 6,601.04 43,267.88 105,690.03
2002 5,292.93 7,271.46 28,946.96 19,750.05 3,564.92 14,964.14 51,454.84 131,245.30
2003 2,778.10 7,409.38 7,797.85 423.04 2,138.90 35,948.83 28,496.66 13,039.20 28,524.63 90,000.70 216,557.29
2004 2,482.51 7,787.43 8,555.59 921.53 45,274.83 22,443.50 9,576.12 40,064.24 122,765.84 259,871.59
2005 586.1 4,289.29 27,809.36 2,770.65 2,042.95 39,678.80 48,608.14 9,127.54 52,325.79 165,289.54 352,528.17
2006 2,943.66 9,029.52 46,972.95 7,315.67 13,646.15 43,542.21 51,747.80 7,942.57 86,493.15 231,650.60 501,284.29
2007 5,715.55 7,800.80 27,870.90 7,488.24 21,132.32 48,497.62 137,461.20 12,194.57 170,667.57 252,422.41 691,251.19
2008 49,911.96 19,467.50 151,266.50 18,937.43 50,876.46 138,313.03 106,168.22 20,784.62 145,171.91 397,228.43 1,098,126.06
2009 38,807.19 9,605.43 23,398.49 30,363.67 35,589.83 96,796.80 61,529.45 14,384.40 88,595.26 125,307.47 524,377.99
2010 18,201.38 12,294.95 18,164.42 1,295.28 8,745.23 21,573.09 189,010.65 22,710.55 72,417.44 135,695.73 500,108.72
2011 25,242.83 22,155.45 17,900.06 8,760.87 70,116.80 118,386.90 13,693.10 85,336.04 140,423.40 502,015.45
2012 19,385.07 18,974.79 13,313.90 2,549.99 1,549.80 75,234.33 62,588.46 1,852.32 23,755.55 101,244.93 320,449.12
2013 2,648.63 13,263.60 28,991.09 1,372.12 35,547.11 52,180.60 4,425.39 36,625.57 44,515.03 219,569.13
2014 5,673.39 68,212.32 24,436.31 314.5 2,598.08 26,004.98 33,937.66 3,840.31 35,202.34 64,728.63 264,948.51
2015 34.21 5,317.65 41,078.24 0 417.29 22,112.10 22,427.85 3,440.93 17,944.17 29,549.66 157,526.01
Source: SIFMA
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Figure 2.2: Securitisation Issuance in Europe
Source: SIFMA
The details of securitisation in Europe are provided in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. Table 2.1
shows the amount of securitisation from 1991 to 2015. This table reveals that there was a rapid
growth in securitisation in Europe after 2000. During the year 2008 it reached its maximum
but a rapid decline is observed during the preceding years. This situation is prominently
visible in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.3: Securitisation Issuance in European Countries
Source: SIFMA
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Table 2.2 shows the country wise level of the securitisation activity in Europe. The
table shows that the UK has been leading the European securitisation market. Other major
contributors in this market are Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Germany. The situation of the
securitisation activity from 1991-2015 across various countries is prominently observable in
Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.4: Country Wise Securitisation Issuance in Europe - USD Millions
Source: SIFMA
Figure 2.4 shows the trend of securitisation over the years in different countries across
Europe. This figure reveals that UK, Netherlands, Italy and Spain has been the market leaders
over the years. The trend of securitisation is quite similar in most of the countries. The GFC
affected this market in all countries but the Dutch market relatively showed some resilience
and the decline here was lower than other countries.
The effects of the GFC on the securitisation market were not confined to the level of
issuance only but banks also faced placement problems. Banks who were issuing ABS after
the GFC were not able to place these securities with investors. The issuers were not able to
restore the traumatised confidence of investors in this market. Thus, even the banks those were
issuing these securities were not able to use them for the intended objectives. This situation
is visible in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Placement and Retention of ABS in Europe
Source: AFME (2015)
2.1.7 Securitisation — Redefining the Banking Business
The role of banks as financial intermediaries utterly changed because of securitisation and it
challenged the theories of financial intermediation (Gorton & Metrick, 2013). The banks as
financial intermediaries are supposed to hold loans till maturity. According to theory, this
provides an incentive for banks to actively monitor the borrowers during the course of loan to
ensure the timely servicing of loan by the borrower.19 It is often argued that banks may not
have proper incentives to monitor the borrowers if they are not supposed to hold the loans.
These incentives of the banks are linked with the non-marketability of loans. Securitisation
distorted this incentive of monitoring and screening the borrowers (Kara et al., 2015; Kara,
Marqués-Ibáñez, & Ongena, 2016; Keys et al., 2009, 2010, 2012) and it suggests that the
theory of financial intermediation is not workable in this way (Gorton & Metrick, 2013).
Securitisation has weakened the concept of intermediation, thereby marginalizing the
regulated banks as their balance sheets are moving into shadows. Cetorelli and Peristiani
(2012) explain that the evolution of financial intermediation has an important normative
implication. They explain that securitisation caused the banks to move away from their
traditional role of financial intermediaries. This diminishing in the traditional bank-based
system requires rethinking of monitoring and regulatory standards. Regulations working for
the traditional banking system may not work in the light of the new role of banks. However,
19See Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1995).
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the involvement of many parties in the process of securitisation has increased the complexity
for regulators because of the high level of opaqueness of the process (BCBS, 2008; Buchanan,
2014; EBA, 2014; Guo & Wu, 2014; Krahnen & Wilde, 2008).
Loutskina (2011) explains three main changes brought by securitisation to the traditional
banking system. Firstly, the banks largely started managing their liquidity risk through
securitisation. Banks were also taking in account the liquidity characteristic of their loan
portfolio alongside traditional measures of the liquidity on their balance sheet. Secondly,
banks increased the supply of credit to different sectors in the economy by the virtue of the
liquidity generated through securitisation. Banks are able to securitise their illiquid mortgages
thereby increasing their eagerness to extend illiquid loans to corporations. Thus, a structural
shift is observable in the lending structure of the banking system. Now securitisation has
emerged as a mean of financing for loans. This shift has caused a change in the risk profile
of the FIs. Thirdly, the relationship of cost of funding and credit supply from banks became
weaker because of securitisation. The lending activities of banks became less sensitive to the
economic shocks and interventions of the regulatory authorities. However, a huge increase in
the vulnerability of banks to the financial crisis was observed in 2007 because of the excessive
reliance on securitisation to meet the funding and liquidity needs.
Securitisation and Banks
Securitisation provides multiple benefits to the banks. The individual illiquid assets of a bank
can be converted into to tradable securities and banks can replenish their funding sources that
can be used for additional origination of loans. These benefits can be divided into five broader
categories: risk transfer, low funding cost and liquidity, revenue generation, regulatory capital
arbitrage and accounting treatment.
Risk Transfer Securitisation is supposed to provide a vent to banks against the risk through
transferring the same to a third party. The assets being securitised depart from the balance
sheet of the bank. The securitising bank is considered no longer exposed to risks associated
with these transferred loans. It is believed that taking some toxic assets out of their balance
sheets may help the banks mellow down their credit risk exposure (Cabiles, 2012). The
off-balance sheet treatment of the underlying assets is considered as a mean of transferring
credit, interest rate, prepayment, and liquidity risk to investors.
There are many important considerations related with the (advocated) risk transfer benefit
of securitisation. There are various structural and performance related triggers that can be
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procyclical and highly interrelated with each other and have implications for the originator
(BCBS, 2008). A scepticism is associated with the risk transfer in the presence of these
triggers. The retention of lower tranches by the originators also raise questions on the risk
transfer through securitisation (Acharya, Schnabl, & Suarez, 2013). Moreover, contractual
support provided by the originators for the securitisation also influence the level of risk
transfer from the originator to investors (Acharya & Naqvi, 2012; Gorton & He, 2008).
However, insurance companies have been using securitisation to transfer their capricious
risk to market investors by issuing catastrophe bonds (Hagendorff, Hagendorff, Keasey, &
Gonzalez, 2014).20
Low Funding Cost and Liquidity The reliance of the banks on traditional funding sources
restricts the bank activities and it can be expensive in a downturn situation as well. Securiti-
sation provided the banks with a new source of funding. The bank started enjoying a financial
independence by the virtue of securitisation. The lower funding cost is also associated with
the credit rating enhancement benefits in case of securitisation. The assets used as collateral
for the issued securities are separated from the originator. Therefore, smaller institutions with
a non-investment grade credit rating can access the capital market because of securitisation
as the securities are solely rated on the quality of the collateral. These institutions may get a
AAA rating for the issued securities, depending on the quality of collateral, that helps them
secure the financing at a lower cost. The empirical evidence in the previous studies suggests
that this has been the strongest incentive for the banks to securitise (Cardone-Riportella,
Samaniego-Medina, & Trujillo-Ponce, 2010).
Securitisation, before the GFC, served as a stable source of cheaper funding. The banks
could produce liquidity on demand through securitisation thereby avoiding a liquidity crisis
otherwise such a crisis may prove to be a slayer for a bank. The reliance of banks on retail
deposit and issuance of commercial papers was significantly reduced because of it. Moreover,
the tranching feature of securitisation enabled banks to access a broader investor base. This is
helpful in further diversifying the funding base. However, there is a downside of this situation
as well. The heavy reliance on securitisation for funding led to severe problems during the
GFC when banks were not able to place these securities in the market (Loutskina, 2011).
RevenueGeneration This benefit has been widely ignored bymost of the studies conducted
on the motives of securitisation. However, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS,
20The payment against these bonds is deferred or excused in case a catastrophe event occurs. The risk is
transferred to the market investors in this case.
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2011) identifies it as an important incentive of securitisation for originators. Supervisors and
international bodies have recognised it as an area where reforms are warranted. The banks
have been using securitisation to generate revenue through several means. It improves the
return on capital through conversion of on-balance sheet business to a less capital intensive
off-balance sheet fee income stream (Buchanan, 2017). The banks generate fee for origi-
nating and servicing the collateral assets, underwriting and structuring the transactions and
providing credit and liquidity enhancement for the issued securities. The accounting rules
also encouraged the growth of securitisation as banks could recognise gain on sale after the
transfer of assets to an SPV. The spread between the short term issued securities and the
issuance of long term assets financed by them was also a source of revenue generation for the
banks.
It is important to note here that fee generation through various activities, outlined above,
motivated banks to repetitively use securitisation.21 Many issuers in the securitisation process
were relying on third party originators. Many of these originators were thinly capitalised and
poorly regulated. Therefore, in a race of fee generation many institutions including various
boutique lenders also entered into this market without comprehending its dynamics and
underlying risks BCBS (2013).22 The asset generation process became flawed and associated
risks were under-estimated by the financial institutions (Kara et al., 2015). Consequently,
many of ABS issuers faced a failure or severe problems during the GFC that led to extensive
losses to the entire financial system.
Regulatory Capital Arbitrage Regulatory capital arbitrage is a widely documented incen-
tive of securitisation for banks. Most of the financial institutions across Europe are supposed
to follow the Basel Accords. These financial institutions are required to show their compliance
with a framework of capital adequacy laid out in the Basel Accords. These banks are required
to follow the minimum standards for the capital adequacy and other measures related to risk
management initiatives in the banking system. This compliance requirement has compelled
many of the banks to either raise their existing capital or to dispose-off some of their assets.
The exercise of raising new capital is always extensive and expensive for banks. Securitisation
provided banks with a mean to dispose off their existing assets to meet the minimum standards
related to capital requirements (European Securitisation Forum, 1999).
21Bank started issuing several assets with a view to securitise them at a later stage. Banks were originating
assets, transferring them and issuing securities against them. This process was being repeated with a view to
increase the revenue.
22Boutique lenders are small firms who specialises in specific services. These firms extend their lending to
certain sectors. Hence, their loan portfolio may not be well-diversified.
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Banks are highly incentivised to securities when there is a huge gap between the necessary
economic capital and required regulatory capital for an asset.23 The transfer of assets from
the originator’s balance sheet were causing freeing up of regulatory capital. These assets
were transferred from the balance sheet of the originator and they were not required to hold
the capital against them. This enabled banks to generate further assets without increasing
the capital. This also resulted into a greater availability of credit in the economy. The
empirical evidence provided by various studies confirms that regulatory capital arbitrage was
a strong incentive for banks to securitise (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2012; Panetta & Pozzolo,
2010). However, some other empirical studies do not support the claim that regulatory
capital arbitrage is an important motive of securitisation for banks (Ambrose et al., 2005;
Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010).
AccountingTreatment The off-balance sheet accounting treatment is a significant incentive
for banks to securitise. The removal of some financial assets from the balance sheet leads to an
improvement in several accounting rations e.g. leverage ratios, return on assets etc. Moreover,
banks can record any gain on sale of assets in the income statement leading to an increase
in the non-interest income. This increases the return on equity of the originator. The banks
were also able to increase their market share without increasing balance sheet concentration
because of the off-balance sheet treatment of the securitised assets. Moreover, a bank can
better manage its balance sheet by dividing and redirecting the cash flows generated from the
underlying assets. This also offers an efficient source of matching duration of the assets and
liabilities.
Securitisation and Investors
Securitisation caused a fall in the rate of return on traditional fixed income securities.24 The
securities produced out of securitisation were offering a higher rate of return with a better
credit risk profile as compared to the traditional securities. The payment rights against the
issued securities are divided into ‘tranches’. The holders of these tranches are paid in a
pre-defined order with respect to the seniority. The payment structure is also supported by
the credit enhancement mechanisms European Securitisation Forum (1999). Hence, investors
face a diversified exposure to the credit risk that is tailored to the individual risk appetite of
23Regulatory capital is the capital required by the existing regulations with respect to the assets of a bank,
whereas, the economic capital is the risk capital that a banks must have in the light of risk taken by it on realistic
basis.
24These traditional securities include conventional corporate and sovereign bonds.
40
investors. These securities were perceived carrying low risk and many investors made their
flight to this class of securities. However, a failure of the market to price the risk associated
with ABS led to out of the blue losses for investors turning into a full blown financial crisis
as these securities were embedded within the financial system (BCBS, 2011).
High Credit Quality Investors are often required to meet some prudential standards while
making investment in different assets. They tend to invest in highly rated securities to meet
these requirements. Securitisation provides them with such securities having the feature of
credit enhancement and backed by the assets legally separated from the originator. However,
the eruption of the GFC revealed many problems with this approach. Investors were overly
relying on rating agencies and were not conducting any due diligence while evaluating the
securities before making their investment decision (Hellwig, 2008; Kyl, 2003). This due
diligence was actually outsourced to rating agencies. Moreover, investors’ quest for highly
rated securities created liquidity concerns during the crisis when they were forced to sell these
securities. The prices were downgraded to the lowest level when a large number of investors
started selling their securities (Benmelech, Dlugosz, & Ivashina, 2012; Z. Chen, Liu, Opong,
& Zhou, 2017).
Portfolio Diversification ABS provide investors with the portfolio diversification. Their
concentration in the equity market is decreased. The investors can also increase the diver-
sification by taking exposure in different geographical locations. Moreover, the securitised
products are less correlated with other investment products like bonds and equities. However,
investors’ assumptions about the low correlations of these securities with other market prod-
ucts were falsified after the eruption of the GFC (Blommestein, Keskinler, & Lucas, 2011).
The interconnectivity of the financial systems across the globe also outweighed the perceived
benefits of the geographical dispersion.
Attractive Yields ABS were highly attractive investment products for the investors looking
for the higher yields. These securities were offering higher rate of returns as compared to
other securities of similar ratings. Therefore, a large number of investors showed interest in
this class of securities.
Securitisation and Economy
The economies with active securitisation market realised numerous economic and social
benefits of it. Securitisation provided a mechanism of generating assets with higher yields
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and (perceived) low credit risk. Therefore, it helped to close the gap between the demand and
supply of such assets. The conversion of non-tradable financial assets into tradable securities
through securitisation increased the credit availability and reduced its cost in the economy.
Securitisation has also the ability to control regional disparities by linking the national credit
activities with the global capital markets (European Securitisation Forum, 1999). Thus, the
flow from the international capital market systems can increase by the virtue of securitisation.
Shin (2009a) notes that foreign banks have been a major funding source for the residential
mortgage lending market in the US.
It allows to diversify the risk through tranching process and mitigating the idiosyncratic
risk of individual loans. Hence, it enabled the banks to dilute the risk in economy by
segregating and prioritising cash flows and creating assets with multiple levels of credit risk.
As a result, risk does not concentrate in one particular market segment bit it is dispersed
among a large number of market participants. It increases the investment opportunities and
facilitate the flow of capital in the economy. Moreover, securitisation also encourages the
efficient allocation of capital.
For these reasons, the revival of securitisation has been on the agenda of regulatory agen-
cies (AFME, 2014; European Commission, 2015a, 2015b). According to publicly available
statistics provided by Standard & Poor’s, Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) loans secu-
ritisation has played a significant role in providing liquidity to SMEs. From 2007 to 2013,
S&P rated SME loan securitisation amounting to e103 billion. The cumulative default rate
of these securitisation transactions for all tranches was 0.29% of the total issuance (cited in
Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), 2013). According to a survey con-
ducted by European Central Bank (ECB), there is high gap between the demand and supply
of SME loans (ECB, 2013). The loans securitisation can play a key role in filling this gap.
Risks with Securitisation
The most important risks associated with the securitised instruments are discussed below.
Default Risk The default risk is usually taken as the failure of a borrower to meet its
obligations with respect to interest and principal payments. However, the default risk may
also arise because of the failure of a borrower in meeting other obligations. An important
obligation in securitisation transactions is related to maintaining a certain quality of the
financial asset. The minimum criteria for the quality of financial assets is laid out in the
relevant documents governing the securitisation transaction. The criteria are evaluated by the
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rating agencies for assigning the rating to the issued securities. The changes in quality of the
financial assets backing the issuance of ABS lead to changes in rating of these securities as
well (Altomento & Bussoli, 2014).
An investor evaluates the default risk of an ABS on the basis of its assigned rating. The
changes in ratings reflects the changes in default risk as well. The senior classes of the issued
ABS, because of tranching, receive the highest rating. Therefore, the default probability of
these securities is considered remote as the lower tranches are supposed to absorb all the losses
before they reach to the most senior tranches (Gorton &Metrick, 2012). Conversely, the yield
generated on these senior securities is also lower because of the low risk of default. The
lower securities may have AA to C ratings or even they can be unrated as well. The investors
need to consider if the amount of risk is balanced by the associated yield. The investors
with a high-risk appetite are attracted towards low-rated securities as they generate higher
yield. The reliance on the ratings proved fatal during the GFC as senior securities also started
downgrading and it became evident that rating agencies underestimated the risk associated
with these securities while assigning ratings. The ratings proved extremely misleading for
the investors and they experienced unprecedented losses in the secondary market (Griffin,
Nickerson, & Tang, 2013).
Interest Rate Risk The prices of ABS are subject to fluctuations like other fixed income
securities because of changing interest rates in the economy. The prices face a downfall when
interest rate rises and vice versa. The ABS are also issued with floating rates and prices of
these securities are relatively stable with respect to changes in the interest rate as the relevant
index of these ABS reflects such changes. However, changes in interest rate does not directly
affect the prices of ABS always, rather they may affect the payment structure. The pace of the
prepayment is also subject to changes in the interest rate that in turn affects the yield of these
ABS. The prepayments are usually highly correlated with the interest rates changes in the
case of residential mortgage loans (Dübel, 2005). Therefore, RMBS can be highly sensitive
to changes in the interest rate. Non-mortgage loans are less sensitive to changes in the interest
rate and securities backed by these assets are less affected by the prepayment activities.
Liquidity Risk The liquidity risk reflects the relative ease with which an ABS can be traded
in the market at a price that is close to its intrinsic value. Several factors play a role in
determining this relative ease. These factors may include the market conditions, prevailing
interest rate and structure of demand and supply of these securities in the market. A good
measure of liquidity risk of ABS can be the spread between the bid-ask prices (Amiram,
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Landsman, Peasnell, & Shakespeare, 2011). The higher spread reflects a higher liquidity risk.
However, this risk may become less important for those investors who are willing to hold their
securities until maturity.
Prepayment Risk Prepayment risk reflects the risk of receiving payment of principal
amount before the maturity of loans. The investors usually have apprehensions about the
prepayment on the assets backing ABS. These concerns are normally high in case of MBS
and RMBS. Therefore, the evaluation of prepayment risk is a fundamental element for in-
vestors to make the expectation about the life of a security as it affects the associated yield. A
decline in the interest rate may accelerate the prepayments (Pagès, 2013).
2.2 Covered Bonds
Covered Bond (CB), in its basic form, is a debt instrument paying fixed rate of interest. The
interest payment against this bond is called coupon payment and the principal payment is
made at the end of the maturity period. CBs are mainly collateralised by cash flows generated
through a pool of ring-fenced assets. This pool of assets is called cover pool. The holders
of CBs have preferential claims against the collateralised assets in case of issuer’s default.
Their claims can be extended to other assets of the issuer if the underlying cover pool is not
sufficient to meet the claims of CB holders. This cover pool is supervised by an independent
monitor. The complete process of a CB transaction is shown in Figure 2.6.
A single definition of existing CBs is hard to present because of structural differences
in countries across Europe. Every country has a different structure and a set of regulations
for CBs. Some countries allow the structuring of CBs by the virtue of private contracts.
However, a strict conformity with the prescribed features is necessary for the provision of an
enhanced level of protection to investors. European Covered Bond Council (ECBC) provides
four essential features of a CB that can be considered as its definition: (1) a credit institution
supervised by a regulatory authority can issue the CBs; (2) the holders of CBs have a priority
claim against the assets in the cover pool over unsecured creditors of the institution; (3) it is
necessary for the issuing institution to maintain the cover pool all the time for meeting the
claims of CB holders; and (4) public or independent bodies should supervise the obligations
of the issuing institutions with respect to the cover pool (ECB, 2008).
FDIC (2008) defines a covered bond as a “non-deposit, recourse debt obligation of an
Insured Depository Institution (IDI) with a term greater than one year and no more than thirty
years, that is secured directly or indirectly by perfected security interests under applicable
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Figure 2.6: Process of Covered Bond Issuance
state and federal law on assets held and owned by the IDI consisting of eligible mortgages, or
AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities secured by eligible mortgages if for no more than ten
percent of the collateral for any covered bond issuance or series.”
2.2.1 History of Covered Bonds
The traces of CBs can be found in the 18th century during the rule of King Frederick the Great.
Prussia is considered the birthplace of CBs (Larsson, 2013). The aristocracy of the Prussian
land was significantly thrashed during the seven years of war (1756-1763). There were
substantial losses on the agricultural production and a severe credit shortage was hampering
the efforts to rebuild the empire. King Frederick the Great introduced a new scheme of the
mortgage financing to cope with this situation. This scheme was meant to restore the liquidity
for Prussia and remove the credit shortage problem. By a decree issued in 1769, the King
mandated establishment of Law Associations comprised of landed nobles. These associations
were called “Landscaften”. The members of the Landscaften had the right to get credit from
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the associations by providing a full recourse to their land. This credit was provided in form
of a security that was called Pfandbrief and members were able to get cash by selling this
security to investors (Schwarcz, 2011). This Pfandbrief is considered the first CB (Quirk,
2010).
These Pfandbriefe were like CBs issued these days in terms of over-collateralisation
requirement. The holders of the Pfandbriefe were also enjoying two layers of protection like
the dual recourse in the case ofmodernCBs. They had a claimboth against the individual estate
of a borrower and collective pool of the assets established by the Landscaften. This structure
of the mortgage financing proved successful for Prussia and the problem of credit shortage
was successfully handled through this structure. Subsequently, this structure spread to other
countries like Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria and Baltic region (Verband Deutscher
Pfandbriefbanken, 2005).
The German Mortgage Bank Act was enacted on January 1, 1990. This was an important
development for the growth of the Pfandbrief system. This act codified the characteristics of
CBs like dual recourse of CB holders to the asset pool and the issuer in case of default and
ring-fencing of assets in the cover pool on the balance sheet of the issuer. The Pfandbrief
system burgeoned in Europe after this act and it became a popular mean of refinancing.
However, during the middle of 20th century this system was widely replaced by the retail
deposits, but CBs surged back in Europe in 1995 when the issuance of first Jumbo Pfandbrief
took place in Germany.25 Afterwards, realkreditobligationer in Denmark and Austrian CBs
markets also started flourishing Packer et al. (2007). Many countries enacted laws for CBs
later on and a higher interest was visible after the GFC.
CBs have an important place in the bond market in Europe now. Thy are subject to
a set of well-defined regulations and have well grown markets in various countries across
Europe. However, the CB market in the USA is still in nascent stages. The first issuance of
CBs in the USA took place in September 2006. Washington Mutual Bank issued structured
CBs those were backed by a cover pool comprised of the US residential mortgage loans. A
similar transaction was performed by the Bank of America later on (Dechert, 2008). Some
other banks also tried entering this market. However, unlike Europe the CB market is not
well-developed in the USA. The market participants and banks are reluctant in investing and
25Jumbo Pfandbrief were introduced to attract international investors to the CBmarket that previously focused
only on domestic investors. The issuance volume of the Jumbo Pfandbrief must be e1 billion. The average size
of the issuance is about e1.5 billion. The issuance is not made by an individual bank but an issuing syndicate
is formed. There are minimum five banks required to formulate this syndicate. These banks are known as
market-makers. The issued Jumbo Pfandbriefe must be listed on German Stock Exchange. The market for the
Jumbo Pfandbrief is highly liquid, mainly because of its size.
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issuing CBs because of the absence of a legislative framework.
2.2.2 Legal Structure of Covered Bonds
Covered bonds, in most of the European jurisdictions, are issued by the financial institutions
that is subject to certain regulations and supervision. However, the structure of CBs varies
across these jurisdictions. The issuer of CBs in some countries, like Denmark, Germany and
Latvia, must have licence from the competent authorities to issue CBs. CB issuers in other
countries, like Italy and Spain, are not required to get licence from the authorities. However,
they can only issue CBs if they show compliance with the requirements laid out in the relevant
legal framework of the country. Banks in some jurisdictions are also required to provide an
ex-ante notification to the authorities about their CB programme (EBA, 2013).
The regulatory authorities provide guidelines to the CB issuers about the eligibility of
the assets those can be collateralised against the CB issuance. An important criterion used
to evaluate the eligibility of the assets, apart from the eligibility with respect to the asset
class, is LTV ratio.26 The loans placed in cover pool are required to meet certain threshold
of LTV in all jurisdictions. The requirement varies across countries, but in most of the cases
LTV should not exceed 80% limit.27 These eligible assets are placed in a cover pool and
ring-fenced on the issuer’s balance sheet. The assets in the cover pool are segregated by the
law from the insolvency estate of the issuer, providing a status of bankruptcy remoteness to
the cover pool. Hence, these assets cannot be used for any other purpose until CBs issued
against them are retired. There are two legal structures followed for the issuance of CBs i.e.
Special Law Based Structure and General Law Based Structure.
Special Law Based Structure
Most of theCBs issued in various countries of Europe are subject to a defined set of regulations.
These regulations are specifically devised for regulating the CB issuance. The CBs issued in
compliance with these regulations benefit from a preferential treatment with respect to risk
weightings.28 CBs issued under this structure are called Legislative Covered Bonds (LCBs).
26LTV is used to assess the risk associated with the mortgage lending. This ratio shows that how much loans
has been issued against the value of the mortgage. The higher LTV ratio shows a higher risk. Consequently, if
the loan with high LTV is issued by the bank it may cost higher to a borrower because of higher risk associated
with it. A loan with high LTV may become ineligible as a collateral for CB.
27Some countries have more strict limits. For instance, the LTV threshold in Germany is 60%. See Table 3.2
for the details of LTV in different jurisdictions.
28These bonds receive lower risk weights as compared to other instruments of similar rating.
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Apart from the local legislations, LCBs are subject to compliance with Undertakings for
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) and Capital Requirement Directive
(CRD). These legislations provide bankruptcy protection to investors. By virtue of these
regulations, investors enjoy the strength of underlying assets at first place and not the strength
of the issuer. Most of the legislations supervising LCBs require the issuer to maintain a
dynamic cover pool and provide a dual recourse to investors.
Many countries, like Germany, require the issuers to have a licence before issuing CBs. It
is expected that the LCB issuance is not an erratic or opportunistic, but it is a regular activity
of the FI. The regulators also provide guidelines about the eligibility of the assets backing
the LCB issuance. The assets other than eligible ones cannot be used for LCB issuance. For
instance, German Pfandbriefe can only be issued against mortgage loans, public loans, ship
loans and aircraft loans. Commercial and consumer loans cannot be used in the issuance of
Pfandbriefe. The assets backing the Pfandbriefe are recorded in the cover register and these
registered assets cannot be included in bankruptcy estate of the issuer if such proceedings
are started. The holders of LCBs can only participate in the insolvency to the extent their
claims remain unsatisfied by the assets recorded in the cover register. Usually, if bankruptcy
proceedings are opened against an LCB issuer, the court appoints two administrators of the
cover assets. These administrators either continue to service the assets or dispose them off at
once and make payments to the LCB holders.
General Law Based Structure
Some countries follow a general law based structure for the issuance of CBs. These CBs are
not subject to any special law but they are issued under contractual arrangements. The laws
governing the issues of these bonds are based on general laws or contract laws. These CBs
are called Structured Covered Bonds (SCBs). SCBs are more flexible as compared to LCBs.
The eligibility criteria for the assets backing these bonds is not very rigid and issuers may
decide to place the asset according to their requirements. The main purpose of issuing SCBs
is to get an uplift in the rating of these bonds, as these bonds can get a better rating than their
issuers.
SCBs follow a structure that is similar to ABS. The assets used as collateral for SCBs are
not held by the issuers but are sold to an SPE. However, unlike securitisation, bonds backing
these assets are not issued by the SPE but are issued by the originator. Therefore, these bonds
are the direct obligation of the issuing institution. The SPE in this transaction plays the role
of a guarantor. The proceeds generated from the SCB issuance are lent to the SPE that is used
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by it to purchase the assets from the originator. Hence, SPE becomes the legal owner of these
assets. A guarantee is issued by the SPE to investors about making the payment if the issuer
SCBs faces a bankruptcy. This is an irrevocable guarantee that is secured by the cover pool.
The originator makes the payment of principal and interest to investors. The loan to SPE and
assets purchased by it are squared-off when bonds are repaid by the originator.
Though SCBs are not subject to a special law enacted for CBs but a monitor is assigned
to ensure that a level of credit enhancement is well-maintained till the maturity of the issued
SCBs. The guarantee issued by the SPE to investors is enforced if bankruptcy proceedings
are opened against the issuer. The assets backing the bonds are passed on to an administrator.
The claims of the bondholders are settled from the sale of the assets held in cover pool. If
these assets are not sufficient to meet the claim of bondholders, they will have a recourse to
the issuer along with its other creditors.
2.2.3 Participants in Covered Bonds Transactions
There are different participants in a CB transaction like securitisation. Each participant has
well-defined responsibilities. The role of most of the participants is to protect the interest of
CB holders. The details about these participants along with their roles in the transaction have
been provided below.
Borrowers
Borrowers have the same role in CBs as in securitisation. They are responsible for making the
payments of principal and interest against the loans held in the cover pool. These borrowers
are ex-ante not aware about the placement of their loans in the cover pool. The class of the
borrower plays an important role in the CBs issuance. CBs are financed by high quality assets.
Therefore, loans issued to lower class borrowers may not be placed in the cover pool. The
default of a borrower or prepayment from a borrower disturbs the cover pool as such loans are
replaced with other assets.
Financial Institution / Covered Bond Issuer
Financial institution, usually a bank, originates the assets. The cash flows being generated
from the assets are used to back the CB issuance. The originating bank, in a direct issuance
structure, does not transfer the assets backing CB issuance to a separate entity but retain them
on its balance sheet and issues the CBs that are also placed on its balance sheet. Therefore,
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the banks have a very strong ‘skin in the game’ as CBs are their direct and unconditional
obligation. A bank has to show its compliance with many legal provision before issuing CBs.
Supervisory Authorities
The supervisory authorities play an important role in a CB transactions. They define the
regulations for the eligibility of assets backing the CB issuance. They provide the guidelines
about the eligibility criteria for the assets to be placed in the cover pool. They ensure that
banks show their compliance with the defined regulations while issuing CBs with respect
to the eligibility of assets, over-collateralisation requirement, LTV criterion, and required
actions in case of deterioration of assets in the cover pool.
The supervisory authorities do not play role at the time of issuance of CBs only. They have
a continuous role to play during the life time of CBs. They provide instructions to CB issuers
to provide periodical reports about the performance of assets held in the cover pool. Many a
times they also perform on-site inspections to check the authenticity of the reports provided
to them. They review the changes in the features of the CB programme. Banks also need
to get approval from the supervisory authorities to make such changes. These changes may
relate to structure of the cover pool or various figures involved in the programme. Supervisory
authorities also ensure that prompt corrective actions are taken by the CB issuer in case of
any possible disruptions in the programme.
Rating Agencies
Rating agencies are responsible for rating CBs. Unlike securitisation, this rating does not
solely take place on the basis of cover pool but it is partly assigned on the basis of the
issuer’s credit strength and partly on the basis of collateral pool. The rating agency not only
assesses the quality of the assets held in cover pool but they also evaluate the level of over-
collateralisation. The rating agency does not take into account the legal minimum standard of
the over-collateralisation but any voluntary over-collateralisation provided to bondholders is
also taken in consideration. The assessment of this voluntary over-collateralisation is a grey
area for the rating agencies in many CB programmes (Fitch, 2016).
The different rating agencies have different criteria for the assigned rating to CBs. The
legal framework of a specific country also plays a significant role in the rating of CBs. For
this reason, the rating of a bond may change significantly even if rating agencies do not
change their rating criteria. These changes can be attributed to legal frameworks or market
conditions. Recently, many of the rating agencies have redefined their rating methodologies
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for CBs to account for the favourable regulatory treatment and exemption of CBs from the
bail-in regime (Dierick, 2015).
Cover Pool Monitor
An independent cover pool monitor is assigned to supervise the assets held in the cover
pool.29 This monitor is a qualified and independent entity to perform the role of a monitor.
This cover pool monitor performs the audit of the cover pool to ensure that all assets in the
cover pool meet the eligibility criteria defined in the relevant legal framework. It verifies the
compliance with over-collateralisation and LTV requirements and reports any discrepancies
to the national authorities. It continuously monitors that cover pool does not drop down the
notional value at any time during the maturity of CBs. For this purpose, it continuously keeps
a track of movements of assets in the cover pool and instructs issuers about replacement of
any deteriorating assets. A CB issuer cannot make any changes in the cover pool without
approval of the cover pool monitor. However, a cover pool monitor may not be required where
similar tasks are directly performed by the competent authority (EBA, 2013).
Swap Providers
The CB issuers often enter into swap agreements with various parties that are usually some
other financial institutions. The SWAP agreements are made for a hedge against fluctuations
in interest rates and exchange rates when CBs are issued in another currency or in some other
jurisdiction. The losses arising from the difference in interest received on assets held in the
cover pool and interest paid on CBs are mitigated in this way. The SWAP provider is required
to take remedial actions in case of a downgrade or provide support from another back-up
SWAP provider. The CB issuers also have to make a compliance with the payment terms
mentioned in the agreement otherwise SWAP provider may not be considered liable to meet
its obligations. The termination of this agreement may result into a payment from the SWAP
provider or the CB issuer.
29The cover pool monitor works under different titles in various jurisdictions e.g. trustee (Treuhänder) in
Germany, special reviewer (reviseur special) in Luxembourg, special controller (controlleur specifique) in France
and independent auditor (auditor independente) in Portugal. However, it performs approximately a similar set
of responsibilities irrespective of the title.
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Investors
CBs are highly attractive instruments for the investors looking for secured financial instrument.
The quest for secured instrument was highly increased in the aftermath of the GFC. The
investor looking for return yielding options prior to the GFC started looking for the safe
investment options. The interest of investors is highly protected in case of CBs because
of various provisions provided by the regulations. Investors are less concerned about the
payment from CBs unless bankruptcy proceedings are opened against the issuer.
2.2.4 Features of Covered Bonds
CBs have distinctive features that make them prominent securities in a crowd of securities
being traded in the secondary market. Most important features of covered bonds are explained
below:
On-Balance Sheet Nature
CBs are on-balance sheet instruments. Unlike ABS, collateral against CBs does not leave
the balance sheet of the issuer and issuer has a strong incentive for active monitoring of
the cover pool. This ensures that issuer’s incentives regarding the performance of reference
collateral are in full alignment with investors’ interest. This feature of the CBs is highly
attractive for the investors who are concerned about off-balance sheet nature of the collateral
pool in securitisation.30 However, these assets are separated from other assets and separately
mentioned that they are held against covered bonds.31 Banks are also required to hold capital
against these assets. Therefore, CB issuers do not enjoy the regulatory capital arbitrage benefit
as enjoyed by securitising banks.
Over-Collateralisation
Over-collateralisation is a method of credit enhancement used in CB transactions. The value
of the collateralised assets is greater than the amount of CBs issued against them. The
minimum level of over-collateralisation is either set by a special law or by the contract made
for the issuance of CBs. The legal requirement of over-collateralisation varies across different
30The concerns about ‘skin in the game’ do not exist in case of CBs because of their on-balance sheet nature.
31These assets held against the issuance of CBs are recorded in a cover register in the case of issuance of
famous German bonds, Pfandbrief. An independent monitor ensures that the cover pool is well maintained all
the time and necessary adjustment are made timely and recorded in the cover register. A certificate is also issued
by this monitor before the issuance of CBs.
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jurisdictions.32 However, many banks perform voluntary over-collateralisation in excess of the
required level to obtain a higher rating of the issued CBs. The over-collateralisation preserves
the claims of CB holders in the insolvency estate of the issuer and provide protection to
investors against the market risk.
Dynamic Cover Pool
A key feature of CBs that differentiate them from ABS is the dynamic nature of the collateral
pool against which they are issued. The CBs issuers are required to maintain the notional
value of the cover pool at all times. It implies that in case of a drop down in the value of the
collateral, issuer will put some other assets to match the notional value and for compensation
of the moribund in the collateral. This is a distinguishing feature of CBs. Contrastingly, the
sponsors in a traditional securitisation structure are not required to replace any deteriorating
assets and all losses occurring because of these deteriorations in assets in the pool are borne
by the investors.
Dual Recourse
The CB holders enjoy a dual recourse. They have a preferential claim over the assets held in
the cover pool. This pool is ring-fenced and segregated from other assets. The assets held in
the cover pool remain unaffected in post-bankruptcy situation. Other creditors of the bank do
not have access to these assets. However, CB holders have an unsecured claim on bankruptcy
estate of issuers if the collateral held against the issued CBs does not generate enough cash or
its value drops down. CB holders in such a condition are treated pari passu with unsecured
creditors of the credit institution and in some cases they also get a preferential treatment over
unsecured creditors. Hence, a CB holder enjoys a dual recourse to the cover pool and the
issuer as well. Nonetheless, this dual recourse depends on the enforcement strength of the
local legislations (in case of LCB) or on the legal structure of the transactions (in case of
SCB). The status of claims has been summarized in Table 2.3.
2.2.5 Covered Bonds in Europe
CBs have been widely used refinancing instruments in European countries for the last 250
years. The roots of CBs can be traced back to the 17th Century when Frederick the Great
32Most protective legislation related to over-collateralisation are in Spain where investors are required to
maintain a minimum 25% over-collateralisation in case of CBs backed by the residential mortgages and 43% in
case of CBs backed by public loans.
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Table 2.3: Recourse of Investors for Funding Sources
Claim Against Collateral Pool
No Yes
Claim Against No ABS or MBS
Financial Institution Yes Unsecured Debt and Depositors Covered Bonds
Source: (ECB, 2008)
issued the first CBs after seven years ofwar. These bondswere similar to the bonds issued these
days with respect to their over-collateralisation requirements (Larsson, 2013). As Germany
is considered the birthplace of CBs, it has been leading the CB market in Europe. Figure 2.7
provides the level of issuance of CBs across different countries in Europe from 2004-2015.
Other significant contributors to this market are France, Spain and UK.
Figure 2.7: CB Issuance in European Countries (2004-2014)
Source: ECBC (2015)
A sizeable growth of the CBs market has been experienced since 2003 (ECB, 2008). A
trend of growth of CBs in Europe has been shown in Figure 2.8. This figure shows that the
CB market did not follow a concise a trend but it has been fluctuating during the last decade.
The market faced a growth after 2003 but this was not a steady growth. The effects of GFC
and European sovereign debt crisis are also visible in this market but in comparison with
securitisation this market was relatively less affected by the GFC and European sovereign
debt crisis. Moreover, the market faced an immediate revival in 2010 after its decline in 2009.
This shows that CBs market in Europe served as a stable source of funding for European
banks. However, this revival of the securitisation market is ascribed to the Covered Bond
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Purchase Programme (CBPP) introduced by ECB in 2009.33 Therefore, the claim about the
resilience of the CB market during the crisis become questionable.
Figure 2.8: Trend of CB Issuance in Europe (2004-2014)
Source: ECBC (2015)
Figure 2.9 shows the year wise issuance of CBs in different countries across Europe.
This figure reveals that Germany had the biggest share in this market but this share has been
declining with the passage of time. The issuance of CBs was affected in the primary market.
This is largely ascribed to sovereign debt crisis. A large portion of German CBs, Pfandbriefe,
was covered by public sector loans. The sovereign risk affected these CBs especially and a
large number of banks stopped public sector lending. As a result, Pfandbriefe issuance against
public sector loans was seized.
2.2.6 Covered Bond — A Safe Investment
CBs are considered a safe investment for the investor as compared to the senior unsecured
bonds and other close counterparts like ABS. The multiple layers of protection attract many
investors to this market, especially, after the GFC when investors are more inclined towards
safer products as compared to high yielding products. The benefits provided by CBs to issuers,
investors and economy are being discussed further.
33The government intervention in the markets in form of various programmes like CBPP are considered
impeding the natural price discovery mechanism. These programmes might contribute o financial instability by
creating assets bubbles, contingent liabilities and accumulation of excess credit in the economy.
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Figure 2.9: Year Wise CB Issuance in European Countries (2004-2014)
Source: ECBC (2015)
Covered Bonds and Issuers
The issuers of CBs have several motives for the CB issuance. These motives and (perceived)
benefits and limitations are given below.
Funding Source CBs serve as a cost effective source of funding for the issuers. They
can diversify their funding mix by issuing CBs. CBs served as a stable source of funding
when other sources of long-term funding were dried-up during the GFC. This was mainly
because of the maintained investors’ confidence in CBs and preferential treatment of CBs
in regulations. These bonds are issued for a fixed funding duration that improve the asset-
liability management by providing a funding certainty. The multiple layers of protection
provided against these bonds lead to a higher rating. The voluntary over-collateralisation also
plays an important role in getting higher rating for these bonds. Therefore, banks can obtain
funding at a cheaper cost because of the high rating of these bonds. However, the large-scale
issuance of CBs may result in a lower rating for the unsecured bonds because rating agencies
account for the asset encumbrance resulting from the issuance of CBs while rating these
unsecured bonds.
Accounting Treatment Banks retain the assets used in the cover pool on their balance sheet.
If an accounting sale occurs like a securitisation transaction, then banks may have to realise
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losses in the depressed market conditions. However, the on-balance sheet nature of CBs also
creates accounting complexities for the issuers, especially in the case of SCBs where an SPV
is involved in the transaction. Moreover, the banks are required to make compliance with
additional operational requirements including monitoring and actively managing the cover
pool (because of the dynamic cover pool), and reporting to the supervisor. Banks are also
required to hold capital against these assets and deleveraging can be a great challenge for the
banks issuing CBs.
Liquidity Benefits CBs receive a favourable treatment in regulations.34 They are viewed
positively in the market by investors and regulators. The haircut on these bonds are lower
than other unsecured bonds and ABS. Therefore, a bank can obtain more funds while using
CBs as collateral in the repo market as compared to ABS.
High Quality Loan Origination CBs are subject to a strict set of regulations and industry
standards. The assets used in the cover pool are usually high quality assets and in most of
the jurisdictions these asset must be in a compliance with certain LTV requirements. The
origination standards are improved because of these requirements thereby helping to maintain
a high credit quality.
Covered Bonds and Investors
Investors enjoy multiple layers of protection in case of CBs and they are less concerned about
the default unless bankruptcy proceedings are initiated against the issuer. Sovereign bonds
are also considered as secured investment but CBs offer attractive yield along with security
as compared to sovereign bonds. The investors looking for secured yield-bearing instruments
are more inclined towards CBs. Because of these reasons, these bonds also outperformed
sovereign bonds during the crisis. The prepayment risk against the assets held in the cover
pool is also absorbed by the issuer therefore, investors are not concerned about the prepayment
events as well. There is no early redemption in these bonds as they do not amortise along
with loan payments.
The favourable treatment of CBs in regulations is also an attractive factor for the investors.
These bonds also meet the liquidity requirement of the liquidity coverage framework of the
Basel III. The legal limits for the holding of CBs are also higher as compared to other
investment options. The lower Risk Weights (RWs) assigned to these bonds also results in
34See Chapter 3 for details.
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lower capital holdings against them. Therefore, these bonds have been high in demand after
the GFC. CBs also offer a high level of transparency and simplicity as compared to securitised
products. Hence, evaluation for these bonds for the investor is comparatively easier. Finally,
investors are not bothered by moral hazard problems because of the on-balance sheet nature
of the assets held in the cover pool unlike securitisation.
Covered Bonds and Economy
It became a great challenge for the European Commission to unlock long-term financing
after the impairment of banks’ ability to channelize the funds for long-term investment. It is
recognised that CBs have the potential to serve this purpose. The long-term nature of the CB
transactions is helpful in unlocking the long-term financing. Investors are supposed to take
into account the long-term performance and risk for their investment in CBs. Bank with a
problem of maturity mismatch can issue CBs to over come this problem. The liquidity crisis
arising out of such maturity mismatches can be mitigated in this way.
The Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach introduced in Basel II and III promotes the
issuance of residential mortgage lending as it results in low RWs for residential loans. The
countries where larges share of CBs are backed by these residential mortgages can experience
a brisk growth in house prices. A liquid covered bond can facilitate this growth. CBs may
prove a cheaper mean of financing residential mortgage loans that may also lead to a cheaper
lending rate (Nicolaisen, 2017). The low RWs assigned to residential loans will also help in
coping with the capital constraints of the banks, as the issuance of other assets with high RWs
may quickly deplete the current capital. Hence, the objective of increasing the credit flow in
the economy can also be acheived through CB for certain sectors of the economy. For these
reasons, banks issuing CBs might curtail their lending to certain sector of the economy where
they can enjoy low RWs against the issued assets.
2.3 Securitisation vs Covered Bonds
ABSs and CBs are important funding instruments used by FIs during the last few decades. The
two most common motives behind the issuance of these instruments are generating liquidity
and controlling funding cost. ABS, in a static theoretical sense, are also meant to transfer the
risk but it is practically bit controversial and has further implications. Apart from some of
the structural differences, it is argued that these instruments should be regulated in a similar
manner because of their underlying similarities with respect to the benefits provided by them
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(IOSCO, 2011; Surti, 2010). There are concerns that discriminatory treatment of these two
instruments may create imbalances in the funding base of FIs. The revival of securitisation is
also hampered due to the absence of a level regulatory playing field.
ABS and CBs work in a similar manner at a very basic level. An FI originates some
assets that are placed in a pool afterwards. This pool is ring-fenced in both situations, as
other creditors of the FI do not have access to these assets. The characteristics of the pool
and nature of ring-fencing may vary across different jurisdictions and types of the issued
securities. However, the common feature in both types of securities is that they are backed
by a specific pool of collateral. Carbó-valverde, Rosen, and Rodríguez-Fernández (2017) find
that the bank issuing ABS were more prone to bail-out during the years close to GFC, while
this situation was not observed for the banks issuing CBs. These findings suggest that banks
involved in securitisation activity were taking an elevated amount of risk.
CBs are issued against less risky assets, but these assets also have lower rate of return
associated with them. On the other hand, usually, securitisation takes places against riskier
assets and a bank also relinquish higher return while transferring risk out of its balance sheet.
Therefore, the issuance of securitisation may not have positive effects on the profitability of
banks. However, this situation may vary in case of CBs (Carbó-valverde et al., 2017; Pinedo
& Tanenbaum, 2010).
Boyce (2008) challenges the issuance of CBs to overcome the problems related to se-
curitisation. He emphasises that there can be many other ways of managing problems of
securitisation e.g. increase in capital requirements, higher disclosure for investors, insuring
mortgages, issuance of warranties to retain investors’ confidence and prudential regulations.
Despite all these measures being adapted, complexity of securitisation will not be reduced.
The increase in capital requirements will offset the benefit of reducing capital requirement
provided by original OTD Model. Mortgage insurance will add extra cost and issuance of
warranties will cancel out the risk transfer benefit. Some other suggest that CBs will be a
good replacement for ABS as suggested changes in the securitisation framework are already
present in CBs.
CBs may not be able to replace ABS for several reasons. The most important aspect
of CBs is their on-balance sheet nature. The issuers are required to provide full capital
coverage to issued CBs and there is no capital arbitrage as provided by ABS. This results into
a limited number of CB issuers even in those countries where no licensing requirements are
implemented. The issuers of ABS also enjoy a greater flexibility in selection of the assets
for placing in the collateral pool but CB issuers have to face a limited range of assets that
are eligible to be used for backing the CB issuance. The pass-through nature of ABS also
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facilitates the bank to perform a better asset-liability management. The proceeds generated
from the assets backing the issued securities are passed to the investors and banks can actively
manage their asset portfolio. The CB issuers do not have this benefit because there is no full
pass through.
The rating assignment to ABS is based on the type of the collateral pool and bankruptcy
remoteness of the SPV. For these reasons, a bank involved in securitisation obtains funds at a
cheaper cost given its own credit rating. However, CBs are partly rated on credit strength of
the issuing bank, therefore, it might be difficult for banks to get funds at a cost beyond their
credit rating using CBs. Practically, both instruments provide a similar risk dispersion with
respect to investors types but ABS provide a benefit of greater risk distribution across the
various market segments. The securitisation has the potential to control credit, market and
liquidity risk but CBs do not provide credit risk management benefit. Therefore, securitising
banks enjoy a greater flexibility, better risk management and capital relief benefits, but these
benefits come with a price that was largely materialised during the GFC.
The incubation of securitisation market along with CBs will help to reduce the reliance of
FIs on a specific funding instruments. This will help the banks to increase the credit supply
to commercial and industrial sectors while CBs will continue to enjoy a greater investor
confidence and serve as a cheaper source of funding for banks. Alternatively, over-reliance
on CBs may adversely affect the capability of taking deposits from the open market that
may create disintermediation problem for some of important eligible market segments. This
reliance may also make it harder for banking system to show resistance to call for bailout
if such a call is considered necessary by the regulators for ensuring functioning of market.
However, such problems are being mitigated through strong legislation (IMF, 2011). Table
2.4 provides a comparison of securitisation and CBs.
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Table 2.4: Differences between Traditional Securitisation and Covered Bonds
Feature Securitisation Covered Bonds
Accounting Treat-
ment
The underlying collateral normally leaves the bal-
ance sheet
The underlying collateral mostly remains on the
balance sheet with a mentioning of belonging to
the cover pool, except in case of SCB
Motives Financing, risk transfer, regulatory arbitrage, re-
duction in capital requirements
Financing
Issuer Special purpose vehicles Generally issued by the loan originator
Underlying Assets Any class of assets mainly including residen-
tial and commercial mortgage loans, auto loans,
credit card receivables, corporate loans and con-
sumer loans
Limited by law (excepted SCBs)
Recourse to Origina-
tor
Generally, there is no recourse to the originator
until some explicit guarantees are provided by the
originator
There is a recourse to the originator
Capital Reduction Yes No
Legal Restrictions Generally, not much regulations A specific legal framework governs the covered
bonds
Transparency of asset
pool
Very limited Generally high
Tranching Yes No
Coupon Floating Fixed
Prepayment of Assets Full pass-through in most cases Assets are replaced and no pass-through (except
SCBs issued with CPT)
Risk Retention Limited Full risk retention
Cash Flows Generated solely from the underlying asset and
follow a waterfall like structure because of
tranching
Issuers are fully liable for all payments of interest
and principal without reference to cover pool
Claim of Investors Claims of investors are only limited to the under-
lying assets
Claim of underlying assets are not limited to the
collateral only.
Credit Enhancement Mainly provided through tranching but many
other methods are also deployed to provide credit
enhancement
Over-collateralisation is the principal mean of
credit enhancement
Servicer andOrigina-
tor
Originator and servicer may or may not be same.
The originator can be a servicer under a specific
contract but can be a different entity as well.
Originator is not isolated from the underlying
assets therefore banks are the originators and ser-
vicers at the same time.
Maturity Linked with maturity of underlying assets. Some
structures may offer maturities shorter than un-
derlying assets. ABCP is one example
Fixed maturity independent of the maturity of
underlying assets. Thematurity of covered bonds
can be shorter than the underlying assets
Bankruptcy of Origi-
nator
Mortgage present in the pool of securities are
remote from their originator. This pool remains
unaffected in case of bankruptcy of the originator
Collateral against covered bonds is remote from
bankruptcy but bond holders may have further
recourse to other assets if this collateral is insuf-
ficient to meet the par value of the bonds
Rating Rating is assigned on the basis of the mort-
gage pool and credit enhancement provided to
the transactions
Rating is assigned on the basis of assets in the
cover pool and the issuer
Sources: (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2012; Dinca, 2014; Murphy, 2013; Packer et al., 2007; Segoviano et al., 2013)
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Chapter 3
Regulations for Securitisation and
Covered Bonds: Premises, Context and
Asymmetry
Wilbur Ross said in a Question and Answer Session, “There is no evidence
that more regulation makes things better. The most highly regulated industry
in America is commercial banking, and that did not save those institutions from
making terrible decisions.”
Benner (2011)
3.1 Introduction
Securitisation, the process generating Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), has always been a hot
potato for regulators and policy makers because of its complex nature. Many attempts to
regulate this market have been made after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), but regulatory
authorities in USA and Europe are still struggling to devise an efficient and effective regulatory
framework for it. However, Covered Bonds (CBs) are governed by a set of well-defined
regulations in most of the European countries with some differences in the legal framework
of each country. Despite some structural differences between ABS and CBs, it is argued
that they can be regulated in a similar way, as they are expected to provide similar economic
benefits (IOSCO, 2012).1
1This argument lacks an empirical support. However, both instruments are used for generating liquidity and
controlling the funding cost.
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After the collapse of securitisation market, it was generally perceived that CBs might
replace ABS. Different market stakeholders including banks, investors and regulators started
showing a deeper interest in CBs. Their stable performance during the GFC was the main
cause of this interest. Many countries devised new regulations for CBs and others updated
their existing ones. CBs also made their entry into the US market during this period. Keeping
in view the higher interest ofmarket stakeholders and stable performance during theGFC, CBs
were given a favourable treatment in the post-crisis regulations that further incited the interest
in this asset class. However, CBs might not serve as the actual replacement of securitised
products, rather it is another security in the arsenal of the giant financial market (Harrison,
2008).
According to Keys et al. (2009), seeds of bad regulations are sown during the crisis period
and a knee-jerk reaction is usually seen after the crisis. Such a reaction was seen in the
regulations immediately devised after the GFC. The resulting criticism on these regulations
led to several revisions. Nevertheless, many of these regulations are still stringent and they
are hampering the efforts to revive the securitisation market. The efforts are being made to
revive securitisation, as it is considered to play a positive role in the economic growth by
increasing the funding availability.2
This chapter reviews the most recent regulations devised for the ABS and CB markets.
It identifies key regulations devised for both markets and performs an economic analysis
of these regulations. It develops three perspectives of these regulations. First, the chapter
focuses on the premises of these regulations that are found in contradiction with the theoretical
underpinnings of securitisation process. Moreover, these premises are highly influenced by
the political reactions. Second, the chapter highlights that the current regulatory treatment
provided to securitisation is not based on the European realities, rather it is heavily influenced
by the situation in the US market. There are some key differences in both market but
unfortunately those differences are ignored. Finally, the study performs a comparison between
the regulatory treatment of CBs with ABS. This comparison helps understand how CBs are
getting a favourable treatment in the regulations and what can be the possible implications of
this asymmetric treatment.
Rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the regulations for
securitisation. It provides an overview of pre-crisis regulations before moving to the post-
crisis regulations of securitisation. The premises of different regulations have been highlighted
and regulations have been analysed in the light of these premises. A critique of regulations
2Securitisation increases the lending capacity of banks and a wider population in the economy can access
funding through banks.
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for securitisation has been provided at the end of this section. This section also highlights
that the current regulatory treatment of securitisation is not based on the European realities.
Section 3.3 reviews the regulations for CBs. This section provides an overview of the recent
developments in the regulations for CBs and a critique of these regulations. Section 3.4 makes
a comparison of regulations for securitisation and CBs. This section highlights that how CBs
are getting a favourable treatment as compared to ABS. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Regulations for Securitisation
Many economists maligned the regulatory authorities for the lax treatment of securitisation.
It was argued that regulators could not provide an effective regulatory framework for se-
curitisation and they let the securitisation market grow without any bounds. The concerns
about the rising trend of securitisation were echoed even before the eruption of the financial
crisis (Allen & Carletti, 2006; Kiff, Michaud, & Belgique, 2003; Kiff, Michaud, & Mitchell,
2002). Many market analysts were of the view that an increase in the securitisation activity
might have serious implications for the stability of banks and the overall financial system as
well.3 The negligent behaviour of regulators ostensibly played a key role in the exponential
development of this market and the problems arising afterwards.
The poor regulatory framework allegedly provided banks with vicious incentives for
securitisation (Cerasi & Rochet, 2014).4 The creation of these perverse incentives is largely
ascribed to the purportedly feeble regulatory framework. ABS entailed less cost for banks
to hold as compared to the assets underpinning them, as the financial regulations provided
different standards for such assets.5 The regulations allowed the securitising banks to hold
less capital.6 Therefore, banks were encouraged to use securitisation to reap the wider
economic benefits by spreading out credit exposure. This helped the banking system diffuse
their concentration in different risk classes and reduce systemic vulnerabilities arising from
3The banking system occupies a core place in the economy and the failure of one bank may lead to the failure
of other banks because of the contagion effect. This situation may have adverse effects on the stability of the
overall financial system.
4The alleged perverse incentives relate to lending practices and pooling of different assets in the securitisation
process. The opponents of securitisation argue that banks were issuing loans and quickly packaging them in
a pool to issue securities. The investors were not aware of the characteristics of the loans being pooled and a
lemon problem was existent in this way.
5The differential treatment is continued after the GFC but this time in a reverse manner. Now holding ABS
is more expensive than underlying assets because of strict capital regulations introduced after the GFC.
6The off-balance sheet nature of securitisation allowed banks to play around the capital requirements. The
investors in the securitisation market were also required to hold less capital against them because of the high
rating assigned to ABS.
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concentrated exposures (Cerbioni et al., 2014).
Along with its various benefits, securitisation created challenges for regulators and policy
makers. Conventionally, lending activities of a bank are controlled by the monetary policy
of the central bank. However, securitisation deteriorated the ability of monetary authorities
to control lending (Loutskina, 2011). Nonetheless, the vulnerability of banks to economic
shocks exacerbated when securitisation market was disrupted because of an excessive reliance
on it.
In the run-up to the crisis, securitisation transactions became extremely opaque and
complex. This high level of opaqueness is also ascribed to lax regulations (Cerbioni et al.,
2014). This opaqueness gave rise to wider information asymmetries. Most of the frictions
in this market are linked with information asymmetries those are believed to plague the
entire securitisation process (Ashcraft & Schuermann, 2008). The regulators were demanded
to decrease the opacity of this process as the information asymmetry can be controlled by
bringing transparency in the securitisation process, thereby helping control the (alleged) moral
hazard and adverse selection problems.
After the GFC, for the reasons such as outlined above, regulators at both sides of the
Atlantic were urged to devise stringent regulations for the securitisation. However, regulations
devised after the GFC largely affected the incentives of banks to securitise. The reduction
in the securitisation activity raised concerns related to an increase in the funding cost and
a decrease in the credit supply to the economy (Guha, Braithwaite, Guerrera, & van Duyn,
2009). Therefore, it is argued that new regulations should not decrease the securitisation,
as it helps to boost the economic activity by increasing the credit supply in the economy.
However, distortions in this market should be controlled to avoid its negative effects on
financial markets (Casu, Clare, Sarkisyan, & Thomas, 2013). Given the competing goals
outlined above, regulating securitisation becomes a challenging task.
3.2.1 Pre-Crisis Regulations for Securitisation
For the perceived benefits of the risk transfer, an increase in credit supply and reduction in the
liquidity pressures, securitisationwas initially endorsed by the regulatory bodies (BCBS, 2005;
IAIS, 2003). Securitisation, along with other forms of financial innovation, was welcomed
by the market and regulators (BIS, 2003). Most of the regulations before the eruption of
the GFC were securitisation supportive. The regulators were following an indirect approach
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and direct regulations for securitisation market were missing.7 Most of the transactions were
taking place under the contractual arrangements. There were no defined limits regarding
securitisation and taking exposures in the securitised instruments.
Basel I defined RiskWeights (RWs) for various classes of assets held by a bank. Corporate
loans were given 100% RWs in Basel I and banks issuing these loans were required to hold
higher capital against them. This situation adversely affected credit supply to corporate
sector. There was widespread criticism by academicians and practitioners on the rigidity of
these RWs. It was argued that the credit risk rating of corporate borrowers should also be
considered. These guidelines were revised in 1999. The purpose of revisions in the Basel
I Accord was to promote safety and soundness of the banking system along with enhancing
the competitive quality of banks (Fabozzi, Davis, & Choudhry, 2006). However, these rules
were still considered inflexible and Basel II was introduced to overcome the shortcomings of
Basel I. Basel II was based on three pillars:
1. New capital requirements for credit and operational risks;
2. Supervisory actions for higher risk as compared to the capital;
3. Greater disclosure requirements for banks to promote the market discipline.
Basel II followed a model based and a rating based approach. For the calculation of capital
requirements, two approaches were introduced in the Basel II i.e. Standardised Approach
(SA) and Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach. By following the SA, banks can split
assets as per their credit ratings. There are two sub-approaches in IRB i.e. foundation
approach and advanced approach. The categorization of the assets is based on internal
assessment of the bank. However, relevant supervisory body should identify internal systems
to use this approach. The banks in EU were provided with the freedom to choose any of
these approaches. This approach based mechanism provided banks with a justification for
their thinner capitalisation. Banks in Basel II were not allowed to follow their internal risk
assessment mechanism for evaluating the risk related to their securitisation exposures. This
increased their reliance on the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) that are widely maligned for
playing a significant role in the debacle of securitisation market.
Basel I provided a flat treatment to various asset classes to many of the bank assets.
Consequently, regulatory capital for many of the (high-quality) assets was higher than the
7The regulators were focusing on lending standards, risk classification of various assets (loans) classes and
investment exposures. These regulations indirectly played a supportive role in the exponential growth of secu-
ritisation market. As a set of regulations directly targeting the securitisation market was not existent, therefore,
banks allegedly used the loopholes present in indirect regulations and securitised their assets enormously.
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required capital to cover the economic risk. Hence, Basel I provided banks with an incentive
to remove those assets from their balance sheet through securitisation to reduce regulatory
capital requirements.8 However, it is pertinent to note here that banks were reducing the
regulatory capital requirement but not the economic risk because of the retention of first loss
position in the lower tranches in securitisation deals (Gorton & Pennacchi, 1995). Basel II
was meant to reduce this incentive or regulatory capital arbitrage. However, stringent capital
requirements were applied to the lower securitisation tranches those were mainly retained by
the banks. This incited banks not to retain these tranches (Fabozzi et al., 2006) or reduce the
size of these tranches.9
Under the Basel II Framework, similar RWs were assigned to corporate bonds and ABS of
similar rating. The similar RWs to these assets classes incited the interest of investors in the
latter class as it was perceived safe being backed by specific assets and generating higher yield
at the same time. However, non-investment grade ABS attracted higher RWs. The issuers
of ABS started working closely with CRAs to increase the proportion of investment grade
ABS in the economy. This resulted in an economy flooded with ABS and many of them were
too complex to understand for investors and regulators [e.g. Collateralised Debt Obligations
(CDOs) and CollateralisedMortgage Obligations (CMOs)] (C. W. Calomiris, 2009; DeMarzo
& Duffie, 1999; Griffin et al., 2013; Schwarcz, 2013c).
The differences in the capital charges against the senior and junior tranches of securitisation
were significant in the Basel II framework. This framework created a scope for engineering
specific tranches to maximise the leverage. The banks decreased the size of lower tranches
because of significantly high capital charges on these lower tranches.10 The protection offered
through subordination was adversely affected because of this situation. Moreover, Basel
II framework led to the generation of ‘cliff effects’.11 The changes in the capital charges
because of downgrades in the rating of any single type of security or tranche were not smooth,
rather such downgrades resulted in disproportionate cascading effects on other tranches and
securities. This has been identified in the recent securitisation framework in Basel III. The
above discussion explicates that banks have been continuously involved in countervailing
financial engineering in response to the changes in regulatory framework.
8Banks were able to reduce the regulatory capital requirements by removing some assets from their balance.
9The new securitisation framework of Basel III focuses on the thickness of tranches while assigning RWs to
overcome this issue.
10This has been identified in the recent securitisation framework in Basel III and size of the tranches have also
been taken into consideration while allocating RWs (BCBS, 2016).
11‘Cliff effect’ can be referred to a positive feedback loop. Small changes in ratings of the securitised
instrument led to significant changes in the capital. Banks had to substantially increase their capital when many
ratings were downgraded during the GFC.
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3.2.2 Post-Crisis Regulations for Securitisation
In response to the criticism on securitisation and role of regulations, regulators on both sides
of the Atlantic developed stringent regulations for securitisation. The reaction to the criticism
on securitisation is visible in the new regulations, mainly Dodd-Frank Act in the USA, and
Capital Requirement Directive (CRD) IV, Capital Requirement Regulations (CRR), Solvency
II and Basel III in Europe. These regulations became a subject of widespread criticism from
the market analysts, academicians, and other market stakeholders. The regulations devised
after the GFC have been repeatedly revised in response to this criticism. These changes
and revisions in the different regulations after the financial crisis show the intensity of the
challenge faced by the regulators in regulating this market.The key regulations introduced
after the GFC are given below.
• Basel III
– An initial draft of the Basel III was issued by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) in 2012. This draft was later on revised in 2013, 2014 and
finally in 2016 (BCBS, 2016).
• Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 (Capital Requirement Regulations (CRR)):12 CRR
directive provides the provisions for the capital treatment of securitisation and other
relevant exposures. Many of the legal provisions provided in CRR are considered very
strict by the securitisation industry.
– A proposal for the revision of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 has been issued by
the European Commission (EC) (European Commission, 2015b).13,14
– Delegated Regulation (EU)2015/61 was issued by the European Union to sup-
plement Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 with regard to the liquidity coverage
requirements for credit institutions.15
12REGULATION (EU) No 575/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of
26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation
(EU) No. 648/2012, Official Journal of the European Union (June 2013) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/oj/
direct-access.html
13Proposal for a “REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL Amend-
ing Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms”.
Brussels: European Commission, No. COM(2015) 473, 30.09.2015.
14This proposal is placed by the EC to supplement the Simple, Transparent and Standardised (STS) proposal.
The capital regulations of the original CRR Directive have been relaxed in this proposal for the securitisation
meeting the criteria given in the STS proposal.
15COMMISSIONDELEGATEDREGULATION (EU) 2015/61 of 10October 2014 to supplement Regulation
(EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council with regard to liquidity coverage requirement for
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• Directive 2013/36/EU (Capital Requirement Directive (CRD-IV)):16 This directive sup-
plements the CRR and reflects the capital standards and rules of Basel III.
• Directive 2009/138/EC (Solvency II):17 This directive provides the provisions for the
treatment of securitisation exposure by the insurance industry, 18
– A delegated Act Supporting the Solvency II directive was also issued in 2014
(European Commission, 2014).19
• STS Proposal:20 European Commission (EC) issued a proposal on September 30, 2015
for Simple, Transparent and Standardised (STS) securitisation (hereinafter referred as
‘STS proposal’) to promote STS securitisation (European Commission, 2015c). This
proposal is currently under review in the European Parliament (EP) and the Council.21
This proposal is analogous to the BCBS Proposal for Simple, Transparent and Com-
Credit Institutions. Official Journal of the EuropeanUnion, 11. Retrieved fromhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R0061{&}from=EN
16DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 June
2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and
investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Dir. Official Journal of the European Union,
L(176).
17DIRECTIVE 2009/138/ECOF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTANDOF THECOUNCIL of 25 Novem-
ber 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of insurance and reinsurance (Solvency II).Official Journal
of the European Union, L335/1-129.
18Solvency II deals with insurance companies. However, this act occupies a core importance in the securitisa-
tion market as insurance industry has been significantly investing in this market and the current provisions in the
Solvency II are likely to reduce the interest of insurance industry in this market, thereby reducing the investor
base of the securitisation market.
19COMMISSIONDELEGATED REGULATION (EU) 2015/35 of 10 October 2014 supplementing Directive
2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the business
of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II), Official Journal of the European Union, 12. Retrieved from
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R0035{&}from=EN
20Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying
down common rules on securitisation and creating a European framework for simple, transparent and standard-
ised securitisation and amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) No
1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012. Brussels: European Commission
21According to the Article 294 of Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU), EC submits
its proposal to the European Parliament and the Council. The Parliament has to approve or amend this
proposal and forward the same to the Council. The Council can approve or amend this proposal. The
proposal is sent back to the EP if amendments are made by the Council. The proposal is adopted or rejected
depending on the approval of the EP. In case of any further amendments by the EP, the EC is asked to
give its opinion and the proposal is sent to the Council for the second reading. Decision is made on the
basis of majority voting if opinion of the EC is positive or on the basis of unanimity if EC’s opinion is
negative. If proposal is rejected by the Council, a Conciliation Committee is formulated and negotiations
start. See https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vga3bya9max9 for details about
the ordinary legislative procedure. The STS Proposal is also following the same procedure to take the form of a
directive or act.
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parable (STC) Securitisation in July 2015,22 but the former is proposed as the EU law.
– A draft report has been issued by the Committee on Economic and Monetary
Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament in response to the STS proposal
(hereinafter referred as the ‘ECON report’) (Tang, 2016). The ECON report has
proposed various amendments in the original STS proposal.23
The post-crisis regulations for securitisation are focused on four key areas: (i) addressing
conflicts of interest by aligning incentives; (ii) transparency of securitisation by removing
the information asymmetry; (iii) dealing with inappropriate incentives and (iv) reduction
in the reliance on rating agencies. In line with these targeted objectives, the post-crisis
regulations for the securitisation in Europe can be classified into six categories i.e. risk
retention requirements, high disclosure requirements, due diligence requirements, capital
requirements and liquidity requirements. These regulations are discussed below.
Risk Retention
The Risk Retention Regulations (RRR) have been introduced because of the alleged moral
hazard associated with the so-called Originate-to-Distribute (OTD) model. A general percep-
tion about securitisation is that securitising banks do not have a ‘skin in the game’ after the
loan transfer from their balance sheet. This results in a misalignment of incentives between
investors and originators leading to deterioration in the quality of the originated assets. The
RRR is also based on this perception. It is believed that these requirements will help ensure
incentive alignment and quality of the underlying assets will improve as originators will have
a ‘skin in the game’.
US regulatory authorities introduced the risk retention requirement in Dodd-Frank Act.
The European regulations have also focused on the risk retention (so-called ‘skin in the game’).
According to RRR, originators are required to retain an unhedged portion of credit risk while
securitising their assets. The minimum requirement is 5% of the securitisation transaction.24
The originators are not allowed to use any hedging technique for this retained portion of the
risk, as hedging will trounce the (desired) objective of the RRR.
22A complete version was issued in November 2015.
23The amendments proposed by ECON are not binding and the Council will review them in light of the
ordinary legislative procedure. A press release has been issued by the European Commission on 30 May 2017.
According to this press release, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission agreed to set out the
criteria for the STS securitisation. This agreement is being followed by further discussion for the finalization of
the text (European Commision, 2017).
24Article 405, Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013
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The RRR has been directly placed on originators, sponsors or original lenders. If there are
different entities involved in a transaction, then the originator is deemed responsible for the
risk retention and the net economic interest in the transaction should not be split among various
retaining parties.25 The STS framework — to overcome the loopholes in the definition of an
originator — specifies that “an entity shall not be considered to be an originator where the
entity has been established or operates for the sole purpose of securitising exposures”. Hence,
the Special Purpose Entity (SPE) does not qualify as an originator for the risk retention.
The premise for the RRR is the general perception about securitisation that banks do not
maintain a ‘skin in the game’ while securitising. However, this premise is questionable as it
may not be the reason behind the astronomical losses emanating during the GFC. The risk
retention was mandated by the market before the debacle of securitisation during the GFC.
Originators and sponsors of securitisation transactions were already having a strong ‘skin in
the game’ as the securitisation might be difficult unless the lower tranches are not retained
by the originator.26 According to Chiesa (2008, 2015) and Schwarcz (2009), securitisation
should not matter with respect to the risk creation. An investor, being the new owner of
the assets, should undertake the risk assessment before making the investment decisions and
taking positions in securitisation. However, the assessment for the investors was difficult
because of the complexity of the securitisation transactions. Hence, they were excessively
relying on the rating agencies (Barth, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 2012; Rösch & Scheule, 2011;
White, 2010). Therefore, the complexity of securitisation transactions might support the
propagation of STS securitisation but it does not support the risk retention.
Schwarcz (2016) is of the view that risk retention regulation may lead to ‘mutual mis-
information’ problem. The originator may exhibit a fake confidence in the issued securities
by retaining a portion of the risk in the securitisation transactions. The investors may get
misinformed and reliance may also shift on the signal generated by the originator. This may
become in conflict with the due diligence requirements. The securitisation carried out by
many originators with retention of the lower tranches also contributed to the financial crisis,
as it buttressed the false confidence of investors in these securities.
Guo and Wu (2014) argue that RRR may not prove to be effective as one size may not fit
all. It may not be sufficient for the banks having a high securitisation intensity and vice versa.
The different classes of securitised instruments performed differently before, during and after
the GFC.27 Therefore, the treatment of securitisation as a homogeneous class in RRRmay not
25Article 4 § 1 of STS Framework
26See Gorton and Pennacchi (1995)
27See Moody’s (2015)
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be justifiable. Moreover, the risk profile and motives of securitisation also vary from bank to
bank. The RRR should be defined by keeping in view the market conditions, the risk profile
of Financial Institutions (FIs) and type of assets being securitised. The later aspect occupies
a core importance in this context.
Disclosure Requirement
Transparency in the securitisation transactions has been the central concern of regulators after
the GFC. The securitisation transactions were considered highly complicated and opaque
and several market frictions are attributed to this perceived opacity of the securitisation
transactions. Most of the problems related to securitisation are attributed to the information
asymmetries. Therefore, regulatory authorities largely focused on promoting transparency
of these transactions through higher disclosure requirements. The disclosure is believed to
control the information asymmetry and improve transparency. The disclosure requirements
are a key element of the new STS framework in Europe.
Chapter 3 of the STS framework provides disclosure requirements. This chapter outlines
all the standards that should be followed to qualify as STS.28 This chapter defines the transfer
mechanism that should be considered as a true sale. The underlying assets must be homo-
geneous in their classification. The STS framework discourages re-securitisation as most
of the complexity lies in these transactions.29 An originator is required to maintain all the
underwriting standards while originating the exposures being securitised like the exposures
that have not been securitised. If there are some significant changes in these underwriting
standards, the originator must disclose them to the investors.
Article 9 of the said proposal provides standards for standardised securitisation trans-
actions. The interest rate and currency risk against these securitisation transactions must
be mitigated and the originator must disclose the measures used for the mitigation of these
risks.30 The payments against these securitisation transactions must be based on the market
interest rate and there should be no involvement of any complicated formulae for calculation
of these payments. The relevant documents governing the securitisation transactions should
explicitly specify the obligations, duties, rights and responsibilities of the servicer and the
28Article 8 of the STS framework
29Article 8(5) of STS framework
30Interest rate and currency risk are mitigated by FIs through various means e.g. future contracts, SWAPS
and options. Securitisation transactions are subject to fluctuations in interest rates and exchange rate if issued
in other currencies. The value of the ABS may fluctuate as per movements in interest and exchange rates.
Therefore, interest rate and currency exchange risk must be controlled and measures taken for controlling these
risks should be disclosed.
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trustee. The possible remedies and actions in case of default should be well-defined in the rel-
evant documents. Different triggers should be considered while structuring the securitisation
transactions and they should be mentioned in the documentation. The documentation should
also provide with a mechanism used for conflict resolution.
The STS framework also provides the requirements for transparency. The originator is
responsible for providing the historical data related to the default and delinquencies of the
underlying exposure. The minimum period covered in this data should be 7 years. A sample
of the underlying exposures should be subject to the verification by an external party.31 The
investors should be provided with a liability cash flow model by the originator before the
investment decision has been taken. The compliance with all these requirements is the joint
responsibility of originator, sponsor and Securitisation Special Purpose Entity (SSPE). The
securitisation transaction showing compliance with chapter 3 of the STS framework will be
regarded as STS Securitisation.
The disclosure requirements may not prove to be effective as the risks associated with
complex securitisation and especially subprime mortgage loans were fully disclosed before
the GFC, but such disclosure could not prevent the cataclysmic collapse of the securitisation
market. Moreover, the information required to be disclosed by an originator is substantial
and it is an arduous task to evaluate the long documents with complex legal and technical
terminologies. The investor will require a fair amount of financial modelling to understand
STS securitisation transactions as well. Therefore, even the most sophisticated institutional
investors may continue to rely on the rating agencies while taking the investment decisions.
The granular disclosure requirements are likely to place a burden on the securitising institutions
without providing a proportionate benefit to the investors (Slaughter and May, 2015). Hence,
these requirements may serve as a disincentive to securitisers.
Due Diligence
It is believed that the massive losses faced by investors in the securitisation market can be
ascribed to the heavy reliance on the rating agencies. The ratings assigned to the issued ABS
were dictating the investment decisions. The investors were not showing the due diligence
while taking the investment decisions. The decline in the mechanistic reliance on the rating
agencies (BCBS, 2014b) and thereby promoting due diligence has been high on the regulatory
agenda after the crisis (The European Commission, 2015).
31This requirement seems akin to the cover pool monitoring in case of CBs. However, the regulations do not
clarify that who will appoint this external agency and who will bear the cost. The eligibility criteria for the
designated external party is also not given in this proposal.
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The due diligence requirements are provided in Article 406 of CRR and Chapter 2 (Article
3) of the STS framework. According to these requirements, an investor must show due dili-
gence while making the investment decision. This due diligence entails several requirements.
An investor must evaluate before taking positions in the securitisation if the transaction follows
the relevant requirements outlined in various recent regulations (e.g. Article 4 of Regulation
(EU) No. 575/2013, STS framework etc.). The institutional investors must undertake a risk
assessment associated with all the structural features of the target securitisation. The payment
priorities and different triggers affecting the payment structure should be evaluated. As part
of this due diligence framework, the investors are also required to document the procedures
being followed for the risk assessment and regularly perform the stress tests on the cash flows
generated from the securitisation exposures. They must be aware of the changes in the risk
profile of the underlying exposure of securitisation. Lastly, they must have a mechanism for
reporting to concerned authorities about their understanding and management of risk inherent
in the securitisation positions.
The due diligence requirements were laid out to avoid feeding-frenzy atmosphere in the
financial markets.32 However, these requirements may be unnecessary and considered too
paternalistic in nature. They seem to shout at investors: ‘Do a better job!’. Given that
investors will suffer the losses in case of poor investment decision, they are already expected
to conduct some due diligence before making their investment decisions. Generally, this
(expected) due diligence is not confined to the securitisation exposures only, rather investors
are expected to show this due diligence in almost all forms of investment decisions, as other
market instruments like unsecured bonds, equities and CBs are not inherently less risky than
securitised products. It should be investors’ decision to decide about the nature of the due
diligence. The empirical investigation performed by Fabozzi and Vink (2012), on the data
before 2007, shows that European investors were already looking beyond the credit rating.
They were already performing some sort of due diligence while making their investment in
the ABS market. Hence, these requirements seem unnecessary.
The reliance on the STS notification by the originator may not be sufficient and investors
need to evaluate other accompanying information. These due diligence requirements may
prove to be burdensome for the investors. They are required to outlay high level of due
diligence before investing in securitisation, and evaluating if a securitisation transaction
can be regarded as STS. These regulations require investors to evaluate a number of risks
32Paul Stevenson, Managing Director of Moody’s Investor Service Inc. said, “When everybody wants to
securitize, and everyone is willing to buy, and everyone thinks nothing will go wrong, there gets to be a
feeding-frenzy atmosphere, and you have to remain cautious” (Woolley, 1996).
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involved in the securitisation transactions that clearly lie in originators’ ambit (Mullin, 2015).
The compliance with the granular and detailed due diligence requirements envisaged by the
EC may cause a decline in investors’ interest in the securitised instruments. The investors
breaching the due diligence requirements will be subject to higher RWs (as a penalty) on their
securitisation exposures in compliance with other sectoral regulations (Basel III and Article
407 of CRR).33
Capital Requirements
Capital requirements are meant to protect FIs from economic shocks. The losses are absorbed
by the capital maintained by an FI. The capital requirements are higher for ABS holdings in
the new Basel III Framework. The investors are required to hold high capital against their
ABS exposures as compared to their exposures in other similar types of investment. These
regulations have been introduced after the observations related to the thin capitalisation of
banks before the GFC and sudden downgrades of the securitised instruments. The losses
arising from these downgrades are to be absorbed by the capital, therefore there must be
sufficient capital.
The revised securitisation framework of Basel III revised the hierarchy of the approaches
used to determine the RWs of securitisation exposures. The new framework consists of three
hierarchies: Securitisation Internal Ratings-Based Approach (SEC-IRBA), Securitisation
External Ratings-Based Approach (SEC-ERBA), and Securitisation Standardised Approach
(SEC-SA). The last approach is meant for less-sophisticated banks. The minimum RW floor
given to a securitisation exposure is 15% regardless of the type of approach used by a bank.
The regulatory RWs assigned to securitisation exposure in case of following SEC-ERBA
approach are higher than the ones under the Basel II framework.34
Banks following SEC-SA must know about the delinquency status of the underlying
exposures.35 A bank will follow this approach if the delinquency status of an exposure is not
greater than 5%, otherwise, the securitisation exposure will be given a RW of 1,250%. The
revised securitisation framework allows for the application of Internal Assessment Approach
(IAA) in the case of unrated Asset-Backed Commercial Papers (ABCPs) only, but rest of the
unrated securitisation exposures receive RWs of 1,250%. Furthermore, capital requirements
33Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013
34The purpose of these higher RWs under SEC-ERBA approach is to discourage the reliance on rating
agencies.
35“Delinquent underlying exposures are underlying exposures that are 90 days or more past due, subject to
bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings, in the process of foreclosure, held as real estate owned, or in default,
where default is defined within the securitisation deal documents” (BCBS, 2014b)
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against the securitisation exposure are not limited to the credit risk but banks must recognise
the dilution risk as well (unless a bank can prove to the respective supervisor that dilution risk
is immaterial).36
The capital requirements against the securitisation exposures have beenwidely criticised in
the industry. Some have dubbed them as a punitive treatment of securitisation (AFME, 2014;
Federation Bancaire Francaise, 2014; GFMA, 2013; IOSCO, 2012; Millán, 2014). These
requirements are considered following a conservative approach resulting into the tightening
of capital requirements for the ABS investors (Perraudin, 2014b). The investors are required
to hold higher capital against the ABS than the capital required against the assets backing
these ABS. Therefore, the notion of capital neutrality is supported in the industry (Federation
Bancaire Francaise, 2014).37 The notion of capital neutrality sounds reasonable as banks
were playing around the capital requirements before the GFC because of different standards
for the securities and assets underlying them.
It is also argued that the proposed approaches for calculating RWs should be calibrated
with the historical loss statistics of different classes of securitisation (Mayer Brown, 2014).
However, such calibration is not provided in the revised securitisation framework. The capital
treatment of securitisation exposure in the light of the revised securitisation framework does
not consider the legal form of securitisation, rather it is based on the economic substance
of the relevant exposure (p. 6, § 1). The RW penalty of 1,250% is too strict. Thus, many
participants are likely to make an exit from the securitisation market and such a conservative
approach will act as a barrier for the smaller banks to enter this market. The additional RWs
as proposed in Article 407 of the CRR reflect a more suitable approach.38
The Proposed STS framework of EC and STC Proposal of BCBS have been introduced
in response to this criticism. A proposal revising the CRR directive has also been issued by
the EC to supplement the STS proposal. The CRR proposal has been issued with a view to
facilitate the STS securitisation. European Commission believes that STS securitisation must
be dealt differently in order to facilitate the growth of this market. Hence, the securitisation
transactions making a compliance with STS frameworks will be subject to 25% reduction in
the capital requirements as compared to non-STS securitisation. However, the compliance
with these proposals itself is too costly and tedious that this benefit of reduction in the capital
36Dilution risk is referred to the probability of reduction in receivables from an obligor because of disputes,
credit rebates, warranty claims and offsets. This risk may arise in case of revolving securitisation structures.
37The amount of required capital for holding ABS should be decided on the basis of the capital required for
the underlying assets.
38Article 407 of the CRR does not apply the RW of 1,250%, but this penalty is capped at 1,250%. The RW
penalty is progressively increased with the infringement of each due diligence provision.
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may not be attractive for the investors.
Liquidity Requirements
BCBS introduced Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) in 2013. The objective of LCR was to
promote resilience of banks against the liquidity risk in the short-run. According to LCR, a
bank must hold sufficient High-Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) for covering the differences
in cash inflows and outflows over a period of 30 days to avoid the stress scenario. The bank
management is expected to take corrective actions during this time. It also provides central
banks with additional time to take appropriate measures to deal with the stress scenario
(BCBS, 2013).
LCR is considered the most significant regulatory innovation after the GFC. This is the
first detailed liquidity regulation introduced at the European level. Similar regulations are
introduced in the delegated regulation of the EuropeanUnion in 2014 a the EU level (European
Union, 2014).39 LCR divides HQLA into 3 distinct levels. LCR will now determine the
liquidity level of an FI. The illustrative summary of HQLA as per LCR directive of the
European Union is provided in Table 3.1.
Securitised instruments are placed in the last category of high-quality liquid assets i.e.
level 2B.40 However, the treatment of securitisation is a little bit relaxed in the LCR Directive
as compared to the recommendations of Basel III. In the prior LCR framework, securitised
instruments were not classified as HQLA and later on only RMBS were included in the list of
HQLA after the market criticism. The new Delegated Regulation included the ABS backed
by commercial loans and auto loans as well. All these ABS must meet a list of requirements
outlined in Article 13 (§ 2 to 134) of the above-referred regulations. This article applies
high-RWs and haircuts and delineates the assets backing the securities those are eligible for
placement in level 2B assets.
RMBS are given a preferential treatment in the LCR framework.41 Moreover, given
the criteria, outlined in the Article 13, many of the securitised instrument will not be able
to qualify as HQLA. Perraudin (2014a) provides the empirical evidence that some of the
non-residential mortgage-backed securities have remained more liquid than RMBS and these
securities have been either excluded from the LCR framework or they are subject to higher
39Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 of 10 October 2014 to supplement Regulation (EU) No
575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council with regard to liquidity coverage requirement for Credit
Institutions
40Article 13 of The Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35 of 10 October 2014
41Haircuts are lower for RMBS as compared to other classes of ABS included in the LCR framework.
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Table 3.1: Illustrative Summary of LCR
Item Haircut
Level 1 Assets
Bank notes and coins
0%
Marketable securities from central banks, multilateral development banks,
sovereigns
Central bank or domestic sovereign debt for non-0% risk-weighted sovereigns
Central bank reserves
High-Quality Covered Bonds with RW of 10% for Credit Quality Step (CQS) 1 and
minimum size of Euro 500 million
7 %
Level 2 Assets
Level 2A Assets
Assets of central banks, multilateral development banks, and sovereigns that qualifies
for 20% RW 15%
Corporate debt securities having a rating of AA- or higher
Qualifying covered bonds rated AA- or higher meeting with 20% risk weight for
CQS 2 and minimum size of Euro 250 million
Level 2B assets (maximum of 15% of HQLA)
Corporate debt securities with a rating between A+ and BBB- 50%
Common equity shares 50%
High quality covered bonds with a risk weight not greater than 35% for CQS 3
and minimum size of Euro 250 million
30 %
Qualifying Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) 25 %
Qualifying Commercial ABS 35 %
Qualifying Auto ABS 35 %
All securitised products should meet following requirements:
• Minimum size of the tranche should be Euro 100 million
• Loan-to-Value (LTV) of the assets in the underlying pool should not be less
than 80%
• None of the borrowers should be an investment firm
• The remaining weight average life of the tranches should not exceed 5 years
haircuts. Therefore, despite many revision in the new LCR framework, securitisation is still
significantly disfavoured in the LCR framework.
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3.2.3 Critique of Post-Crisis Regulations for Securitisation
The securitisation market is still crippled by the legacy of the financial crisis. The revival of
the securitisation market is a prime agenda of regulators in Europe as now it is considered a
panacea for the ailing European economy. However, the regulations devised for securitised
instruments are hindering the revival of this market. Many researchers are of the view that
regulatory responses to securitisation in the US and Europe are based on political reactions
(Chiesa, 2015; Schwarcz, 2016;White, 2010). Therefore, most of the regulatory responses are
considered ad hoc in nature. According to German Banking Industry Committee, it is imper-
ative to ensure the legal certainty to revive investors’ confidence in the securitisation market.
The biennial changes in the legal frameworks are creating challenges for the resumption and
stable functioning of the securitisation market.
It is also argued that regulatory treatment of securitisation after the GFC is not based
on the European realities, rather it is highly influenced by the situation in the US market.
Unlike the USA, the failure of securitisation market is not linked to the credit deterioration in
Europe, rather market became illiquid and prices fell down that led to the accumulation of the
marked-to-market losses (Blommestein et al., 2011). Mario Draghi, president of European
Central Bank (ECB), said in a press conference on March 6, 2014:
If we consider just the revitalisation of the ABS market, there are many things
that need to change in regulation and in legislation. Today, the capital charges
for ABS discriminate them unfavourably with respect to other instruments with
similar degrees of riskiness. The current capital regulation of ABS was calibrated
on a reality which is not the European one. Draghi (2014)
The OTD model and development of complex securities like Collateralised Loan Obli-
gations (CLOs) are two key elements for which securitisation was immensely criticised and
strict regulations were demanded. However, it is pertinent to note that both are largely the
US phenomena. Many of residential mortgages in the US were issued with a view to secu-
ritise them at a later stage. Many non-banking companies and mortgage brokers in the USA
also started issuing mortgage loans with the above-referred view. However, in Europe, with
an exception of Netherlands and Spain, residential mortgages were never securitised on a
large-scale.42 The OTD culture never flourished in Europe like the US market. Mainly, loan
origination was taking place within the banking system and there were no boutique lenders.
42Dutch RMBS were mainly issued for the funding purpose and risk transfer was not the main motive behind
their issuance (Bronzwaer, 2012).
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The development of complex securities was also very limited in Europe. CDOs became
the second biggest segment of the ABS market in the USA in 2006. These CDOs were backed
by subprime bonds as collaterals. Although some European banks invested in US securitised
instruments including CDOs, but the existence of CDOs in Europe was not ubiquitous. More-
over, banks in Europe were issuing more complicated securities like CLOs and Collateralised
Bond Obligations (CBOs) as well. Therefore, the securitisation in Europe cannot be alleged
for the problems that were pervasive in the US market. Moreover, the European securitisa-
tion market operates under the private market forces but Government Sponsored Mortgage
Enterprises (GSMEs) have largely influenced the securitisation market in USA. Therefore,
evaluating the impact of securitisation on the credit market is more difficult, as it is hard to
disentangle its impact in the presence of concurrent impact of the GSMEs (Kara et al., 2015).
European regulations have discussed a lot about the above explained re-securitisation. Hence,
they are trying to correct the problems that are non-existent in the European market.
Certain parts of the securitisationmarket have undoubtedly played their role in intensifying
the effects of GFC, but it should be kept in view that it is not endemic to all parts of the market.
The performance of securitised mortgages in Italy had a lower probability of default than non-
securitised mortgages (Albertazzi, Eramo, Gambacorta, & Salleo, 2015). However, when
some of the esoteric securitised products faced a decline, a stigma was quickly developed
and the entire securitisation market became contaminated. The products exhibiting a solid
performance could not remain immune from this stigma.
The new STS framework highlights that the EC has realised the importance of securi-
tisation in the financial market. The proposal for STS Securitisation is considered a good
development and it has been welcomed by many of the market participants but it may not
help revive the securitisation market. Many of the regulations are still administratively cum-
bersome for issuers and investors. The complexity and onerous nature of these regulations
are still disincentivising for the market participants. It is still not clear to what extent the
proposed measures in STS framework will be workable in practice. There is a widespread
uncertainty about the securities that will qualify for a more favourable treatment under this
framework (Brunsden & Hale, 2015).
Amonitoringmechanism is apparentlymissing to evaluate if the securitisation transactions
meet the STS criteria. The originators, sponsors and issuers are jointly required to notify
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the competent authority that the
securitisation transactions are STS compliant. Although such securitisation will be listed on
the website of the ESMA, it does not imply that ESMA or any other authority will certify that
the concerned securitisation is compliant with the STS requirements. An STS securitisation
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transaction may become a non-STS securitisation at a later stage and the responsibility of
notifying about this situation also lies on the originator and ESMA or any other authority
is not liable to evaluate this situation. Although the ESMA maintain a register of all the
securitisation transactions for which STS notification is provided, it does not mean that the
ESMA or any other competent authority approves that the concerned transactions meet the
STS criteria. In the absence of this verifications system by the third party, investors might
consider this notification as self-certification.
Self-certification is a potential problem that may arise out of the STS proposal. Banks
may paint a rosy picture of their securitised instruments unless some deterrence mechanism
is in place. Most of the market participants have the consensus that STS status should not
be self-awarded but it should be given by an external agency. However, according to the
British Bankers Association (BBA), originators are the best candidates to understand the
various aspects of the assets in the collateral pool (BBA, 2015). Therefore, self-certification
is considered the most suitable process, but the politicians, market and investors may see self-
certification as a return of bad habits for which the securitisation industry was stigmatised after
theGFC.The self-certificationmay not help to revive investors’ confidence in the securitisation
market as investors may be sceptical about the credibility of this self-certification.
Currently no authority is empowered to verify the STS-compliance. The recital 5 of
the CRR proposal mentions that a close monitoring of the impact of the new framework
of securitisation will be carried by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and competent
supervisory authorities. However, it is not clear if monitoring for the compliance with the
STS proposal will also be performed by any of the regulatory agencies. The ECON report has
addressed themonitoring and supervisory issues in the STS proposal. This report specifies that
ESMA along with other competent authorities including Joint Committees of the European
Supervisory Authorities (JCESA) for the securities market should supervisor and monitor the
compliance with the STS proposal. This will help in addressing the concerns of investors
regarding the the self-certification. The issue of various interpretations possibility is also
addressed in this report.43 A template for the disclosure of information about securitisation
is proposed in the ECON report. Moreover, the earlier proposal has ambiguous provisions
regarding the homogeneity of the securitisation pool. The amendment 70 of the ECON report
in the Article 8(a) of the STS proposal clarifies this ambiguity to a larger extent.
CRAs were put under an extensive scrutiny thereby placing a greater pressure on CRAs
fostering them to revise their methodology in a stringent manner. They tend to follow a
43See Amendment 5 of the ECON report for Recital 9 of the STS proposal and Amendment 12 regarding the
deletion of recital 37 of the STS proposal
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more conservative approach now while rating the securitisation transactions that has made
securitisation costlier and difficult for banks. Many market stakeholders and organisations are
in favour of giving labelling to securitisation. The investors should be given the confidence
in this market by the certification system. For this purpose, Prime Collateralised Securities
(PCS) labelling has been introduced in Europe.44 The initiative of PCS has been taken to
strengthen the ABS market with an aim to fuel the credit supply in the economy. However,
I believe that this labelling mechanism may not be very different from ratings and that the
similar blames those are placed on CRAs can be placed on PCS in the case of next crisis. This
is especially true when CRAs are mainly criticised for the ‘issuer-pays’ model and the same
model is followed in getting the PCS label.45 The labelling requirements are also placing
extra cost for issuers, thus acting as a disincentivising element for them.
The above discussion explicates that most of the premises for the new regulations for
securitisation are questionable and so are the regulations. Pacces (2010) highlights that
these financial regulations are likely to increase distortions in the banking system instead of
correcting them. Most of the regulations concerning ABS are based on controlling moral
hazard and maintaining ‘skin in the game’. However, a number of studies have documented
that these problems did not play a major role in unfolding the financial crisis (Chiesa, 2008,
2015; Hartman-Glaser, Piskorski, & Tchistyi, 2012; Pacces, 2010; Pagès, 2013; Schwarcz,
2013b, 2013c). Therefore, it is unlikely that these regulations can help in rectifying the actual
problems in the securitisation market.
The objective of reviving the securitisation market may not be achievable in the pres-
ence of a strict treatment given to securitisation. The regulators should make securitisation
economically viable for the issuers and investors. Punitive and administratively cumbersome
regulations are restricting the flourishing of securitisation market in Europe as incentives of
market participants are largely distorted (Nomura, 2015).
3.3 Regulations for Covered Bonds
A regulatory framework for Covered Bonds (CBs) is currently non-existent in the US market.
Therefore, investors in the US market are still hesitant to invest in CBs. On the contrary,
The CB market is well-established in Europe and these bonds are issued and traded under
a well-defined legal framework. However, regulations pertaining to CBs in Europe vary
from country to country. Larsson (2013) is of the view that performance of CBs should be
44It is similar to European Covered Bond Council (ECBC) labelling system for CBs.
45See http://pcsmarket.org/about-pcs/
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evaluated under these different regulatory structures in Europe and possible lessons, not only
for regulating CBs in the US but also for regulating securitisation, should be identified.
Figure 3.1: Legislation for Covered Bonds in Europe - Before Crisis
Source: ECBC (2014)
Figure 3.1 shows the status of CB legislation in Europe before the GFC. It is clear from
this figure that many countries had defined legal frameworks for CBs and some other countries
were in the process of transition or devising the legal framework for CBs. This shows that
these bonds are deeply rooted in the European market. Not only many European countries had
already well-established markets for CBs, rather interest of other countries was also growing
and they were developing legal frameworks to promote this market. The interest in CBmarket
was further incited after the eruption of the GFC.
Figure 3.2 shows the status of the CB legislation in Europe after the crisis. Many countries
in Europe established the regulations for the CB market after 2007 or existing regulations
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Figure 3.2: Legislation for Covered Bonds in Europe - After Crisis
Source: ECBC (2014)
were updated. This shows an increase in interest of European market towards CBs. There
were 19 countries with defined regulations for CBs before the GFC but this figure has reached
to 28 now, as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The financial crisis increased the dependency
of banking system across Europe on CBs to access non-depository funding from the market.
Therefore, regulatory authorities defined regulations for CB market or countries already
having a regulatory framework for CBs updated their regulations to meet the challenges posed
by changes in market conditions after the GFC.
The basic regulations for CBs were outlined in Undertakings for Collective Investment
in Transferable Securities (UCITS) directive of 1988. The Article 52(4) of this directive
provided the minimum requirement that makes a CB programme eligible for the privileged
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regulatory treatment.46 According to this article, a CB programme must meet following
requirements:
1. CBs should be issued by a credit institution.
2. A public authority should prudentially supervise the credit institution.
3. A special legal framework should govern the CB programme.
4. A law must define the eligibility of the assets used in the cover pool.
5. The cover pool should be comprised of sufficient assets to meet the claims of CB
holders.
6. A priority should be given to the claims of CB holders over the assets held in the cover
pool in case the issuer faces a default.
CBs making a compliance with these requirements are considered as a safe investment and
get a favourable treatment in regulations. The easier investments limits are justified because
of this compliance. An investor can hold the CBs issued by a single issuer up to 25% of
its total assets if they are complied with Article 52(4) of UCITS directive. The insurance
companies can also hold 40% of UCITS compliance CBs in their asset portfolio in light of the
EU Directives governing the Life and Non-Life Insurance companies (Directive 92/96/EEC
and 92/49/EEC).
The new CRD IV (2013/36/EU) and CRR (575/2013) provide a cornerstone for the
CB regulations in Europe. These directives are based on the proposal of BCBS for the
revision of capital adequacy requirements for international banks. These directives came
into enforcement on July 17, 2013 replacing the EU Directives 2010/76/EU, 2006/49/EU and
2006/48/EC. The Article 129 of the CRR provides the guidelines to get a favourable treatment
in case of CB exposures. This article defines the eligibility criteria of the assets used in the
cover pool. The minimum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for the assets used in the cover pool is
80% for the residential and 60% for the commercial and ship loans.
The Article 129(4) of the CRR provides the RWs applicable to the CBs assessed by an
External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI). However, the CBs for which credit assessment
by an ECAI is not available, RW assignment is based on RWs assigned to senior unsecured
exposures as per the Article 129(5) of the CRR. These RWs assigned to CBs are lower than
46This privileged treatment is given to the qualifying CB in form of lower risk weights for the bondholders
and exemption from investment limits.
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weights assigned to unsecured exposures. These lower RWs are reflective of a favourable
treatment given to CBs even they are not assessed by an ECAI.47 The § 7 of the same Article
provides the transparency requirements.
LCR also has central position in the set of regulations for CBs in Europe. According to
the Article 10(f) of the LCR Delegated Regulations, CBs having a compliance with UCITS
(Directive 2009/65/EC) Article 52(4) and CRR Article 129 — with issuance size of Euro
500 million or equivalent and having 2% excess coverage over the outstanding claim of
bondholders — are placed in level 1 (the highest level of liquid assets).48 According to the
Article 11(c) of this act, CBs having a compliance with UCITS Article 52(4) and CRRArticle
129(1c) & (7) — with issuance size of Euro 250 million or equivalent and having 7% excess
coverage over the outstanding claim of bondholders — are placed in level 2A. The credit
assessment of these CBs should be carried out by an ECAI as per the Article 129(4) or 129(5)
of CRR. Per Article 12(e) of this act, CBs having a compliance with UCITS Article 52(4),
CRR Article 129(4) or (5) and Article 129(7) — with issuance size of Euro 250 million or
equivalent, RWs lower than 35% and having 10% excess coverage over the outstanding claim
of bondholders — are placed in level 2B.
CBs can only be issued against high-quality assets meeting a certain criterion of LTV
Ratio. According to Capital Requirement Directive (CRD), a bank must calculate the LTV
for each loan individually. Therefore, a loan with higher LTV cannot be part of the cover
pool because of the fact that other loans in the cover pool have lower LTV. Notwithstanding,
there can be loans with higher LTV in a cover pool because of other factors e.g. property
devaluation. These loans are replaced by other loans with a lower LTV. This is highly
protective for the investors but onerous for the issuers. During the economic downturns, a
small increase in the LTV may create several challenges for the issuing institutions when
LTV is close to the ceiling. The LTV requirements currently vary from country to country
but each CB issuance must have a compliance with a certain LTV threshold (ECB, 2008).49
Table A.1 in Appendix A provides the details of the legal structure of CBs in major European
jurisdictions.
The CB holders have been provided with an exemption in the new bail-in regulations in
Europe.50 The investors and creditors are asked to take the losses and bail-in the bank before
47The RWs assigned to ABS are much higher. See section 3.4 for a detailed comparison.
48These are Jumbo covered bonds.
49See Table A.1 for comparison of LTV requirements across European jurisdictions.
50See Article 44(2b) of EU Directive 2014/59/EU. Bail-in regulations require banks to call on bondholders
instead of governments to bail them out in a crisis. The bail-in regulations is part of the wider efforts of insulating
the financial system from the negative shocks generated by ailing financial institutions (Manning, 2015). The
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the taxpayers intervene for the bail-out. The EU Directive provide competence to the member
states to exclude CBs holders from the bail-in. This provides CB holders with an extra layer
of protection, thereby increasing their confidence in this market. Hence, investors get more
inclined towards CBs as compared to other securities issued by the banking industry.
3.3.1 Critique of Regulations for Covered Bonds
The new regulations devised after the GFC, mainly liquidity, capital, funding and investment
related regulations, incentivise the CB issuance (in lieu of ABS issuance).51 The purpose is
to strengthen the funding profile of the issuing banks and provide extensive legal protection to
investors in the CBmarket. However, a large-scale CB issuance may result into a high level of
asset encumbrance that results into subordination of unsecured creditors and depositors (EBA,
2013).52 The increase in the issuance of CBs for securing cheaper funding may give rise to a
tension between the rights of the CB holders and that of Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS).
A higher CB issuance implies a downside to the DGS, as it may create an asset shortfall for
satisfying the claims of depositors.
Because of the large-scale CB issuance, banks may curtail their lending to the economic
sectors who meet the eligibility requirements for the cover pools backing the issuance of
CBs.53 Because of their subordination, unsecured creditor may increase the risk premia.
Thus, the unsecured funding via issuance of unsecured bonds may become costlier in this
situation. CBs also result into ring-fencing of the underlying assets on the balance sheet of
the issuers unlike securitisation. The issuer cannot use these assets at the time of distress to
generate liquidity. Moreover, this ring-fencing also results in the subordination of unsecured
depositors and general unsecured creditors in the event of bankruptcy.
Most of market participants in the United States and Europe are iffy if CBs could truly
replace ABS. These concerns are linked with the balance sheet capacity constraints of the
issuers and the size of domestic housing market. Therefore, promoting securitisation is
inevitable to boost the economic activity by ensuring the continuous supply of credit in the
regulations are meant to protect taxpayers from rescuing lenders. ABS are implicitly exempted from the bail-in
because of their off-balance sheet nature.
51CBs are subject to lower haircuts in the LCR and risk weights given to CBs are lower than ABS of similar
rating.
52According to the definition of asset encumbrance provided by the EBA, “An asset shall be treated as
encumbered if it has been pledged or if it is subject to any form of arrangement to secure, collateralise or credit
enhance any transaction from which it cannot be freely with-drawn”.
53CBs can only be issued against certain loans. The large issuance of CBs will not let the bank to issue loan
to other sectors and only CBs eligible loans will be issued.
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financial system that is dominated by banks.54 Hence, the regulatory authorities and policy
makers must consider the merits of a reformed securitisation market. The issuance of CBs
and ABS should be balanced and a tilt towards any single security needs to be discouraged.
The favourable regulatory treatment of covered bonds is based on historical default statis-
tics as explained by EBA (2014). Nonetheless, there is no incident of a CB default and none of
the CB holders has been asked to take the losses (not during the GFC and sovereign debt crisis
in Europe, not in Greece and not even in Cyprus), there are some CB issuing institutions that
faced a bail-out after the GFC,55 and liquidity in this market was adversely affected. The ECB
introduced Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) at that time to maintain liquidity in
this market. Conversely, the fact that an instrument did not default in the past does not make it
immune from the risk and the probability of default in future cannot be ruled out completely.
3.4 Asymmetric Regulatory Treatment
The regulations after the GFC provides a discriminative treatment to ABS as compared to
CBs that is visible in the CRR, Solvency II, Basel III and LCR Framework. There are
many concerns that a less rigorous regulatory scrutiny received by CBs relative to ABS may
eventually lead to an under-appreciation of risk in the CB market. The asymmetric regulatory
treatment of securitised instruments vis-a-vis other instruments of similar risks such as CBs
may result into unintended consequences. CBs provide a dual recourse to investors but this is
onerous for CB issuers.56
The most important discrimination is visible in the capital regulations as CBs have been
given the lowest RW of 10% in CRR,57 whereas, the RW given to securitisation exposures
with Credit Quality Step (CQS) 1 is 20%.58,59 As a result, banks taking exposures in ABS are
required to hold higher capital as compared to the ones taking exposures in CBs. Moreover,
54The issuance of ABS will decrease bank reliance on unsecured funding and CBs. This will not help them
to control their funding cost but credit supply to economy will also increase.
55These banks include Düsseldorfer Hypothekenbank (April 2008), Hypo Real Estate AG (October 2008),
Eurohypo AG (May 2009) and Valovis Bank (December 2011).
56The investors in the securitisation have only recourse to the underlying pool of collateral. If the pool is not
sufficient to meet their claims they do not have a recourse to the originator. However, CB holders do not have the
recourse to the underlying cover pool only. Their first claim is against the underlying cover pool but if this cover
pool is not sufficient to meet their claims then they have an unsecured claim against other assets of the issuing
institution pari passu to its other creditors and in some cases, they have a preferential claim against other assets.
57Article 129(4) of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 (CRR)
58Article 251 of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 (CRR)
59The credit quality of a security informs about its default risk. The securities with CQS 1 are highly rated
securities usually having a AAA rating.
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the competent authorities have been given the authority to partially or fully exempt CBs60
against the limits on large exposures.61 Therefore, a bank may take large exposures in CBs if
it is allowed by the local authorities, whereas such exemption is not given in case of ABS and
investors can take limited exposures in this market.
Solvency II proposal also provides a highly discriminative treatment to securitisation as
compared to CBs.62 For instance, spread risk factors63 under Solvency II Directive are 2.1%
(Type 1) and 12% (Type 2)64 for AAA-rated ABS65 and 0.7% for CBs of same rating.66 The
same factor for re-securitisation transactions range from 33% to 100%.67 These differences
in spread risk factor result into higher capital requirements for securitised instruments as
compared to CBs.68 The potential size of the investor base of securitised instruments may
reduce significantly because of these regulations.69
LCR framework also provides a favourable treatment to CBs as compared to securitised
products of similar rating andmaturity profiles. ABSwere altogether excluded from the initial
proposal of LCR. Although, some classes of ABS are now included in the LCR framework
after the market criticism, asymmetric treatment of ABS continues. The qualifying ABS are
required to meet several conditions. These conditions are explicitly outlined in the Article
13 of the LCR regulations.70 Mainly, these conditions include the compliance with CQS
60Article 400(2a) of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 (CRR)
61An institution shall not incur an exposure that is higher than 25% of its eligible capital or e150 million,
whichever is higher. However, CBs can be exempted from such limits. See Article 395 of Regulation (EU) No.
575/2013 (CRR).
62Spread Risk Sub Module of the EC Delegated Act Supplementing Directive 2009/138/EC (Solvency II)
63The value of a bond may decrease because of some financial mistakes made by the issuing institutions.
These mistakes may result in downgrade of issuer’s rating thereby causing a drop in value of the issued security.
The spread risk factor is assigned to various classes of bonds to account for this spread risk. The holding
institutions must hold some capital against these exposures. The amount of required capital against the holding
of a security is determined on the basis of its assigned spread risk factor.
64Securitisation is classified as Type 1 and Type 2 Securitisation. Type I Securitisation refers to high-quality
STS Securitisation.
65Article 178(1b & 2b) of the EC Delegated Act Supplementing Solvency II Directive
66Article 180(1) of the EC Delegated Act Supplementing Solvency II Directive
67Article 178(3b) of the EC Delegated Act Supplementing Solvency II Directive
68The spread risk factor of an instrument is directly proportional to the risk weight assigned to that instrument.
69Before the eruption of GFC, approximately 15% of securitised instruments were placed with insurance
companies. Therefore, the strict regulations provided in Solvency II might cause a remarkable decline in the
inclination of insurers to buy these securities, as it will be uneconomical for them to hold these securities because
of high capital charges associated with them.
70Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 of 10 October 2014 to supplement Regulation (EU) No
575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council with regard to liquidity coverage requirement for Credit
Institutions. Official Journal of the European Union, 11.
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requirements71, class of tranches72, LTV requirements73 and full recourse for mortgages.74
This may not be possible for all ABS transactions to meet these requirements. Despite all
these strict requirements, all classes of qualifying ABS are placed in level 2B assets i.e. last
category of the LCR framework. The total amount of level 2B assets must not exceed 15% of
the total liquidity buffer, whereas this limits is 60% and 30% for level 1 and level 2A assets of
the LCR respectively and CBs are placed in these first two categories.75 Consequently, many
of ABS virtually remain excluded from the LCR framework.
The favourable treatment of CBs is also visible in Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) of
Basel III.76 NSFR is meant to ensure that a bank maintains a stable funding profile in relation
to the composition of its assets and off-balance sheet activities. Among all the securitised
instruments, only RMBS are part of the NSFR.77 The amount required to fund a specific class
of assets is determined on the basis of the Required Stable Funding (RSF) factor assigned
to each class of assets. The RSF factor78 assigned to CBs (with a minimum credit rating of
AA-) is merely 15% but for the qualifying RMBS (with a minimum credit rating of AA) the
same factor is 50% (BCBS, 2014a). Other types of securitised products receive RSF factor of
100%. A bank taking exposure in securitised instruments will be required to maintain large
number of funds against its securitisation exposure because of higher RSF factors.
CBs are also getting favourable treatment in the form of lower haircuts on the discount
window. There are five categories of the eligible assets that can be used as collateral.79 CBs
are placed in the Category II (Jumbo CBs) and III (All other CBs). The applicable haircuts to
CBs with the CQS 1 and 2 start from 1% and varies with the maturity of CBs. However, ABS
71The securitised instruments with a credit assessment of at least CQS 1 are allowed in the LCR.
72The securitised instruments must belong to the most senior tranche.
73All securitised instruments must be subject to the LTV requirements laid down in the point 1 of the Article
129(1)(d) of the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (CRR).
74The mortgage owner remains responsible for the shortfall in sale proceeds from the property.
75Article 17(1c) of Regulation (EU) 2015/61 (LCR)
76Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is the amount of available stable funding divided by the required stable
funding. This ratio should be equal to or greater than 100%. Available Stable Funding (ASF) is the amount
of liabilities and capital that is expected to be stable over the period considered by the NSFR, i.e. one year,
and the Required Stable Funding (RSF) is a function of liquidity profile and maturities of the assets held by an
institution. NSFR will be applicable from January 01, 2018.
77The earlier version of LCR also included RMBS only. However, ABS backed by auto loans and Small and
Medium Enterprise (SME) loans are also included in the recent LCR framework, but no changes have been
made in the NSFR.
78RSF factor is assigned to different classes of assets to approximate the amount of funding required for the
holding of particular class of assets. The assets are required to be funded either because of their roll-over or
because of their monetisation inability. RSF is somewhat akin to the haircut applicable to liquid assets for the
purpose of LCR calculations.
79Annexure of Guideline (EU) No. 2016/65 of 18 November 2015
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Table 3.2: Asymmetric Regulations for Securitisation and Covered Bonds
Regulations Securitisation CBs
LCR (Basel III) Placed in level 2B category of
HQLA (the lowest category)
Placed in all categories of HQLA
(even in the top category).
Lowest Haircut is 25% Lowest Haircut is 7%
Maximum allowed limit is 15%
of HQLA
Maximum allowed limit is 40%
of HQLA
Only RMBS, Commercial ABS
and Auto ABS are included in
HQLA (with restrictions)
NSFR RSF Factor is 50% RSF Factor is 15%
(Basel III) Minimum rating AA Minimum rating AA-
Only RMBS are included
Risk Weights (CRR) RW floor for rated securitised in-
struments is 20% for CQS 1
RW floor for rated CBs is 10%
for CQS 1
Risk Weights for
Unrated Securities
(CRR)
1,250% RW for unrated ABS RW assignment is based on RW
assigned to senior unsecured ex-
posures
Spread Risk Factor
(Solvency II)
Ranges from 2.1% to 100% for
different securitised instrument
depending on credit quality and
maturity structure
Ranges from 0.7% to 0.9% de-
pending on credit quality andma-
turity structure
Haircuts (ECB) Placed in the last category of el-
igible assets
Placed in category II and III
Applicable haircut is flat 10% ir-
respective of maturity
Applicable haircut starts from
1% and varies with the maturity
Securities with CQS 1 and CQS
2 are eligible only
CBs with CQS 3 are also in-
cluded
with CQS 1 and 2 are placed in the last category of eligible assets and the applicable haircut
is flat 10% irrespective of the maturity. Moreover, CBs with the CQS 3 are still eligible for
collateral but ABS with CQS 3 are not. As a result of higher haircuts, CBs overtook ABS
as collateral in the repo market (Altomento & Bussoli, 2014). The asymmetric treatment of
securitisation and CBs has been summarised in Table 3.2.
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3.5 Conclusion
The review of regulations performed in this chapter provides with three perspectives of the
regulations for securitisation and CBs. First, the premises for the current regulations are
not aligned with the theoretical understanding of securitisation transactions. This raises the
questions on the credibility of the regulations. It highlights that regulations may fail to target
the actual problems lying in the securitisation market. The regulators need to reconsider these
premises and recalibrate the regulations accordingly.
Second, the regulatory treatment of securitisation is not based on the European realities,
rather it is highly influenced by the situation in the US market. The European securitisation
market had different dynamics and the problems that were pervasive in the US securitisation
market were not ubiquitous in the European market. The differences in both markets must
be understood and problems on the other side of Atlantic should not be generalised. The
treatment of the European securitisation market should be aligned with its own dynamics.
Thirdly, an asymmetric treatment is provided to ABS and CBs in the current regulations.
The consequences of this asymmetric treatment need to be evaluated. The favourable treatment
given to a specific instrument may generate a system-wide instability, as it might promote over-
reliance on it. This may adversely affect the funding diversification of issuers and investment
diversification of investors. A financial system flooded with a certain instrument may become
fragile to the economic shocks of that specific market. A situation akin to the securitisation
crisis may arise in future. Therefore, there is a need to develop a level playing field for the
securities with similar risk characteristics and maturity structures.
The economic analysis conducted in the subsequent chapters will provide a basis for
reconsidering the regulatory treatment as it will help evaluate the premises of the current
regulations and understand the realities of the European market. The comparative approach
being followed in this study will be helpful in evaluating the asymmetric treatment given to
ABS and CBs.
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Chapter 4
Securitisation, Covered Bonds and Credit
Risk Taking Behaviour of Banks
The universe of mortgage lending has gotten to the point where there is a place
in it for everybody.
Joe Mays
4.1 Introduction
It is a hoary notion in the banking industry that securitisation leads to lax lending standards.
Securitisation is chastised for moral hazard, adverse selection, and high risk taking. These
problems are often attributed to the lack of so-called ‘skin in the game’. This view of
securitisation has influenced the policy reforms on both sides of the Atlantic after the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC). According to the US regulatory authorities, the above-mentioned
problems can be mitigated if the underlying assets are kept on the balance sheet of originator
(Pinedo & Tanenbaum, 2010),1 as this will ameliorate the loan origination practices. Covered
Bonds (CBs), a close counterpart of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), are supposed to serve
this purpose because of their on-balance sheet nature. This study is aimed at evaluating the
impact of these two instruments on the credit risk taking behaviour of banks.
The policy reforms premised on the view that securitisation leads to moral hazard thereby
increasing the riskiness of issued loans are questionable (Gorton, 2009; Pacces, 2010). These
regulations emphasise on risk retention. However, these risk retention requirements seem
unnecessary as securitising banks already retain the risk in one form or another (Gorton &
1Similar views are visible in the European reforms. See risk retention requirements in Capital Requirement
Regulations (CRR) Directive.
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Souleles, 2007). Nonetheless it is still an unanswered question whether the on-balance sheet
risk retention can make a difference. Banks retain all the risk in case of CBs. Therefore,
if risk retention can make a difference then, ceteris paribus, CB issuing banks should not
face problems similar to securitising banks. The ‘skin in the game’ in case of CBs should
refrain banks from the imprudent risk taking. To this end, this study attempts to investigate
the impact of securitisation and CBs on credit risk-taking behaviour of banks in Europe.
Previous studies about the effects of securitisation are equivocal. The theory is not
conclusive and empirical studies provide contrasting results. Moreover, these studies have
certain limitations. First, most of these studies focus on the US market and their results
are not generalizable to Europe, especially since sub-prime mortgage market is largely non-
existent here. Therefore, this study endeavours to explore the European realities. Second, the
methodology of some studies has been recently challenged. For instance, the most prominent
empirical work about the impact of securitisation on lending standards is done by Keys et al.
(2009, 2010, 2012). For controlling the endogeneity, they ingeniously use FICO score as a
rule of thumb to determine securitisation decision.2 Bubb and Kaufman (2014) show that the
evidence of moral hazard has been misinterpreted in this work. The exclusion restriction of
the instrumental variable is violated that invalidates their research design.3 FICO Score can
also affect the screening incentives of a lender.4
This study follows a different approach. It compares securitising banks with CB issuing
banks. This is one of the very few studies comparingABSandCBs. CBs are close counterparts
of ABS,5 but most of the allegations placed on ABS may not be applicable to CBs. Banks
maintain a strong ‘skin in the game’ in the case of CBs as opposed to ABS. The investigation
in this chapter is expected to make a threefold contribution to the literature. First, it focuses
on the European securitisation that is still relatively under-investigated. Second, CBs have
been ignored in the academic literature and this study attempts to fill this gap. Finally, this
study helps understand the role of risk retention (in the form of on-balance sheet retention) in
shaping the credit risk taking behaviour of banks.
The most important issue in analysing the impact of securitisation and CBs on credit risk
taking behaviour is the endogeneity of the decision to issue ABS or CBs, which leads to the
self-selection bias. A natural experiment can be an ideal solution to overcome the problem of
endogeneity. However, in the presence of two different instruments, it is extremely unlikely
2Loans below the FICO score of 620 are harder to securitise
3The instrumental variable should not affect the dependent variable.
4The lender may rely on high FICO score and do not screen the borrower properly. Therefore, the change in
screening cannot necessarily be linked with securitisation.
5The terms ‘securitisation’ and ‘ABS’ have been used interchangeably here.
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to find an exogenous shock that can be used as a natural experiment. Many previous studies
have used the instrumental variable methodology, but choice of the right instrument is a
potential problem. Selection of a wrong instrument can invalidate the findings. The selection
of appropriate instruments becomes harder while dealing with multiple choices, as this study
deals with the choice of issuing ABS or CBs.
The empirical design followed in this study addresses the issue of self-selection bias
by using the Propensity Score Methods (PSM). It makes the use of recent developments in
the PSM literature i.e. Covariate Balancing Propensity Score (CBPS). To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first study using CBPS in a finance study. Thus, this study makes an
important methodological contribution as well. The study estimates the impact of ABS and
CB issuance on the change in credit risk level of a bank that is measured as difference of pre
and post-issuance risk level. This method is known as double differencing or Difference-in-
Differences (DID). The first difference controls for the unobserved heterogeneity and second
difference provides the estimate of impact.
The study uses data from 253 banks operating in 7 European countries from 2000-2014.
The initial results suggest that European banks do not securitise to transfer risk, rather than
liquidity generation. The impact of ABS and CB issuance on credit risk-taking is observed
in the short and long run. The results show that ‘skin in the game’ in the form of on-balance
sheet risk retention may not be playing an important role in terms of determining the risk
level of a bank. Securitisation does not lead to an increase in the existing risk level of a bank.
Results do not support that securitising banks under-price their risk. Moreover, CB issuing
banks — although they retain a greater risk portion — tend to issue riskier loans in the long
run.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews previous research in
the field, focusing on securitisation and covered bonds. Section 4.3 provides details about the
research methodology. This section explains various methodological issues involved in the
analysis under a basic framework and introduces the PSM and CBPS methodology to deal
with the identified issues. Section 4.4 provides detailed results and explain the main findings.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
The securitisation process has been extensively studied, especially after the eruption of the
GFC. Moral hazard, adverse selection and the risk-taking behaviour of banks have been the
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key areas of interest for researchers. On the contrary, CBs did not get much attention in the
academic literature. However, the market has shown a deeper interest in CBs after the GFC
and they are considered an alternative to securitised products. There are mixed views about
the above-referred allegations placed on securitisation, but a little is known about CBs.
4.2.1 Securitisation
A number of theoretical and empirical studies have documented that securitisation leads to
lax lending standards. According to Pennacchi (1988), loan sale may create moral hazards
and adverse selection problems as it affects the bank’s incentive to monitor borrowers. These
problems mainly stem from the information asymmetry. Most of the information used by a
bank during the loan origination process is not transmitted to the market. A bank may have an
incentive to securitise its poor quality loans (Gorton & Pennacchi, 1995). It might also lack
incentives to properly screen its borrowers at the time of loan origination and continuously
monitor them after the loan securitisation (Morrison, 2005).
The originate-to-distribute model has been ferociously criticised in the post-crisis era.6
Purnanandam (2011) finds that the originate-to-distribute model led to the issuance of inferior
quality loans in the years close to the crisis. Banks following this model had a higher default
rate. The empirical evidence provided in his study endorses the popular view that securitisation
causes the loss of screening incentives. The adverse selection problem in securitisation is
also confirmed by the empirical evidence provided by Elul (2015). Nonetheless, these results
cannot be generalised to the European market where the originate-to-distribute model never
got popularity.7
Bord and Santos (2015) conducted their study on Collateralised Loan Obligations (CLOs)
i.e. a form of securitised products, and evaluated if loans used in CLO transactions performed
differently than non-securitised ones. Their results suggest that banks followed lax underwrit-
ing standards while issuing loans used in CLO transactions as compared to non-securitised
loans. However, these banks were aware of the risk associated with these loans as they were
charging higher interest rates. They also find that the share of the retained securitisation (‘skin
in the game’) also played a significant role in this market. The loans issued by banks with
6In the originate-to-distribute model, loans are issued with a view to securitise them at a later stage. Many
non-banking institutions also get involved in securitisation through this model. Frankel and Jin (2015) argues that
securitisation worsens the screening by allowing the entry of remote lenders. Therefore, banks start competing
with non-banks.
7The loan origination in Europe remained within the banking industry and remote lenders were not involved
in loan business. Hence, the problems pervasive in the US market cannot be prevalent in the European market.
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higher retention level performed better than others. These findings endorse the recent policy
reforms about the risk retention. Similar results are presented by Carey (1998) who finds
that retained loans performed better than the securitised ones. These findings imply, first,
that banks retain higher quality loans on their balance sheet and second, monitoring of loans
creates some value.
The study of Kara et al. (2015) provides some interesting results. They endorse the
signalling8 and monitoring9 hypotheses at the same time. They find that loans with a higher
default risk have a lower probability to be securitised. However, once these good quality loans
are sold to investors, bank’s incentive to continuously monitor its borrowers is reduced. This
lack of monitoring deteriorates the performance of these loans that are initially considered
of good quality. These results endorse the view presented by previous researchers about the
monitoring incentives (Bord & Santos, 2015; Carey, 1998).
On the other hand, many studies depart from the views about moral hazard and incentive
problems associated with securitisation (Chiesa, 2008, 2015; Hartman-Glaser et al., 2012;
Pagès, 2013). Chiesa (2008) states that credit risk transfer (through securitisation) cannot
be necessarily linked with the distortion of monitoring incentives instead, the optimal use of
securitisation may enhance monitoring incentives. She further argues that default of loans
can mainly be linked with the state of the economy and bad luck instead of securitisation. If
this is true, the issuance of a specific type of security becomes irrelevant in determining the
credit risk taking of a bank rather, economic and market conditions determine its credit risk
level.
The study of Bonner, Streitz, andWedow (2016) negates the positive effect of securitisation
on risk taking of banks. They find that securitisation reduces risk-taking because of the risk
aversion of banks and investors. Along similar lines, Casu, Clare, Sarkisyan, and Thomas
(2011) explain that banks well understand the risk arising out of the securitised pool and
become more risk averse. This motivates them to have less risky assets and to allocate
capital to a portfolio with assets having lower credit risk. This is supported by the empirical
evidence in their study. They ascribe this observation to the recourse hypothesis.10 The
empirical evidence provided by Benmelech et al. (2012) also negates views about adverse
8A bank securitises its better-quality loans to generate a positive signal about the loan quality.
9Securitised loans perform worse than non-securitised loans because of reduced monitoring incentives.
10The originators provide an implicit or explicit recourse to the securitisation structure. Explicit recourse is
often provided through credit enhancement and standby letters to securitisation structures, known as Special
Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). Implicit recourse can be provided by selling assets to an SPV on discount, purchasing
assets from the SPV on a greater amount as compared to the fair value, replacing the non-performing assets with
performing ones and providing credit enhancement beyond contractual arrangements. See Gorton and Souleles
(2007) for further details.
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selection caused by the securitisation in their study on CLOs. They find a weak evidence of
under-performance of securitised loans.
The motives behind securitisation are very important to evaluate the securitisation effects.
Bank may securitise their assets because of the regulatory capital arbitrage (Ambrose et al.,
2005), to reduce the bankruptcy cost (Gorton & Souleles, 2007), transfer risk (Panetta &
Pozzolo, 2010), increase liquidity (Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010) and decrease funding cost
(Loutskina, 2011). If securitisation is performed for the former two motives, then it cannot
be blamed for the risk taking or moral hazard problems. Bank will securitise their less risky
assets because of the similar capital charges applicable to a broader set of assets and safer
assets are helpful in achieving the bankruptcy remote structures. However, the risk transfer
objective may precipitate risk taking. The bank might issue riskier loans with a view to
securitise them at a later stage and transfer their risk. This situation can be ascribed to adverse
selection. A bank might take advantage of information asymmetries and securitise some of it
worst loans (Parlour & Plantin, 2008).11
Banks who securitise their assets with a view to transfer credit risk are likely to increase
the risk they take. They tend to issue loans with a view to securitise them on a later stage
(the so-called originate-to-distribute model). Martín-Oliver and Saurina (2007) empirically
evaluate motives behind securitisation in Spanish banks. They find liquidity as the main
driver behind securitisation. Capital arbitrage can be another potential driver in some cases.12
However, they do not find that risk transfer is a motive of securitisation. Similar results
are provided by some other studies as well (Ambrose et al., 2005; Cardone-Riportella et al.,
2010).
The empirical investigation carried out by Ambrose et al. (2005) confirms that higher
risk loans are retained by the banks and lower risk loans are securitised. Therefore, the
retention of high-risk loans prevents the distortion of monitoring incentives. It implies that
the securitisation decision is not driven by the information asymmetry and that risk transfer
may not be a motive behind the securitisation. Ultimately, securitised loans can be expected
to be safer. Their results confirm the regulatory capital arbitrage as a motive of securitisation
(Ambrose et al., 2005).
11An investor might not be aware if a bank securitises because of the outside investment opportunities or some
inside information. The trading in the secondary market might face a break down resulting into illiquid loans if
the adverse selection problem is too severe. However, market remains liquid if banks are selling their loans for
private motives (Akerlof, 1970).
12The securities issued against the loans provided to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) were meant to
serve the purpose of regulatory arbitrage to some extent.
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4.2.2 Covered Bonds
ABS and CBs have similar functioning at a basic level and are expected to provide similar
economic benefits (IOSCO, 2012). A bank places its assets into a ring-fenced pool after
originating them. The characteristics of the issued securities and ring-fencing practices may
vary from country to country and type of the security issued against these assets, but these
assets serve as a collateral against the issued securities (ABS or CBs). However, unlike
securitisation, collateral against CBs does not leave the balance sheet of the issuer, rather
these ring-fenced assets are separated from other assets. The issuing institution explicitly
mentions that these assets are held against CBs.13 The on-balance sheet nature of CBs is
supposed to maintain the banks’ incentive to monitor and screen their borrowers (Pinedo &
Tanenbaum, 2010).
CB is prosaically considered to be a product that may help prevent the next financial
crisis. CBs, on the one hand, provide a secure mean of investment to investors because of
many layers of protection and, on the other hand, they serve as a stable source of funding
for issuers who can sell them to investors or central banks for obtaining funds (Murphy,
2013). Prudent underwriting is perceived as the primary benefit of CBs relative to ABS
(Surti, 2010). CBs offer a greater level of transparency as compared to ABS. The information
asymmetry problem, largely associated with ABS, is quite controlled in the case of CB
issuance. Moreover, the on-balance sheet and dynamic cover pool features abstain the bank
from moral hazard and adverse selection. Therefore, the lemon market problem is hard to
expect in case of CBs. However, CB may not be the silver bullet as it is flaunted. It should
be taken as another financial instrument in the arsenal of financial market having benefits and
costs at the same time (Harrison, 2008).
CBs, because of their on-balance sheet nature, do not provide the benefits of regulatory
capital arbitrage and credit risk transfer, but are issued to meet liquidity requirements and
control funding cost. According to many previous studies, securitisation in the European
market is also driven by the same motives and not by credit risk transfer and regulatory capital
arbitrage (Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010; Martín-Oliver & Saurina, 2007). Therefore, if both
instruments are issued for liquidity and funding cost motives, the issuance of ABS or CBs
should not affect the credit risk-taking behaviour of a bank. The analysis performed in this
13The assets held against the issuance of CBs are recorded in a cover register, in the case of issuance of famous
German bonds, ‘Pfandbrief’. An independent cover pool monitor ensures that the cover pool is well maintained
all the time and all the necessary adjustments are made timely and recorded in the cover register. A certificate
is also issued by this monitor before the issuance of covered bonds. This monitor plays an important role in
maintaining the confidence of investors and ensuring the stability of the covered bonds market.
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study sheds light on this issue.
4.3 Research Methodology
This study follows a different path to study the securitisation market in the European context.
It compares ABS with CBs. The inclusion of these two instruments in a single study gives
rise to various challenges calling for a carefully crafted research design. This section first
explains the basic framework and identifies associated methodological issues if the analysis
is performed under this basic framework. It then introduces PSM and CBPS to overcome the
problems related to the analysis. Finally, it provides details about the empirical approach and
the data used in this study.
4.3.1 Basic Framework
This study aims at evaluating the impact of ABS and CBs on credit risk taking behaviour of
banks. Let Ri,t+1 be the credit risk of bank i at time t+1 that is encountered by two financing
decisions i.e. securitisation (s) and issuance of CBs (b) at time t. The purpose of the analysis
in this study is explaining the differences in Ri,t+1 across banks and periods using:
• si,t , securitised products issued by bank i at date t; si,t = 0 if the bank did not securitise,
si,t = 1 otherwise;
• bi,t , CBs issues by bank i at date t; bi,t = 0 if the bank did not issue covered bonds,
bi,t = 1 otherwise;
• ZRi,t , a HR×1 vector of additional controls
The risk equation is then given by:
Ri,t+1 = ZRi,tβR+θssi,t+θbbi,t+u
R
i,t (4.1)
The positive impact of securitisation on risk taking behaviour is shown if:
θs > 0
while the impact of on balance sheet retention (in case of CB issuance) in controlling the
credit risk-taking behaviour is also shown if:
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θs > θb
This study uses two proxies for measuring the credit risk taking of banks i.e. the ratio
of Risk-Weighted Assets to Total Assets (RWATA) and the Loan Loss Provision (LLP). This
is in line with many previous studies (Aggarwal & Jacques, 2001; Avery & Berger, 1991;
Casu et al., 2011; Dionne & Harchaoui, 2008; Salah & Fedhila, 2012). RWATA captures the
bank’s allocation of its assets across different risk categories and helps evaluate the quality
of the asset portfolio.14 LLP can be a good proxy to measure the quality of issued loans as
per the bank’s estimations. LLP shows how much losses have been estimated by a bank on
its loan portfolio. A higher LLP ratio shows the issuance of risky assets by the bank. At the
same time, this ratio is also indicative of a (conservative) risk averse approach of the bank.
A positive relation of securitisation with RWATA and a negative one with LLP implies that
banks take more risk and under-price this risk as a result of securitisation, as explained by
Kara et al. (2015). However, a negative relationship with RWATA and a positive one with
LLP do not support this understanding about securitisation.
The financing decision of bank i at time t is induced by its conditions at time t−1. Hence,
the issuance of ABS and CBs can be determined by K-dimensional vector of pre-treatment
covariates xsi,t−1 and x
b
i,t−1 respectively. ABS and CBs equations are given by:
Pr(si,t = 1|xsi,t−1) = f [(xsi,t−1)′βs] (4.2)
Pr(bi,t = 1|xbi,t−1) = f [(xbi,t−1)′βb] (4.3)
Banks in the population can be classified into four groups.
1. Non-Issuers: Banks who do not issue any of the two securities under consideration in
this study.
2. Securitisers: Banks who issue securitised products.
3. CB Issuers: Banks who issue covered bonds.
4. SB Issuers: Banks who issue both securitised products and covered bonds.
14The Basel Accord I divides assets and off-balance sheet activities of a bank in four categories as per their
credit risk i.e. (i) assets with zero risk weight (government securities and reserves); (ii) assets with a low risk
(interbank deposits); (iii) assets with a medium level of risk (e.g. mortgage loans); (iv) assets with high default
risk (e.g. consumer, commercial and credit card loans). The assets for which no risk weight is mentioned receive
100% risk weight. The total risk-weighted assets of a bank are calculated as follows:
RWA= 0×AC I+0.2×AC II+0.5×AC III+1.0×AC IV , where AC = Asset Category
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Methodological Issues
The basic framework, explained in section 4.3.1, entails various methodological issues. First,
the most important issue is endogeneity of the decision of issuing ABS or CBs. The issuance
of a particular instrument by the bank i at time t can be prompted by multiple factors at time
t− 1. The fund managers of banks may have some inside information or motives to decide
the issuance of a particular type of instrument. For instance, fund managers want to issue
more loans in order to gather maximum commission that is often linked with the number of
issued loans. However, the capital requirements do not allow them to issue loans those are
beyond the limits of existing capital. They might use securitisation for the capital arbitrage.
As a result they might issue more loans to meet their objective of higher compensation. Thus,
sit and bit are endogenous.
The problem of self-selection bias is most likely to arise in this type of situation.15 Banks
may also select the issuance of ABS and CBs to meet their liquidity needs. When liquid assets
are produced beyond their current needs, available funds are used to create new assets. This
excess capacity created by the issuance of ABS and CBs might motivate them to issue some
riskier loans. Therefore, estimation of equation (4.1) with traditional models of panel data
analysis (fixed and random effect models) may not provide unbiased results as they require
that sample selection must take place outside the model (Dustmann & Rochina-Barrachina,
2007). The bias in the results will be induced because of the selectivity problem.
Another type of endogeneity stems from the reverse causation. Securitisation may affect
credit risk taking behaviour, but credit risk taken previously can also affect the decision to
securitise. Therefore, if the bank managers have already issued loans with a higher credit risk,
this might motivate them to securitise such loans. Similarly, CBs can be issued to alter the
reputation of a bank, as CBs are considered safer securities. Second, factors other than the
issuance of one specific type of security can explain the differences in credit risk behaviour of
banks (e.g. increasing competition among banks). Third, some banks can be more sensitive
to the economic shocks that may affect their lending behaviour. This resilience can be mainly
linked with the size of the bank. Bigger banks have the capacity to better absorb the economic
shocks. The involvement of all these issues makes it difficult to evaluate the impact of the
issuance of a specific financial instrument on credit risk-taking behaviour of banks.
Popular methods to deal with selection bias and endogeneity problems are based on instru-
15This is a very common problem in non-experimental studies. In experimental studies, the treatment can be
random but in non-experimental context, this is generally not true. The selection problem arises in another form
in studies using panel data and focus on units observed at all dates. This may also create self-selection bias. See
Heckman (1979)
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mental variables (IV), Heckman’s two-stage estimation (Inverse-Mill Ratio - IMR Method)
and Propensity Score Methodss (PSMs). The researcher employing instrumental variable
methodology must have at least one variable to predict the choice. The selected instrumental
variable(s) must meet three conditions. First, they should not be correlated with error terms;
second, they should have a strong impact on the choice variable and third they should not affect
the outcome variable. The major problem in this methodology is to find the right variable(s)
meeting the above three conditions. For this reason, this methodology is not used widely.
The Heckman’s two-stage estimation method (Heckman, 1979) has also been widely used
by researchers. However, thismethod has been criticised for its lack of robustness and potential
sensitivity (Tucker, 2011). Therefore, the use of alternative methods is currently increasing.
Some of the previous studies have used IMR and PSM simultaneously. Nonetheless, these
two methods work under different assumptions and results may differ significantly thereby
creating confusion.
This study employs PSM to analyse the impact of ABS and CBs on the credit risk taking
behaviour of banks. PSM has been widely used in the health economics literature to measure
the impact of different treatments, but its usage in accounting and finance is also growing.16
The traditional PSM method of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) deals with two groups (i.e.
treatment and control). Nonetheless, the use of PSM is extended to the case of multiple
groups by Imbens (2000). Further developments in PSM for multiple treatments are made
by other researchers (Abadie & Imbens, 2015; Imai & van Dyk, 2004; Lechner, 2001). This
study also deals with a situation in which a bank faces multiple choices.
4.3.2 Propensity Score Method (PSM)
In accounting and finance, firms face the dilemma of selecting among different alternatives.
These alternatives are considered as treatments here. Firms selecting a specific alternative are
placed in the treatment group and the others are placed in the control group. The impact of a
specific treatment d (d ∈D) on the credit risk-taking behaviour of a bank (i.e. the outcome R)
can be measured by calculating the difference between the state of the world if d was chosen
and the state of the world if it was not. However, the latter situation is counter-factual as the
same bank cannot be observed under both situations. This is the fundamental problem of
causal inference (Holland, 1986).
PSM deals with the fundamental problem of causal inference by calculating the proba-
bility (pidi,t) of receiving the treatment (d) for each unit i at time t. PSM works under two
16See Tucker (2011) for a review of studies using PSM in accounting and finance.
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key assumptions. The first is conditional independence or unconfoundedness assumption.
According to Wooldridge (2002), the treatment effect is identified if the information related
to observable covariates can be collected and if the treatment is determined by observables
only, that is, it is unaffected by unobservables. This assumption is given by:
(Rdi,t+1)⊥ Di,t |Xi,t−1,∀X (4.4)
This is a strong assumption as the systemic differences between banks may exist even
after conditioning on a set of observable covariates. For instance, such differences may arise
because banks operating in different regions face different market conditions thereby affecting
their credit policies differently. To overcome this problem, this study focuses on change in the
credit risk measured as the difference between the credit risk before and after the issuance of
ABS and CBs. The change in the credit risk of a bank is measured as:
∆Ri,t+1 = Ri,t+1−Ri,t (4.5)
This is the Difference-in-Differences (DID) or double-differencing approach.17 The im-
pact of time-invariant unobservables is controlled in this approach. Focus on ∆Ri,t+1 instead
of Ri,t+1 helps control the bank fixed effects and removes the bank-level heterogeneity. The
second difference provides the estimate of the impact of ABS and CB issuance on the credit
risk-taking behaviour. The assumptions to justify DID are weaker than those required to
justify conventional matching under unconfoundedness assumption (Smith & Todd, 2005).
The second assumption is overlap or common support assumption. The fulfilment of
this assumption rules out the possibility that pre-treatment covariates can perfectly predict
Dit . This assumption ascertains that units having the same scores can be either in treatment
or control group (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). The Propensity Score (PS) in the presence of
this assumption cannot be zero or one, as shown by:
0< pr(Di,t = d|Xi,t−1)< 1 (4.6)
PS is conditioned on K-dimensional pre-treatment covariates. The formula for PS is:
pidi,t = pr(Di,t = d|Xi,t−1) (4.7)
Traditionally, the estimated PS are used to match units from the treatment and control
group. To estimate the treatment effect, the mean outcome of matched units is compared.
17This is non-paramteric version of DID, used in line with Casu et al. (2013).
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There are two types of treatment effects (τ) estimated in PSM:Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
and Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). ATE is the estimation of difference in
the outcome had the entire population been observed under one treatment d′ versus the entire
population been observed under another treatment d′′ or no treatment (control group), whereas
ATT is defined by the difference in the outcome of units getting treatment d′ and that of those
actually getting d′′ had they received the d′ (Wooldridge, 2002).
The choice of the treatment effect depends on the research question and target population
of the study. ATE is more interesting to calculate if treatment can be offered to all elements of
a population. Conversely, if some elements in the population cannot get a particular treatment,
ATT becomes the estimand of interest. One of the potential disadvantages of ATT is that
it does not provide the information about the relative effect of a treatment program if it is
extended beyond its base clientele (McCaffrey et al., 2013). I believe that ATE should be the
parameter of interest in this study, as all the banks can issue either ABS or CB but it is matter
of personal choice to issue a specific security or not. ATE is given by:
τd
′,d′′
ate = E(∆Rd
′
i,t+1|Di,t = d′,d′′,Zi,t)−E(∆Rd
′′
i,t+1|Di,t = d′,d′′,Zi,t) (4.8)
Covariate Balancing Propensity Scores (CBPS)
This study uses the CBPS methodology. CBPS is a recent development in PSM introduced
by Imai and Ratkovic (2014). CBPS is more robust than the traditional propensity score
estimation methods as it improves the resulting covariate balance. PS , at the same time, is a
covariate balancing score and the conditional probability of assigning the treatment. CBPS
exploits this dual characteristic of PS and a single model here determines the mechanism
of treatment assignment and the covariate balancing weights. Incorporation of the covariate
balance in the estimations is a more robust way of PS estimation that optimises the covariate
balance and controls the bias.
Traditionally, the popular method for the estimation of PS is the logistic model:
piβ (Xi) =
exp(XDi β )
1+ exp(XDi β )
(4.9)
where β ∈Θ is an L-dimensional vector of unknown parameters and L=K. β is estimated
by maximizing the log-likelihood function:
βˆMLE = arg max
β∈Θ
N
∑
i=1
Di logpiβ (Xi)+(1−Di)log{1−piβ (Xi)} (4.10)
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Assuming:
piβ (.) ∈C2(β ) =⇒ first order condition
1
N
N
∑
i=1
sβ (Di,Xi) = 0, sβ (Di,Xi) =
Dipi ′β (Xi)
piβ (Xi)
−
(1−Di)pi ′β (Xi)
1−piβ (Xi)
(4.11)
Equation (4.11) shows the condition used to balance the function of covariates. The main
problem in this traditional approach is that treatment effects may become largely biased if the
treatment model is misspecified (Smith & Todd, 2005). CBPS help overcome this problem by
exploiting the above-explained dual characteristics of PS . CBPS operationalises the covariate
balancing property by using the inverse propensity score weighting:
E=
{
DiX˜i
piβ (Xi)
− (1−Di)X˜i
1−piβ (Xi)
}
(4.12)
where X˜i = f (Xi), an M-dimensional vector-valued measurable function of Xi. Equation
(4.12) gives more weights to the covariates with a stronger predictive power of the treatment
assignment. Maximum Likelihood (MLE) might not balance the covariates if model is
misspecified. Hence, setting X˜i = Xi ensures that first moment of each covariate is balanced,
even in the presence of model misspecification. Both the first and second moments are
balanced when X˜i = (XTi X2Ti)T . The model estimated through CBPS will be just-identified
when L = M and over-identified when M > L.18 Imai and Ratkovic (2014) found that just
identified models perform better than over-identified ones, because the latter fail to detect
model misspecification which leads to a significant bias in the estimates.
CBPS has many advantages over traditional approaches of PS estimations. First, it
helps mitigate model misspecification by taking in account parameter values that lead to
a robust covariate balance. Second, CBPS incorporates all theoretical properties of the
GMM and Empirical Likelihood (EL). Third, matching or weighting can be used without
any modifications as it already provides improved estimations of PS. Finally, unlike other
conventional methods of PS estimations, CBPS can be extended to non-binary treatments and
continuous treatments. Moreover, CBPS simplifies the process of balancing covariates and
helps avoiding the iterative process of refitting the logistic PS model (Fong & Imai, 2015;
Imai & Ratkovic, 2014, 2015).
Another method dealing with multiple treatment cases is the use of Generalised Boosted
Models (GBM) by McCaffrey, Ridgeway, and Morral (2004). However, the high dimension-
18Over-identified model is estimated using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach.
108
ality of the pre-treatment covariate vector can become a challenge for GBM. Furthermore, an
evaluation of various PS methods conducted by Wyss et al. (2014) shows that CBPS provides
more robust estimates than GBM in many instances. In their simulation study, they found that
CBPS was the best estimation method. The simulation study of Imai and Ratkovic (2014)
also shows that CBPS outperforms GBM.
Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights (IPTW)
Estimation of the treatment effect by the Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW)
is an extension of the PSM. The IPTW approach tries to mimic a situation akin to random
assignment to the treatment. The specification of the treatment model is more important here
as compared to the outcome model (Ellis & Brookhart, 2013). The calculation of treatments
weights is based on the computed PS. These weights create a pseudo-population in which
the treatment assignment is unrelated to the baseline covariates, given that the treatment
model is correctly specified.19 The pseudo-population is formulated in a way that the weight
assigned to each element is proportional to the inverse of the element’s probability of getting
the treatment. The weights for ATE can be estimated as:
ωate =
Di,t−pidi,t(Xi,t−1)
pidi,t(Xi,t−1)[1−pidi,t(Xi,t−1)]
(4.13)
As compared to matching, weighting is a more robust approach as exact matching is
impossible with estimated propensity scores (Abadie & Imbens, 2011). However, IPTW has a
limitation that very large weights can lead to higher variance in the estimated treatment effect.
A lower value of pi in the treatment group and higher value in the control group result in large
weights. A solution to this problem is using stabilised weights. Stabilisation can be achieved
by using pi (mean of pi) and 1 - pi in the formula used for computing weights. Weights can
be trimmed as well if weights after stabilisation are still very large.20 These weights are used
in the estimation of treatment effects either through regression or differences in means (t-test
or ANOVA). However, calculated weights are already stabilised when CBPS is used for the
PS estimations. There is no need to perform separate weight stabilisation or weight trimming
while using CBPS.
19CBPS can control the model misspecification.
20See Lee, Lessler, and Stuart (2011) for further details
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4.3.3 Empirical Design
The principal purport of this study is to evaluate the impact of ABS or CBs issuance on the
credit risk-taking behaviour of banks. For this analysis, this study focuses on the change
in credit risk instead of absolute level of credit risk as measured in equation 4.5. Here,
credit risk taking behaviour is proxied by RWATA or LLP. Hence, the outcome variables are
∆RWATAt+1 and ∆LLPt+1. To estimate the impact of the issuance of any particular security,
banks are divided in three categories.21
1. Non-Issuers: These banks do not issue securitised products or CBs. This group of
banks is used as a control group in this study.
2. First Time Securitisers: These are the banks who switched from non-issuer to securi-
tisers by issuing securitised products for the first time during the sample period. This
group of banks is treatment group 1 here.
3. First Time Covered Bond Issuers: These are banks who became covered bond issuers
after issuing CBs for the first time during the sample period. This group of bank is
treatment group 2 here.
Banks are dropped from the sample once they issue ABS or CBs for the first time during
the sample period. This is in line with Casu et al. (2013) and Panetta and Pozzolo (2010).
Looking at the bank outcomes after the first-time ABS or CB issuance can help disentangle
the impact of ABS or CBs issuance. If ABS or CBs are likely to affect, a significant change
in the level of credit risk should be visible after the first time issuance of ABS or CBs. Taking
into consideration first time securitisers and first time CB issuers is also important as banks
may have different frequencies of issuing a security. However, they become comparable when
they issue ABS or CBs for the first time.
The selection of the pre-treatment covariates (Xi,t−1) for the PS model is an important
decision in any PSM analysis. According to Wooldridge (2002), the best candidates for the
inclusion in Xi,t−1 are pre-treatment variables and past outcomes. The main motives for the si,t
and bi,t are controlling funding cost, improving liquidity and controlling credit risk (through
the risk transfer in case of securitisation and improvement in lending standards in the case of
CBs). The issuance of ABS or CBs depends on the types of loans issued by a bank. CBs can
21A fourth category, defined in the section 4.3.1, has been dropped here. There were only 9 banks in the full
sample who fell under this category and there were only 2 banks who securitised and issued CBs for the first
time in the same year.
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be issued against a certain type of loans and similar preferences can be observed in the case
of securitisation as well. Different loan categories are taken as determinants of any specific
choice. Moreover, institutional variables have also been included in Xit−1 given the fact that
propensity scores, mainly, are not meant to predict the treatment but to balance the covariates
among the groups. The details of the pre-treatment covariates are provided in Appendix B.
The riskiness embedded in securitisation may not be observable in the short run but it
is noticed after some time. Therefore, the analysis is first performed on a 1-year window to
measure the impact of ABS and CBs issuance in the short run. The analysis is then extended
to a 3-year window to evaluate if there is an impact of ABS or CBs issuance over the long run.
Data
The increase of ABS issuance in the Euro Zone is widespread but heterogeneous across
different countries. This study is mainly focused on the major contributors in this market. The
countries included in the sample are Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain. There are 253 banks in the sample from these 7 countries. 228 banks are active
and 25 banks are dissolved during the sample period. However, these dissolved banks are not
excluded from the sample to avoid survivourship bias.22 The complete details of the sample
are provided in Appendix C.
The data frequency is yearly covering the time period from 2000 to 2014. Data come
from multiple sources. Data for ABS and CBs are collected from AB-Alert, the Bloomberg
terminal and European Covered Bond Council (ECBC). Bank level data, comprised of the
information from financial statements, are obtained from Bankscope (Bureau van Dijk). All
banks with missing information about total assets, equity and net income are excluded. All
ratio variables are winsorised at the 1% level to prevent the problem of any potential outliers.23
Non-performing loans and funding cost for total deposits have been dropped because of several
missing values. The variables of return on assets, loans funded by long term funding ratio,
equity ratio, loans to banks ratio, other mortgage loans ratio, other loans ratio, loan ratio, other
interest ratio, other interest expense, loan income, loan income ratio, other interest ratio, other
interest expense ratio, debt to equity ratio and asset growth have been dropped because of
collinearity, detected using the Cariance Influence Factor (VIF). The VIF value of all retained
22Survivorship bias arise by focusing on the active units only. This bias may lead to positively skewed results.
It may result in a rosy picture as failures are ignored.
23Winsorisation amounts to limiting extreme values in the data to prevent the possibility that results are driven
by outliers. All outliers in the data are set to a specific percentile of data. All the data below the Nth percentile
is replaced with the Nth. Winsorisation at 1% level implies that all the data below the 1st percentile is replaced
with the 1st percentile data.
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variables is lower than 2.24 The analysis is performed in the free software R.
4.4 Results
This section provides results of the econometric analysis performed in the chapter. The
analysis starts with some simple statistics and extends to the PSM. Table 1 provides the
frequencies of each treatment during the sample period. CBs gained significant attention after
the GFC and many new banks made their entry into this market. This is evident from the
statistics provided in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Year Wise Treatment Frequencies
This table provides the frequencies of first time securitisers and CB issuers in the sample
period. It is pertinent to note here that given figures are for first time securitisers and
first time CB issuers and not for securitisers or CB Issuers.
Year Non-Issuers First Time Securitisers First Time CB Issuers Total
2001 126 16 2 144
2002 114 9 4 127
2003 115 7 1 123
2004 114 6 4 124
2005 104 5 8 117
2006 96 3 6 105
2007 93 2 4 99
2008 93 2 2 97
2009 85 2 11 98
2010 83 0 7 90
2011 74 0 12 86
Total 1,097 52 61 1,210
4.4.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics computed for a comparison of banks’ situation
before and after the GFC.Most of the differences among the variables before and after the GFC
are significant, suggesting that banks in Europe are significantly affected by the GFC. Risk
taking has declined but LLP has significantly increased after the GFC. Post crisis RWATA is
lower as lending usually contracts during and after the crisis. A significant decrease is visible
in corporate & commercial loans ratio. The profitability of banks is also significantly reduced
after the GFC and growth is adversely effected.
24A variable is considered collinear if its VIF value exceeds 4.
112
Table 4.2: Descriptive Analysis - Before and After GFC
.
This table provides the descriptive statistics for all the variables computed before and after the GFC. This tables shows the
difference in banks’ situation before and after GFC that helps understand the effects of the GFC on banks in Europe.
Before GFC After GFC Difference
N Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. After - Before
Risk Weighted Assets to Total Assets 765 0.5666 0.1974 624 0.5271 0.2138 -0.0394***
Loan Loss Provision 765 0.0316 0.0306 624 0.0489 0.0686 0.0173***
Net Interest Margin 765 0.0168 0.0148 624 0.0150 0.0134 -0.0017**
Return on Assets 765 0.0042 0.0051 624 0.0026 0.0071 -0.0016***
Return on Equity 765 0.0779 0.0752 624 0.0431 0.1478 -0.0348***
Loan Funded by Deposits 765 1.6582 1.7245 624 1.6402 1.4740 -0.0179
Funding Through Deposits 765 0.3957 0.2751 624 0.4273 0.2822 0.0316***
Loans Funded by Short Term Deposits 765 1.1011 1.0736 624 0.9698 0.9033 -0.1312**
Loans Funded by Long Term Deposits 765 0.6130 0.2638 624 0.5953 0.2741 -0.0177
Funding Cost for Total Liabilites 765 0.0343 0.0175 624 0.0276 0.0183 -0.0067***
Liquid Assets Funded by Short Term Funding 765 0.4660 0.5420 624 0.4569 0.5539 -0.0092
Liquid Assets Funded by Long Term Funding 765 0.2588 0.2081 624 0.2643 0.2226 0.0055
Liquidity Ratio 765 0.2480 0.4640 624 0.3050 0.5795 0.0571**
Equity Ratio 765 0.0530 0.0472 624 0.0552 0.0451 0.0022
Capital Adequacy Ratio 765 0.1213 0.2097 624 0.1308 0.1826 0.0095
Loans to Banks Ratio 765 0.2726 0.2458 624 0.2643 0.2693 -0.0083
Residential Mortgage Loans Ratio 765 0.0507 0.1552 624 0.0947 0.1924 0.0441***
Consumer & Retails Loans Ratio 765 0.0069 0.0463 624 0.0080 0.0401 0.0011***
Corporate & Commercial Loans Ratio 765 0.1849 0.3075 624 0.1264 0.2543 -0.0585***
Other Loans Ratio 765 0.4839 0.3691 624 0.4981 0.3702 0.0143
Loans Ratio 765 0.7413 0.1602 624 0.7040 0.1998 -0.0373
Cost / Income 765 0.5545 0.2047 624 0.5703 0.2750 0.0158
Loan Interest Ratio 765 0.5482 0.3973 624 0.5704 0.3692 0.0222
Interest Expense on Deposits Ratio 765 0.2294 0.3638 624 0.2076 0.2976 -0.0218
Debt to Equity Ratio 765 28.8338 24.6881 624 29.4848 31.7425 0.6511
Debt to Assets Ratio 765 0.9470 0.0472 624 0.9448 0.0451 -0.0022
Interest Coverage Ratio 765 1.2521 0.3078 624 1.2146 0.4159 -0.0374
Asset Growth 765 0.1225 0.2286 624 0.0703 0.2115 -0.0522***
Loans Growth 765 0.1183 0.2501 624 0.0592 0.2013 -0.0591***
Dividend Payout 765 0.1491 0.3086 624 0.1417 0.3300 -0.0073
Size 765 9.7737 1.7273 624 10.2835 1.7273 0.5097***
Reputation of Bank 765 0.0430 0.0591 624 0.0455 0.0669 0.0025
Charge-Off Ratio 765 0.0002 0.0015 624 0.0002 0.0033 -0.00008
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
The simple analysis of means across different treatment groups has been performed as
after the descriptive analysis for before and after the GFC. The groups of ABS and CB issuers
include first-time securitisers and first-time CB issuers respectively. The results are reported
in Table 4.3. This table compares the characteristics of banks who issued ABS and CBs at
least for once in the sample period with those who never issued any of these two securities.
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Table 4.3: Analysis of Means (Tuckey’s HSD)
This table provides the pairwise comparison of means. The equality of means across various categories of banks, with
respect to ABS and CBs issuance, is evaluated by Tuckey’s HSD. The Null hypothesis tested here is: Means are equal across
various categories of banks.
Means Equality of Means (Tuckey’s HSD)
None ABS CBs ABS - None CB - None CB - ABS
Panel A: Credit Risk
Risk Weighted Assets to Total Assets 0.5039 0.6127 0.5742 0.1089*** 0.0704*** -0.0385**
Loan Loss Provision 0.0398 0.0374 0.0395 -0.0024 -0.0003 0.0021
Panel B: Profitability
Net Interest Margin 0.0144 0.0217 0.0158 0.0073*** 0.0014 -0.0059***
Return on Assets 0.0037 0.007 0.0027 0.0033*** -0.0009*** -0.0043***
Return on Equity 0.0669 0.0906 0.0488 0.0237** -0.0181*** -0.0418***
Panel C: Funding Structure and Cost
Loans Funded by Deposits 1.6437 1.7421 1.628 0.0984 -0.0157 -0.1141
Funding Through Deposits 0.3544 0.4949 0.4393 0.1406*** 0.0849*** -0.0557**
Loans Funded by Short Term Funding 1.0285 0.9636 1.0801 -0.0649 0.0516 0.1165
Loans Funded by Long Term Funding 0.5587 0.7023 0.6127 0.1436*** 0.0540*** -0.0895***
Funding Cost for Total Liabilities 0.0296 0.0338 0.0323 0.0042*** 0.0027** -0.0015
Panel D: Liquidity
Liquid Assets Funded by Short Term Funding 0.5715 0.306 0.4001 -0.2655*** -0.1714*** 0.0941**
Liquid Assets Funded by Long Term Funding 0.3039 0.2281 0.2286 -0.0758*** -0.0753*** 0.0006
Liquidity Ratio 0.3251 0.2262 0.2365 -0.0989** -0.0886*** 0.0103
Panel E: Capital
Equity Ratio 0.0521 0.0752 0.0462 0.0231*** -0.0059 -0.0291
Capital Adequacy Ratio 0.1466 0.1706 0.0905 0.024 -0.0562*** -0.0801***
Panel F: Loan Portfolio
Loans to Banks 0.3229 0.1957 0.2511 -0.1272 -0.0719 0.0553
Residential Mortgage Loans Ratio 0.0643 0.0787 0.074 0.0144 0.0097 -0.0046
Consumer & Retails Loans Ratio 0.01 0.0109 0.0036 0.0009 -0.0064** -0.0073**
Corporate & Commercial Loans Ratio 0.1689 0.1267 0.1583 -0.0422 -0.0106 0.0316
Other Loans Ratio 0.4220 0.5813 0.5178 0.1593*** 0.0957*** -0.0635**
Loans Ratio 0.7008 0.7525 0.7432 0.0516*** 0.0423*** -0.0093
Panel G: Income and Cost Structure
Cost / Income 0.5266 0.5827 0.5903 0.0562*** 0.0637*** 0.0076
Loan Interest Ratio 0.4883 0.5702 0.6247 0.0819*** 0.1364*** 0.0545
Interest Expense on Deposits Ratio 0.2687 0.3584 0.1273 0.0898 -0.1414 -0.2312
Panel H: Solvency
Debt to Equity Ratio 32.1165 17.0746 29.8131 -15.0419*** -2.3034 12.7384***
Debt to Assets Ratio 0.9473 0.9206 0.9526 -0.0267*** 0.0054** 0.0321***
Interest Coverage Ratio 1.2211 1.4146 1.1939 0.1935 -0.0272 -0.2207
Panel I: Other Institutional Characteristics
Asset Growth 0.1245 0.1598 0.0827 0.0353 -0.0418*** -0.0771***
Loan Growth 0.0898 0.1474 0.0766 0.0577** -0.0132 -0.0709**
Dividend Payout 0.1953 0.1253 0.1024 -0.0701*** -0.0929*** -0.0229
Size 10.3322 9.3593 9.8711 -0.9729*** -0.4612*** 0.5118***
Reputation of Bank 0.044 0.0568 0.0403 0.0129** -0.0037 -0.0165***
Charge Off Ratio 0.0002 0.0005 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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Panel A of Table 4.3 shows the differences between banks with respect to credit risk
variables. The results show significant differences in RWATA.BothABS andCBs issuers have
higher RWATA as compared to non-issuers, suggesting that ABS and CB issuers have a higher
inclination towards risk-taking. Although CBs issuers have a lower RWATA as compared to
ABS issuers (57.42% versus 61.27% for ABS issuers), the higher value of RWATA for
CB issuers in comparison to non-issuers (57.42% versus 50.39% for non-securitisers) does
not align with the notion that CBs keep banks from risk taking. These results are in line
with previous studies (Bord & Santos, 2015; Carey, 1998). However, absence of significant
differences for the second measure of credit risk (i.e. LLP) shows a different situation. These
insignificant differences negate the notion that securitising banks issue lower quality loans.
These banks may not be considered under-pricing the risk as explained by Kara et al. (2015).
Panel B shows the differences with respect to profitability. Securitising banks are found
more profitable among all in terms of net interest margin, return on assets and return on equity.
A higher net interest margin shows that securitising banks still earn a higher amount of their
income through interest. Moreover, securitising banks also earn through securitisation in the
form of service fee by playing the role of originator, thereby increasing their profitability.
These results are in line with Jiangli and Pritsker (2008). CBs issuers are found less profitable
than all other banks. Unlike securitisation, these banks do not have the benefit of earning
extra income as a service fee.
Funding and cost structure is considered in Panel C. ABS and CB issuers are found taking
more deposits than non-issuers, and CBs issuers are taking less deposits than ABS issuers.
Both ABS and CB issuing banks are funding most of their loans by long term funding,
suggesting that European banks may not be facing problems related to a wider maturity
mismatch that lead to the liquidity crunch. Moreover, the results also show that ABS and
CBs issuers have a higher funding cost on their liabilities, implying that most of the liabilities
of these banks are bearing higher cost. It suggests that these banks are perceived riskier by
lenders; therefore, they might be charging higher rates for the provided funds.
Differences in liquidity are highlighted in Panel D. Both ABS and CB issuers have lower
liquidity compared to the control group, but differences are not significant between CBs and
ABS issuers, except for liquid assets funded by short term funding. It suggests that these
banks have a better access to external funding and they do not need to maintain a higher
on-balance sheet liquidity. However, this high reliance on external funding (through ABS)
resulted in a liquidity crunch during the financial crisis when the market for the external
funding was frozen (Loutskina, 2011). A similar situation might be observed in the future for
banks relying on CBs for their liquidity needs.
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Two capital ratios have been considered to evaluate the capitalization of bank: equity ratio
and Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). A popular view is that securitising banks hold less capital
as they use securitisation for capital arbitrage. However, results reported in Panel E negate this
understanding. These results suggest that European banks are sufficiently capitalised and they
do not use securitisation for the capital arbitrage. These results are in line with Martín-Oliver
and Saurina (2007).
Panel F shows the differences in loan portfolios. Both ABS and CB issuers are found
issuing higher loans as compared to non-issuers (75.25% and 74.32% respectively versus
70.08% for non-issuers). Despite no significant differences are found between ABS and CB
issuers in terms of their loan ratio, ABS issuers tend to hold a greater amount of consumer &
retail loans as compared to the CBs issuers. These results are in line with the understanding
that CBs issuers curtail their lending to certain sectors, as they cannot use all loans for CB
issuance. It is pertinent to note here that, contrary to the US market, residential mortgage
loans make a small part of the loan portfolio of European banks. Therefore, European banks
might not be facing the shocks from the real estate market experienced in the US.
Panel G provides some important results with respect to the income and cost structure.
ABS and CB issuers have higher cost/income ratio and higher loan interest income to total
interest income. These results depict that both ABS and CB issuers issued riskier loans with a
higher interest rate leading to an increase in their loan interest income ratio. Panel H provides
the information about the solvency of banks. ABS issuers have lowest debt to asset ratio
among all and CBs issuers have the highest debt to asset ratio. These results again are not in
line with the notion that securitising banks are riskier and CB issuers are less risky.
Finally, Panel I provides information about some other important institutional character-
istics of the banks. Significant differences are found in loan growth, dividend payout, size
and reputation. ABS issuers have the highest loan growth, pointing towards the high issuance
of loans because of securitisation.25 However, this does not confirm that these issued loans
are of inferior quality. ABS and CB issuers have the lowest dividend payout and size as well.
However, CB issuers have a greater size than ABS issuers. These results are in contradiction
with some previous studies (Casu et al., 2011, 2013), and highlight the unique nature of the
European market as previous studies are mostly focused on the US market. However, ABS
issuers are found more reputed than CB issuers.
25This is because of the capital arbitrage explained earlier.
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4.4.2 Determinants of Securitisation and Covered Bonds
There are two treatment groups and one control group in this study, as defined below:
Dit =

1 if bank i issues ABS at time t
2 if bank i issues CBs at time t
0 otherwise
(4.14)
First-time issuers from the first year and last 3 years of the sample period have been
dropped because pre and post-issuance information are not observed.26 For the estimation
of propensity scores, I use the multinomial logistic model as this study focuses on multiple
treatments. The probabilities of not issuing any of two securities or of issuing one of two
securities (ABS or CBs) are given by:
Pr(Dit = 0|X j,it−1,β ,α) = 1
1+∑2d=1 e
αd+∑Jj=1 βd jX j,it−1
(4.15)
Pr(Dit = d|X j,it−1,β ,α) = e
αd+∑Jj=1 βd jX j,it−1
1+∑2d=1 e
αd+∑Jj=1 βd jX j,it−1
(4.16)
X j,it−1 is the jth [ j= 1, ....J] indicator used for explainingDit and β j represents coefficients
for the jth covariate. Many previous studies using PSM dichotomised multiple treatments.
However, this dichotomisation may result in the loss of information, thereby compromising
the insights gained from the analysis. Fong and Imai (2015) show that the original analysis
of non-binary treatments provides more insights than dichotomised treatments. They identify
two key issues with dichotomisation approach. First, causal quantity of interest is different
than the one obtained by taking each treatment value separately. Second, dichotomisation
does not provide the balancing of covariates across different values of multiple treatments.
The main of advantage of using multinomial model, instead of dichotomizing treatments, is
that it allows to simultaneously consider all treatments (Fong & Imai, 2015).
Table 4.4 provides coefficient estimates of the multinomial logit model estimated through
just-identified CBPS. To determine the coherence of the coefficients obtained in multinomial
26As explained earlier, the analysis has been extended to a 3-year window to estimate the treatment effects in
the long run. Therefore, the information about pre-treatment covariates and ABS and CBs issuance has not been
included for the last 3 years of the sample period.
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model, I estimated marginal effects for the estimated coefficients by using:
∂ pi j
∂Xi
= pi j[β jd−
J
∑
l=1
βld pil] (4.17)
Table 4.4: Multinomial Model - Just Identified CBPS
The estimates are obtained by using the CBPS Package available from Comprehensive R Archive
Network (CRAN) in the free software R.
ABS CB
(Intercept) 5.482 3.4871
Risk Weighted Assets to Total Assets(t−1) 1.1173 1.1933
Loan Loss Provision(t−1) 8.1752 2.6836
Net Interest Margin(t−1) -10.5852 5.8643
Return on Equity(t−1) 4.3875** 1.6803
Loans Funded by Deposits(t−1) 0.0753 -0.0764
Funding Through Deposits(t−1) -1.1440* -0.3714
Loans Funded by Short Term Funding(t−1) -0.1745 -0.1425
Funding Cost for Total Liabilities(t−1) -0.14 9.9854
Liquid Assets Funded by Short Term Funding(t−1) -0.023 -0.8505***
Liquid Assets Funded by Long Term Funding(t−1) 1.0764 0.6419
Liquidity Ratio(t−1) -0.4560** -0.4546**
Capital Adequacy Ratio(t−1) 1.0287 1.4849*
Residential Mortgage Loans Ratio(t−1) 0.0517 0.5411
Consumer & Retails Loans Ratio(t−1) -1.0041 2.4572
Corporate & Commercial Loans Ratio(t−1) 0.6175 0.1187
Cost / Income(t−1) 1.4661** 1.1704*
Loan Interest Ratio(t−1) -0.3723 -0.5695**
Interest Expense on Deposits Ratio(t−1) 0.5685 1.0718***
Debt to Assets Ratio(t−1) -2.2089 -2.3684
Interest Coverage Ratio(t−1) -0.0355 0.0198
Loan Growth(t−1) 0.3292 0.5913*
Dividend Payout(t−1) 1.1191** 1.1063**
Size(t−1) -0.1704** -0.2884***
Reputation of Bank(t−1) -5.6020** -1.3861
Charge Off Ratio(t−1) -114.4044 -114.6406*
Residual Deviance: 824.5
J-Statistic: 24.951
Log-Likelihood: -412.2308
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Marginal effects were found coherent, in terms of their signs, with all the coefficients
reported in Table 4.4, except for Charge-Off Ratio (COR) in case of ABS and Liquid Assets
Funded by Short Term Funding (LAFST) in case of CBs. The coefficients of RWATA and
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LLP for both ABS and CBs are insignificant, implying that credit risk mitigation may not
be a motive of ABS or CB issuance for the European banks. Banks with higher amount of
Return on Equity (ROE) have a better chance of issuing ABS. The variables used for liquidity
(LAFST and liquidity ratio) show that banks with a lower liquidity at t − 1 have a higher
relative probability of issuing ABS and CBs. Lack of liquidity drives them to issue ABS
or CBs. The insignificant coefficient of CAR for ABS shows that banks may not be using
securitisation for the capital arbitrage. These results are in line with Cardone-Riportella et al.
(2010) and Martín-Oliver and Saurina (2007). However, the coefficient of CAR is significant
for CBs, suggesting that banks with higher capital have a higher probability to issue CBs as
they need to hold capital against the ring-fenced assets used against CBs.
The Cost/Income ratio is another significant factor having a positive effect on the proba-
bility of issuing ABS and CBs. Banks with a higher Cost/Income ratio are more likely to issue
these instruments, as they are perceived to control their cost (by reducing the cost of external
funding) and increase income.27 Banks having a higher loan interest ratio are less likely to
issue CBs. The loan interest ratio has a significant negative coefficient. A possible interpre-
tation of this can be that a higher interest income is usually earned on loans with higher risk.
As CBs are usually issued against loans with lower risk generating a lower interest income,
therefore, banks with risky loans are not likely to issue CBs.
Banks with higher interest expense on deposits are more likely to issue CBs as these
instruments provide source of alternate funding. Dividend Payout (DPO) also has a significant
positive coefficient for both ABS and CBs. DPO results in negative cash flows that can be
countered by issuing ABS or CBs. This is in line with the study of Casu et al. (2011) and
Ambrose et al. (2005) who found that securitisation is used as a funding tool. Size has a
negative impact on ABS and CBs issuance, and reputation has a negative impact on issuing
ABS only. These results are in contrast with some previous empirical studies conducted on
the USmarket (Casu et al., 2013). As explained earlier, banks ABS and CBs are mainly issued
for liquidity in the European market. Bigger and reputed banks are usually least concerned
about liquidity problems, therefore, their tendency to issue ABS and CBs can be lower.
4.4.3 Analysis of Balance
The reliability of any of propensity score method is evaluated by looking at the balance of pre-
treatment covariates after propensity score matching/weighting (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008;
27Apart from the traditional income, securitisation provides another income source to banks in the form of
service fee, earned by playing the role of servicer in the securitisation process.
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Imai, King, & Stuart, 2008). The balance is usually checked by comparing the distributions
of covariates in the control and treatment group through a two-sample t-test (Rosenbaum
& Rubin, 1985). However, the two-sample t-test is replaced with ANOVA combined with
Tuckey’s HSD when there are more than two groups. To this end, I compare covariates
of non-issuers, first-time securitisers and first time CBs issuers before and after weighting.
Results of Tuckey’s HSD are reported in Table 4.5. It is apparent that there are significant
differences in many covariates across three groups before weighting, but all the differences
become insignificant after weighting. This analysis of balance confirms the balancing of the
covariates across three groups, thereby endorsing the quality of weighting.
Table 4.5: Analysis of Balance — Equality of Means (Tuckey′sHSD)
Note: The results are obtained by using aov() function in the free software R combined with the post hoc
function Tuckey’s HSD(aov). The null hypothesis here is: Means of covariates are equal across the groups.
Null hypothesis is accepted for all covariates after weighting.
Before Weighting After Weighting
ABS -None CB-None CB-ABS ABS -None CB -None CB - ABS
RWATA(t−1) 0.0523* -0.0208 -0.0731* 0.0159 -0.0113 -0.0272
LLP(t−1) 0.0046 0.0041 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0039 0.0044
NIM(t−1) 0.0097*** -0.0007 -0.0104*** 0.0022 0.0003 -0.002
ROE(t−1) 0.0111 -0.0384** -0.0494** 0.0182 -0.001 -0.0192
LFD(t−1) -0.4333* -0.1204 0.3129 0.0844 0.1229 0.0386
FTD(t−1) 0.1275*** -0.0089 -0.1364*** 0.0288 -0.0197 -0.0485
LFST(t−1) -0.1051 0.1955 0.3006 0.0041 0.0969 0.0928
FCTL(t−1) 0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0014 0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0045
LAFST(t−1) -0.2134** 0.0372 0.2506* -0.0657 0.0373 0.1031
LAFLT(t−1) -0.0639** -0.0147 0.0492 -0.0004 0.0138 0.0142
LiqR(t−1) -0.062 0.0596 0.1215 -0.0278 -0.0454 -0.0176
CAR(t−1) 0.0478* -0.0191 -0.0669* 0.0017 -0.0117 -0.0134
RMLR(t−1) 0.0335 0.0302 -0.0034 -0.0048 0.0185 0.0233
CRLR(t−1) 0.0073 -0.0011 -0.0084 0.0017 -0.0003 -0.002
CCLR(t−1) -0.0312 -0.0902* -0.059 -0.0078 -0.0442 -0.0365
CI(t−1) 0.0186 -0.0238 -0.0424 0.0084 -0.0178 -0.0262
LIR(t−1) 0.015 0.1062 0.0912 0.0198 0.0384 0.0186
IEDR(t−1) 0.1720*** -0.0512 -0.2232*** 0.0472 -0.0092 -0.0564
DA(t−1) -0.0223*** 0.0058 0.0281*** -0.0071 0.003 0.01
ICR(t−1) 0.1491*** -0.0398 -0.1889*** 0.0629 0.0065 -0.0564
LG(t−1) 0.0402* -0.0549 -0.0951 0.0009 -0.063 -0.064
DPO(t−1) -0.0419 -0.0701* -0.0282 -0.0287 -0.0411 -0.0124
SIZE(t−1) -0.7056*** 0.7026*** 1.4082*** 0.0005 0.3654 0.3649
REP(t−1) 0.0191* 0.0077 -0.0114 0.0051 -0.0013 -0.0062
COR(t−1) 0.0005* 0.0005** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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4.4.4 Treatment Effects
The treatment effects have been estimated by Weighted Least Square (WLS), using weights
estimated through CBPS Package in R.28 There are two variables used for credit risk taking
behaviour of a bank i.e. ∆RWATA and ∆LLP. The treatment effect has been estimated for
both the short run (t+1) and the long run (t+3). Results are reported from Tables 4.6 to 4.9.
The results reported in Table 4.6 show that ABS or CBs may not affect the change in
risk-weighted assets of a bank in the short run. This suggests that securitisation may not be
the driving force behind the increase in risk taking as perceived after the GFC. Similarly,
CBs are also not found having a significant impact on risk taking in the short run. I also
include RWATAt in the model. Its coefficient is significant and negative for ∆RWATA(t+1).
This implies that banks already having a high level of RWATA might have lower tendency to
increase their existing level. The negative sign indicates that banks are conscious of their high
risk-taking and tend to decrease its level. A similar situation is also shown by the negative
and significant coefficients of D/A.
Table 4.6: Weighted Least Square Estimations — Outcome: ∆RWATA(t+1)
This table provides the results of WLS. Weights are taken from the estimated CBPS model. Estimations include
the economic covariates, country dummies, year dummies and interaction terms of the selected economics co-
variates. These four types of variables have been sequentially added to the model. The outcome variable here is
∆RWATA(t+1).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset-Backed Securities 0.001 −0.0005 −0.002 −0.001
Covered Bonds −0.001 −0.003 −0.003 −0.005
Risk Weighted Assets to Total Assets −0.063*** −0.081*** −0.079*** −0.080***
Loan Loss Provision −0.082 −0.132** −0.171*** −0.184***
Net Interest Margin −0.255** −0.253** −0.307*** −0.278**
Return on Equity 0.022 0.015 0.004 −0.003
Loans Funded by Deposits −0.002*** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.004***
Funding Through Deposits 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.013
Loans Funded by Short Term Funding −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.004*
Funding Cost for Total Liabilities −0.412*** −0.333*** −0.413*** −0.367***
Liquid Assets Funded by Short Term Funding 0.006* 0.006 0.004 0.003
Liquid Assets Funded by Long Term Funding −0.012 −0.021* −0.021* −0.018
Liquidity Ratio 0.008** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012***
Capital Adequacy Ratio −0.049*** −0.045*** −0.046*** −0.046***
Residential Mortgage Loans Ratio 0.024** 0.021* 0.024* 0.027**
Continued on next page
28The four models provided here are also tested by simple ordinary least square (OLS). The results of OLS do
not provide any significant coefficients for the treatment variables of ABS and CBs. These results are available
upon request.
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Table 4.6: – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Consumer & Retails Loans Ratio −0.001 −0.036 −0.043 −0.027
Corporate & Commercial Loans Ratio −0.011* 0.001 0.0001 0.004
Cost / Income −0.016 −0.016 −0.017 −0.018*
Loan Interest Income Ratio −0.013** −0.0002 0.001 −0.004
Interest Expense on Deposits Ratio 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.012
Debt to Assets Ratio −0.268*** −0.229*** −0.249*** −0.226***
Interest Coverage Ratio 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.011
Loan Growth −0.003 −0.002 −0.006 −0.007
Dividend Payout 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.003
Size 0.0004 0.002 0.002* 0.002
Reputation 0.053** 0.067** 0.064** 0.060**
Charge-Off Ratio 1.289 0.912 1.006 0.97
Germany −0.016** −0.015* −0.007
Spain 0.007 0.007 0.011
France −0.029*** −0.030*** −0.028***
Italy 0.001 0.001 0.002
Netherlands −0.005 −0.004 −0.007
Portugal −0.016* −0.014 −0.014
2002 −0.001 −0.001
2003 −0.006 −0.005
2004 0.003 0.006
2005 0.008 0.011
2006 −0.018** −0.018**
2007 0.002 −0.015
2008 0.0002 −0.019*
2009 0.002 −0.011
2010 −0.007 −0.016
2011 −0.015* −0.030***
LFD * FC 0.004*
LFST * FC 0.009*
CCLR * FC −0.013
IEDR * FC 0.0003
LG * FC 0.042**
Constant 0.302*** 0.264*** 0.288*** 0.270***
Observations 1.210 1.210 1.210 1.210
R2 0.17 0.185 0.197 0.208
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.162 0.168 0.176
Residual Std. Error 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
F Statistic 8.989*** 8.079*** 6.662*** 6.367***
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
The liquidity ratio is found to be significant and positively related with ∆RWATA(t+1).
This suggests that banks with higher liquidity reserves are more inclined towards issuing risky
assets. Reputation has a significant and positive relationship with ∆RWATA(t+1). This can
be ascribed to the competitive pressure, as reputed banks must sustain their reputation in the
market. In pursuit of this objective, they might issue more risky assets to get a larger market
122
share and to keep up with the horde.
Table 4.7: Weighted Least Square Estimations — Outcome: ∆RWATA(t+3)
This table provides the results of WLS. Weights are taken from the estimated CBPS model. Estimations include
the economic covariates, country dummies, year dummies and interaction terms of the selected economics co-
variates. These four types of variables have been sequentially added to the model. The outcome variable here is
∆RWATA(t+3).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset-Backed Securities −0.003 −0.004 −0.005 −0.003
Covered Bonds 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015***
Risk Weighted Asset Ratio −0.056*** −0.067*** −0.067*** −0.056***
Loan Loss Provision 0.111** 0.038 0.034 0.042
Net Interest Margin 0.838*** 0.814*** 0.657*** 0.624***
Return on Equity 0.044** 0.028 0.02 0.031
Loans Funded by Deposits 0.002** 0.002* 0.002* 0.001
Funding Through Deposits −0.004 0.005 0.016 0.021**
Loans Funded by Short Term Funding −0.0002 −0.0002 0.0003 0.0001
Funding Cost for Total Liabilities 0.106 0.250** 0.206 0.316**
Liquid Assets Funded by Short Term Funding 0.003 0.003 0.0003 0.002
Liquid Assets Funded by Long Term Funding −0.024** −0.033*** −0.027** −0.021*
Liquidity Ratio 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.009** 0.009**
Capital Adequacy Ratio −0.025 −0.023 −0.018 −0.012
Residential Mortgage Loans Ratio 0.030*** 0.029** 0.035*** 0.028**
Consumer & Retails Loans Ratio −0.02 −0.034 −0.029 −0.037
Corporate & Commercial Loans Ratio −0.006 −0.009 −0.008 −0.012
Cost / Income −0.034*** −0.035*** −0.042*** −0.039***
Loan Interest Income Ratio −0.010* 0.006 0.012 0.008
Interest Expense on Deposits Ratio 0.003 −0.013* −0.017** 0.003
Debt to Assets Ratio −0.105 −0.056 −0.121* −0.146**
Interest Coverage Ratio −0.019** −0.022*** −0.027*** −0.029***
Loan Growth −0.006 −0.006 −0.01 −0.007
Dividend Payout −0.059*** −0.053*** −0.048*** −0.044***
Size 0.001 0.002* 0.003** 0.004***
Reputation 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.095*** 0.070***
Charge-Off Ratio −4.095*** −3.862*** −4.426*** −4.656***
Germany −0.027*** −0.035*** −0.031***
Spain 0.004 −0.003 −0.003
France −0.018** −0.021*** −0.019**
Italy 0.002 −0.004 −0.0003
Netherlands −0.008 −0.012 −0.021*
Portugal 0.003 −0.003 −0.013
2002 0.023*** 0.022***
2003 0.020*** 0.021***
2004 0.007 0.01
2005 0.022*** 0.025***
2006 0.006 0.009
2007 −0.008 −0.003
Continued on next page
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Table 4.7: – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2008 0.002 0.007
2009 −0.009 −0.004
2010 −0.0003 0.01
2011 0.007 0.013
LFD * FC 0.003
LFST * FC 0.002
CCLR * FC 0.007
IEDR * FC −0.058***
LG * FC 0.011
Constant 0.149** 0.1 0.158** 0.156**
Observations 1.210 1.210 1.210 1.210
R2 0.255 0.27 0.294 0.314
Adjusted R2 0.238 0.249 0.268 0.286
Residual Std. Error 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
F Statistic 14.984*** 13.161*** 11.309*** 11.090***
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Table 4.7 shows the results of WLS estimations of models accounting for ∆RWATA(t+3).
The effects of ABS issuance remains unchanged, but interestingly coefficients of CBs are
positive and significant for ∆RWATA(t+3). A possible explanation is that CBs result in asset
encumbrance.29 These encumbered assets are not usable by banks for any other purpose.
Bank cannot respond to a liquidity crunch by acting on asset side of the bank. Therefore, they
get more inclined towards the issuance of risky assets (generating higher returns) in the long
run, which are not used for CB issuance and whose returns can be used by the bank.
Table 4.8 provides the results for ∆LLP(t+1). Banks should cancel the LLP related
to securitised loans that should result in a negative relationship between ABS and LLP.
However, the coefficient of ABS is positive and significant here, whereas the coefficient
of CBs is negative and significant. These results suggest that in the short run securitisers
might estimate higher loans losses after securitisation, suggesting that banks might follow
a conservative approach after securitisation. These results do not support that securitising
banks under-price their risk, especially since securitisation does not lead to an increase in the
risk-weighted assets. This shows that banks well understand the riskiness of securitisation
and follow a conservative approach after securitisation. The coefficient for CBs is negative
and significant, apart from model 1 in Table 4.8. This shows that CB issuing banks estimate
fewer losses as they might perceive that the assets they issue are less prone to default. The
results also show that bigger banks have higher value of LLP in the short term that points
29A higher issuance of covered bonds results into a higher ring-fencing of high-quality assets resulting into
high asset encumbrance.
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towards the riskiness of bigger banks.
Table 4.8: Weighted Least Square Estimations — Outcome: ∆LLP(t+1)
Note: This table provides the results of WLS. Weights are taken from the estimated CBPS model. Estimations
include the economic covariates, country dummies, year dummies and interaction terms of the selected economics
covariates. These four types of variables have been sequentially added to the model. The outcome variable here
is ∆LLP(t+1).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset-Backed Securities 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.020***
Covered Bonds −0.002 −0.008** −0.010*** −0.010**
Risk Weighted Asset Ratio 0.024 −0.007 −0.004 −0.015
Loan Loss Provision −0.217*** −0.314*** −0.275*** −0.262***
Net Interest Margin −0.133 −0.068 −0.071 −0.026
Return on Equity 0.023 0.003 0.022 0.019
Loans Funded by Deposits −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.002** −0.002**
Funding Through Deposits −0.015 −0.021** −0.041*** −0.045***
Loans Funded by Short Term Funding −0.005** −0.006*** −0.006*** −0.007***
Funding Cost for Total Liabilities 0.184 0.346*** 0.129 0.051
Liquid Assets Funded by Short Term Funding −0.006* −0.007** −0.007** −0.009***
Liquid Assets Funded by Long Term Funding −0.014 −0.022* −0.021* −0.023**
Liquidity Ratio −0.006 −0.001 −0.004 −0.002
Capital Adequacy Ratio 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.003
Residential Mortgage Loans Ratio 0.01 0.017 −0.003 0.003
Consumer & Retails Loans Ratio −0.077 −0.146*** −0.103** −0.093**
Corporate & Commercial Loans Ratio −0.022*** −0.002 −0.004 −0.007
Cost / Income 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.027***
Loan Interest Income Ratio 0.006 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.025***
Interest Expense on Deposits Ratio 0.0003 −0.007 0.005 −0.009
Debt to Assets Ratio −0.149** −0.052 0.055 0.077
Interest Coverage Ratio −0.017* −0.020** −0.016* −0.014*
Loan Growth −0.006 −0.005 0.002 −0.0004
Dividend Payout −0.006 −0.003 −0.003 −0.006
Size 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004***
Reputation −0.056** −0.058** −0.045* −0.028
Charge-Off Ratio 1.985** 0.856 0.178 0.306
Germany −0.028*** −0.012* −0.012
Spain 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.042***
France −0.043*** −0.037*** −0.036***
Italy −0.007 −0.004 −0.008
Netherlands −0.003 −0.004 −0.003
Portugal −0.014 −0.003 0.004
2002 −0.030*** −0.031***
2003 −0.038*** −0.039***
2004 −0.042*** −0.044***
2005 −0.025*** −0.028***
2006 −0.032*** −0.036***
2007 −0.034*** −0.058***
2008 0.006 −0.013
Continued on next page
125
Table 4.8: – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2009 −0.027*** −0.048***
2010 −0.028*** −0.051***
2011 0.030*** 0.012
LFD * FC −0.0005
LFST * FC 0.009**
CCLR * FC 0.013
IEDR * FC 0.052***
LG * FC −0.036**
Constant 0.131* 0.039 −0.032 −0.03
Observations 1.210 1.210 1.210 1.210
R2 0.126 0.187 0.28 0.301
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.164 0.254 0.272
Residual Std. Error 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
F Statistic 6.325*** 8.204*** 10.552*** 10.417***
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
The positive effects of ABS on ∆LLP seems to be reversed in the long run as shown in
Table 4.9. The coefficient of ABS is significant and negative. This implies that in the long
run banks might realise that securitisation does not lead to higher credit losses. As no impact
of securitisation on RWATA has been seen (both in the short and long run), therefore, this
negative relationship in the long run cannot be taken as under-pricing of risk. This impact
might be reversed because of the retention of first loss pieces and implicit recourse provided
by securitising banks. This implicit recourse prevents the distortion of monitoring incentive
and improves the monitoring and screening mechanism (Chiesa, 2008).
Table 4.9: Weighted Least Square Estimations — Outcome: ∆LLP(t+3)
Note: This table provides the results of WLS. Weights are taken from the estimated CBPS model. Estimations
include the economic covariates, country dummies, year dummies and interaction terms of the selected economics
covariates. These four types of variables have been sequentially added to the model. The outcome variable here
is ∆LLP(t+3).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset-Backed Securities −0.028*** −0.029*** −0.021*** −0.021***
Covered Bonds 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.002
Risk Weighted Asset Ratio 0.025 0.03 0.043** 0.041**
Loan Loss Provision −0.118* −0.140* −0.156** −0.172**
Net Interest Margin 0.008 −0.008 −0.099 −0.116
Return on Equity 0.041 0.041 0.029 0.013
Loans Funded by Deposits 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.006***
Funding Through Deposits 0.014 0.021 0.047*** 0.043***
Loans Funded by Short Term Funding −0.002 −0.002 0.0003 −0.0001
Continued on next page
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Table 4.9: – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Funding Cost for Total Liabilities −0.234 −0.185 0.143 0.199
Liquid Assets Funded by Short Term Funding 0.006 0.006 0.008* 0.009**
Liquid Assets Funded by Long Term Funding 0.016 0.013 0.031** 0.026*
Liquidity Ratio 0.003 0.0005 −0.011*** −0.012***
Capital Adequacy Ratio 0.005 0.002 0.024 0.025
Residential Mortgage Loans Ratio 0.024 0.022 0.023 0.025*
Consumer & Retails Loans Ratio 0.116** 0.142** 0.013 0.034
Corporate & Commercial Loans Ratio 0.008 0.0005 0.025** 0.040***
Cost / Income −0.046*** −0.053*** −0.051*** −0.049***
Loan Interest Income Ratio −0.007 −0.003 −0.002 −0.001
Interest Expense on Deposits Ratio 0.013* 0.01 0.024*** 0.023**
Debt to Assets Ratio −0.194** −0.214** −0.212** −0.184**
Interest Coverage Ratio −0.009 −0.013 −0.028*** −0.025**
Loan Growth −0.021** −0.021** −0.027*** −0.028***
Dividend Payout −0.013** −0.011** −0.005 −0.008
Size −0.002 −0.003** −0.007*** −0.007***
Reputation 0.078** 0.060* 0.02 0.033
Charge-Off Ratio −0.701 −0.533 0.549 0.582
Germany −0.005 0.001 −0.003
Spain −0.002 0.006 0.008
France 0.018* 0.038*** 0.030***
Italy 0.007 0.023** 0.021**
Netherlands −0.001 0.008 0.008
Portugal −0.01 −0.014 −0.013
2002 0.055*** 0.057***
2003 0.038*** 0.039***
2004 0.055*** 0.056***
2005 0.103*** 0.103***
2006 0.098*** 0.100***
2007 0.046*** 0.067***
2008 0.054*** 0.068***
2009 0.075*** 0.096***
2010 0.062*** 0.077***
2011 0.072*** 0.085***
LFD * FC −0.004
LFST * FC −0.001
CCLR * FC −0.063***
IEDR * FC 0.002
LG * FC 0.015
Constant 0.210** 0.245*** 0.199** 0.169*
Observations 1.210 1.210 1.210 1.210
R2 0.124 0.131 0.275 0.289
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.106 0.249 0.259
Residual Std. Error 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
F-Statistic 6.194*** 5.361*** 10.305*** 9.825***
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Table 4.9 also shows that coefficients of CBs also change in the long run. It becomes
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positive but insignificant here. Table 4.7 shows that CB issuing banks issue more risky assets
in the long run. However, corresponding changes in LLP do not take place (LLP should
increase after the increase in RWATA). These results imply that although CBs issuing banks
tend to issue more risky assets in the long run, they might continue to believe that their assets
are less riskier. This belief might lead to the under-estimation of the risk in the long run.
4.4.5 Robustness Check
A number of robustness checks have been performed to confirm the previous findings. Results
are reported in Appendix D. First, the analysis is performed by using the weightedANOVA and
Tuckey’s HSD. Weights are obtained from the CBPS estimations and plugged into ANOVA.
The grouping variable in this analysis is the treatment variable, as defined in the main
analysis. The mean differences are computed across various categories with respect to the
given treatment. These results support the results obtained withWLS. There are no significant
differences in ∆RWATA. Significant differences are found in ∆LLP in the short run but these
differences disappear in the long run. Results are reported in Tables D.1 and D.2.
Second, treatment effects are estimated using the GBM proposed by McCaffrey et al.
(2004).30 GBM is a non-parametric method used to estimate the PS. The resulting weights
have been used to estimate the outcome model. Results are reported from Tables D.3 to D.6.31
These results also suggest that securitisation might not affect the credit risk taking behaviour
but CBs issuance might have a positive impact on the credit risk taking behaviour in the long
run.
Finally, the analysis is performed by dichotomising the treatments, following some of the
previous studies (Kam & Palmer, 2008; Wood, Gooch, & Donnell, 2015). Results remain
qualitatively similar as obtained in the CBPS analysis with the multinomial model. Results
are also not found sensitive to estimates of ATE or ATT. Moreover, treatment effects remain
qualitatively similar after changing the setting of CBPS from just-identified to over-identified.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This study investigates the impact of securitisation and CBs on the credit risk taking behaviour
of European banks in the short and the long run. The comparison of securitising banks with
CBs issuing banks and the use of the CBPS methodology are distinguishing features of this
30The analysis was performed using ‘twang’ package in R.
31Results are reported for the outcome model only.
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study. Some studies suggest that CBs issuing banks might have a lower inclination towards
credit risk taking because of the so-called ‘skin in the game’, whereas securitising banks
tend to issue greater amount of risky assets because of the opposite reasons. Even though
securitising banks maintain enough ‘skin in the game’ in one form or the other, regulators
emphasise upon on-balance sheet risk retention. The results reported in this study suggest
that the absence of ‘skin in the game’ in the form of on-balance sheet retention may not be
the driving factor for the banks to take the elevated risk. The results of multinomial model
did not confirm that securitisation is used for the credit risk transfer by European banks.
These results are in line with Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) and Martín-Oliver and Saurina
(2007). However, this study evaluates the ex post effects of securitisation on credit risk
taking behaviour of banks, particularly focusing on the role of on-balance sheet risk retention.
The use of CBs for comparison with ABS serve this purpose, as CBs are on balance sheet
instruments.
The results, although, suggest a positive relationship of securitisation with LLP in the
short run but this relationship becomes negative in the long run. The negative relation of
securitisation with LLP in the long run cannot be translated as risk under-pricing when
securitisation does not lead to an increase in risk taking. These empirical findings are
attributed to the retention of the first loss position in the securitisation transaction to generate
a signal about the quality of securitised products, as explained by Gorton and Pennacchi
(1995), and implicit/explicit recourse provided to investors (Casu et al., 2011; W. Chen, Liu,
& Ryan, 2008; Cheng, Dhaliwal, & Neamtiu, 2011).
There can bemany other plausible explanations for the decline in underwriting standards in
the loan origination process during the pre-crisis years. The optimism of lenders and investors
because of the housing prices boom is a potential reason for the underestimation of the risk
(Hellwig, 2008). According to Ruckes (2004), the changes in lending standards are linked
with the economic cycle. At the time of an economic boom, banks screen their borrowers
superficially. Banks tend to lend aggressively because of the intensifying competition and
they want to save the resources spent on screening (Cerasi & Rochet, 2014). A bad shock in
the economy may cause the failure of many projects. The widespread losses during the GFC
are consistent with the belief about an unusual bad shock as explained by Chiesa (2008)
The deterioration of lending standards and lax screening can also be linked with com-
pensation practices. The compensation in the banking system is often linked to the volume
of loan origination and sale of high fee products (Segoviano et al., 2015). As a result, the
suitability of products sold to borrowers is often ignored. This results in predatory lending
that may deteriorate the performance of banks’ loan portfolios (Surti, 2010). Therefore, lax
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lending standards cannot necessarily be linked with the issuance of a specific security, but can
be caused by increased competition during the economic boom and compensation practices.
Summarising, this study suggests that European banks use securitisation and CBs as
funding tools and not as a risk management tool. The changes in the risk level of banks can
be attributed to the increase in liquidity but securitisation is not the only tool used to generate
liquidity. CBs and many other similar instruments also serve the purpose of increasing bank
liquidity. When banks are flushed with liquidity, they might get the motivation to take higher
risk because of excess capacity. However, admonishing securitisation solely may not be the
right approach.
The regulations enacted after the GFC which emphasise on risk retention seem unneces-
sary. Risk retention may not help reduce the risk level as shown by the positive impact of CBs
in the long run. Hence, CB is not the silver bullet it is flaunted. Regulators should identify
the loopholes and distortions in the process of securitisation. These distortions should be
controlled, instead of penalising the entire process and the securitisation market.
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Chapter 5
Effects of Securitisation and Covered
Bonds on Bank Stability
Banking is a very treacherous business because you don’t realize it is risky until
it is too late. It is like calm waters that deliver huge storms.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb
5.1 Introduction
Funding sources of banks were put under extensive scrutiny after the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC). Banks were not able to use securitisation to raise funds, as investors lost confidence
in this market. Banks heavily involved in securitisation faced liquidity and funding pressures
during the GFC that turned into a full blown systemic crisis (Blommestein et al., 2011). Amid
this situation, a shift from the preference for returns to the preference for safety was observed
among investors. Covered Bond (CB) — a close counterpart of Asset-Backed Securities
(ABS) and a dual recourse instrument1 —emerged as an important alternative to ABS tomeet
investors’ preference for safety and to provide funding to banks.2 Regulators also provided
1Covered bonds holders enjoy a dual recourse. First, they have a preferential claim over the assets held in
the cover pool backing the issuance of these bonds. This pool remains unaffected in post-bankruptcy situation.
Second, CB holders have an unsecured claim on bankruptcy state of issuers if the cover pool does not generate
enough cash or its value drops. In such a condition CB holders are treated pari passu with unsecured creditors
of the credit institution and in some cases they also get a preferential treatment over unsecured creditors.
2The market for covered bonds remained resilient to the shocks of GFC in 2007/8 when ABS market faced
a decline of 51%. However, the CB market grew by 5% in 2009. CBs outperformed government bonds as well
during the sovereign debt crisis in Europe in 2009.
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a favourable treatment to CBs that incited the interest in this class of instruments.3 On the
contrary, securitisation faces stringent regulations after the GFC. Many market participants
are concerned about this discriminatory treatment of ABS vs CBs, as they think it may result
in a distortion of the funding base diversification of Financial Institutions (FIs). It may have
severe implications for the individual bank stability and the financial stability.4 This study
contributes to the literature by examining how the focus on a particular instrument affects the
bank stability.
The proponents of CBs do not support the concerns about the increasing use of CBs,
mainly for two reasons. First, issuance of CBs can never go beyond a certain limit because of
their on-balance sheet nature and strict requirements for the cover pool. The on-balance sheet
nature of CBs requires banks to hold capital against these bonds. The issuance of new capital
can be difficult, hence CB issuance beyond the limits of current capital can be challenging for
a FI. The strict requirements for the cover pool make it harder for the banks to have enough
assets to be used against CB issuance. Second, the strict requirements for the cover pool and
its continuous monitoring by the regulatory authorities make it harder for risks to materialize
to the extent of threatening the bank stability (ECBC, 2013).
Most of previous studies have been evaluating ABS and CBs (hereinafter collectively
referred as Securities and Bonds (SB)) from the investors’ perspective — especially CBs
(e.g. Buchholst, Gyntelberg, & Sangill, 2010; Prokopczuk, Siewert, & Vonhoff, 2013). The
regulations devised after the GFC are also meant to provide greater protection to investors.
However, the effects of CBs on issuing institutions are not yet explored. This study evaluates
the issuance of ABS and CBs from issuers’ perspective. Despite having important differences
and being affected differently during the GFC, both instruments share many similarities.
This study helps in developing an understanding of the effects of ABS and CB issuance
on bank stability that is assessed in terms of systemic risk, and is measured with the SRISK
and the Long-Run Marginal Expected Shortfall (LRMES) of Brownlees and Engle (2015).
The literature is widely divided between the “securitisation-fragility” and the “securitisation-
stability” views. This study presents a different view, denoted “securitisation-scalability”.
CBs are also analysed along similar lines. The study argues that the relationship of ABS or
3SeeRegulation (EU)No. 575/2013 (Capital Requirement Regulations (CRR))Articles 129(5), 395, 400(1a),
416(2a), 509(3a), Credit RatingAgency (CRA)Regulation (EU)No. 462/2013Article 8c (1), LiquidityCoverage
Ratio (LCR) and the securitisation frameworks of Basel III and the haircut regulations of European Central Bank
(ECB).
4CBs may generate greater amount of risk for issuers as they must actively manage the underlying pool
of collaterals. Therefore, from a financial stability perspective, CBs might not prove to be risk-free and an
over-reliance on them may result in risk concentration in the banking system.
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CBs with bank stability is not totally distinct; rather, it varies with the issuance level of these
instruments. Their respective volumes determine their implications on bank stability. The
potential benefits of these funding sources might not be accessible either beyond or below
a certain level. For these reasons, it is often argued that limits should be imposed on the
issuance of these instruments. Such regulations have been imposed on CBs in some countries
like Australia and Belgium.5 The empirical analysis performed here is likely to provide a
foundation to evaluate these regulations.
The data is taken from 46 ABS and CB issuing banks from Europe for the time period
between 2000-2014. The study performs an extended analysis of both instruments, aiming at
evaluating the link between the scale of the issuance of these two instruments and the systemic
risk of banks. The analysis focuses on the variation in the relationship of ABS and CBs with
bank stability with respect to changes in the issuance scale of these two instruments. The
study also tests the impact of size on the relationship between SB issuance and the systemic
risk of banks. The analysis in the study starts with a quadratic model and extends to a partially
linear setting that uses Generalised Additive Model (GAM).
The empirical results show the presence of a U-Shaped relationship between ABS and
systemic risk. The issuance of ABS initially helps banks in controlling their systemic risk,
but the impact is reversed when a bank keeps on issuing ABS. This is what is dubbed by
some as ‘securitisation beyond limits’, and by this study as “securitisation-scalability”. For
covered bonds, initial estimations showed that this relationship is of the opposite nature. Small
issuance of CBs leads to an increase in systemic risk, but large scale issuance of CBs decreases
systemic risk. I attribute this relationship to bank size and jumbo CBs. Further investigation
revealed that smaller banks face a higher systemic risk when they issue CBs but larger banks
remain unaffected. These findings do not support the proposal of putting a uniform limit on
CB issuance. Such a proposal should be linked with the bank’s size. Moreover, the regulators
should think about devising a framework that can control the limitless issuance of ABS.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides some insights
from the previous literature. There are very few studies on CBs, but ABS have been studied
widely. Section 5.3 explains the research methodology. This section provides economic
intuitions and then an empirical model to test the suggested relationship and explains the
characteristics of the data including the sample details and descriptive statistics. Section 5.4
provides the empirical results of the model tested herein. This section provides the results of
estimations of a quadratic model and generalized additive specification of a partially linear
5The issuance of CBs should not exceed the limit of 8% of total assets of a bank.
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model. Section 5.5 discusses the results and draws conclusions.
5.2 Related Literature
ABS and CBs function similarly at a basic level and are expected to provide analogous
economic benefits. A bank originates some assets and then places them in a ring-fenced pool.
The characteristics of the issued securities and ring-fencing practices may vary from country
to country and among security types, but underlying assets serve as collateral for the issued
securities (ABS or CBs). Banks can use ABS and CBs to finance their asset originations or
to obtain loans from the ECB (in the case of Europe) or from the Federal Reserve Bank’s
discount window (in the case of USA) by pledging them as a security (Pinedo & Tanenbaum,
2010).
Like securitisation, issuers use a specific collateral pool to make payments to CB holders.6
However, this pool differs from the one used against ABS in three respects. First, this pool
is maintained on the issuer’s balance sheet. Unlike securitisation, the collateral does not
leave the balance sheet of the issuer. Therefore, issuers are perceived to have a strong ‘skin
in the game’ and monitoring incentives are hard to get distorted as alleged in securitisation.
However, these ring-fenced assets are separated from other assets.7 The issuing institution
explicitly indicates that the assets in question are held against CBs.8 This segregation of assets
provides protection to CB holders against the event of issuer’s bankruptcy. Second, the assets
in this cover pool comply with strict requirements provided by concerned regulators and this
pool is continuously monitored by the authorities. The third difference is the dynamic nature
of the collateral. If the value of cover pool declines at some point, the issuer must replace
non-performing assets with performing ones. In this way, the cover pool is dynamically
replenished.
ABS are blamed for passing the ‘hot potato’ of bad loans to investors, but CBs are
considered highly secured instruments for investors.9 However, the rising trend of CB issuance
6These collaterals are ring-fenced on the bank’s balance sheet. Banks cannot use these assets in case of
any liquidity needs. Therefore, some economists argue that CB issuance may result in the encumbrance of
high-quality assets. See Avesani et al. (2007), Rosen (2008) and ECB (2008) for more details about ring-fencing
and asset encumbrance.
7See Schwarcz (2013a) for further details of ring-fencing.
8The assets held against the issuance of covered bonds are recorded in a cover register, in the case of issuance
of famous German covered bonds, Pfandbrief. An independent monitor of the cover pool ensures that it is well
maintained all the time and that the necessary adjustments are made timely and recorded in the cover register. A
certificate is also issued by this monitor before the issuance of covered bonds. This monitor plays an important
role in maintaining the confidence of the investors and the stability of the CB market.
9CBs are considered safe and secure as compared toABS because of the on-balance sheet nature of underlying
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gave rise to many concerns among various market participants, mainly regulators and issuers.
It is believed that CBs might prove laborious to issuers —mainly because of their on-balance
sheet nature,10 over-collateralisation requirements,11 dynamic nature of cover pool12 and dual
recourse of investors. All these provisions provide a high level of protection to investors who
can be less concerned till the issuer remains solvent.13 The issuer maintains all risks, including
the prepayment risk, as the underlying assets stay on the balance sheet. Therefore, a higher
focus on CBs may shift risk from investors to the banking system (Anand et al., 2012; Surti,
2010)
Regulators also provide a favourable treatment to CBs that further incited the interest in
this class of instruments.14 On the contrary, securitisation faces stringent regulations after
the GFC. The stringent regulations for ABS are based on their collapse during the GFC
and favourable treatment of CBs is based on their consistent performance.15 Many market
participants are concerned about this discriminatory treatment of ABS vs CBs, as they think
it may result in a distortion of the funding base diversification of FIs. It may have severe
implications for the individual bank stability and the financial stability. CBs may generate
greater amount of risk for the issuers, as they must actively manage the underlying pool
of collaterals. Therefore, from a financial stability perspective, CBs might not prove to be
assets.
10CBs are the direct obligation of the issuing credit institution. These CBs are recorded on the liability side
of the institution.
11The value of underlying cover pool must exceed the amount of outstanding covered bonds. This is called
over-collateralisation. This requirement is meant to protect investors against any moribund collaterals.
12The issuers are required to replace deteriorating assets in the cover pool with other high-quality performing
assets to meet the notional value of the cover pool and fulfil the over-collateralisation requirements.
13CBs can only be issued against high-quality assets meeting a certain criterion of Loan-to-Value (LTV)
Ratio. According to the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD), a bank must calculate the LTV for each loan
individually. Therefore, a loan with higher LTV cannot be part of the cover pool because of the fact that other
loans in the cover pool have lower LTV. Notwithstanding, there can be loans with higher LTV in a cover pool
because of other factors, e.g. property devaluation. These loans are replaced by other loans with lower LTV.
This is highly protective for investors but onerous for issuers. During economic downturns, a small increase in
the LTV may create several challenges for the issuing institutions when LTV is close to the ceiling. The LTV
requirements currently vary from country to country but each CB issuance must comply with a certain LTV
threshold (ECB, 2008).
14See Regulation (EU)No. 575/2013 (CRR)Articles 129(5), 395, 400(1a), 416(2a), 509(3a), CRARegulation
(EU) No. 462/2013 Article 8c (1), LCR and the securitisation frameworks of Basel III and the haircut regulations
of ECB.
15The favourable regulatory treatment to covered bonds is provided on the basis of historical default statistics
as explained by EBA (2014). Despite the fact that there is no incident of CB default and none of CBs holders
has been asked to take the losses (not during the GFC and sovereign debt crisis in Europe, not in Greece and not
even in Cyprus), there are some CB issuing institutions that faced a bail-out after the GFC. Conversely, the fact
that an instrument did not default in the past does not make it immune from risk and the probability of default
in future cannot be ruled out completely.
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risk-free and an over-reliance on them may result in risk concentration in the banking system.
Hence, the problems in CBs may not be very different from securitisation for issuers. For
these reasons, CBs may not deserve a favourable regulatory treatment, as such treatment is
likely to create an over-reliance on CBs.
5.2.1 Securitisation and Bank Stability
Banks acting as financial intermediaries used to reduce their risk by diversifying their portfolio
and taking funds from depositors. Securitisation provided another way to reduce their risk by
shedding the credit risk from the balance sheets and obtaining funds from alternative funding
sources. Securitisation was considered a blessing for banks and the economy for its benefits
provided through various channels. It was considered helping banks reduce the liquidity
pressure (Loutskina, 2011; Martín-Oliver & Saurina, 2007), increasing the credit supply to
the economy by reducing the effect of financial conditions of the lender (Loutskina & Strahan,
2009), creating new profit opportunities for banks (Cebenoyan & Strahan, 2004; Jiangli &
Pritsker, 2008), and transferring risk from banks to a wider investor base (Wagner, 2007).
However, along with these benefits the risk was also lurking in all these channels.
The positive view about securitisation was largely tarnished during the GFC, as ABS
were blamed for passing the ‘hot potato’ of bad loans to investors (Dell’Ariccia, Igan, &
Laeven, 2012; Parlour & Plantin, 2008).16 However, this ‘hot potato’ hypothesis is not
convincing for many reasons. Originating banks were actively involved in the securitisation
process even after the transfer of assets. They were playing the role of the servicer till the
maturity of the ABS sponsored by them and providing credit enhancement in various forms.
Moreover, securitisation vehicles were not able to finance themselves at the time of the crisis
and sponsoring banks were forced to provide credit lines to these vehicles. In some instances,
the assets were also moved back to the balance sheets of banks.17 Hence, the risk that was
initially considered transferred, started flowing back because of the excessive reliance on
securitisation and the market disruption.
According to agency theory implications, banks can sell loans of better quality to generate
a positive signal to investors and to get a better rating for the issued securities (Diamond,
1984; Greenbaum & Thakor, 1987; Instefjord, 2005). This situation results in retention of
riskier loans on the bank’s balance sheet. According to Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), loan
16This problem has been widely discussed in literature and referred as the ‘moral hazard’ problem.
17See Gorton and Souleles (2007) for a detailed description of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and their role
in securitisation.
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sale is only possible when banks retain the riskier loans on their balance sheets. This situation
makes the loan portfolio of a bank more vulnerable. The lower tranches were also retained by
the originators for getting a higher rating. Empirical evidence has been provided by Krahnen
and Wilde (2008) that retention of riskier loans in securitisation resulted in the increase of
systemic risk.
Close to the crisis period, banks were issuing ABS with implicit or explicit guarantees.
These guarantees were issued to enhance the confidence of investors in the ABS market.
However, the issuance of these guarantees implied that the risk was not being transferred. This
type of securitisation was being performed by banks to get benefits of liquidity and regulatory
capital arbitrage.18 Bankswere obliged to honour these guaranteeswhen underlying collaterals
were not able to pay back to investors. This resulted in an erosion of bank capital when the
risk associated with these guarantees materialized on a large-scale during the GFC. Therefore,
the risk transfer objective was not being achieved by this form of securitisation.19
An important implication of securitisation for bank stability can be derived from the
linkage between leverage and liquidity.20 Generally, banks tend to maintain a high level
of leverage to increase their return on equity, but this leverage is pro-cyclical in nature. It
grows during the economic boom and declines when the economy is in a bust. Securitisation
provided banks with an extra source of liquidity and they were flushed with liquidity because
of it (Acharya & Naqvi, 2012; Wagner, 2007). Banks started facing growth on the assets side
of their balance sheet that led to an increase in the leverage. On the liability side, they were
taking more short-term loans21 and on the asset side they were looking for more borrowers
(Adrian & Shin, 2010).22 Banks started issuing loans to subprime borrowers in the absence
of prime borrowers, resulting in lax screening and lower lending standards, as supported by
empirical evidence provided by many previous studies (Demiroglu & James, 2012; Kara et
al., 2015, 2016; Keys et al., 2009, 2010, 2012). This situation threatened the stability of the
18Regulatory capital arbitrage is a purposeful attempt of a bank to avoid the constraints of capital requirements.
Banks are required to hold capital against their risky assets. The capital of a bank is freed up as a result of loan
transfers from the balance sheet as banks are not supposed to hold loans against transferred loans. This is known
as regulatory capital arbitrage and it has been a major driver of securitisation for banks. However, banks were
creating other assets against this capital so it did not remain free. The issuance of CBs does not provide this
benefit. Therefore, this type of securitisation is different from CBs in this respect.
19Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) is one form of this type of securitisation. See Acharya et al.
(2013) for further information about ABCP.
20The leverage of a bank measures how many assets are financed by debt. The leverage shows the debt loan
of the company. The higher leverage ratio shows a high level of debt in the balance sheet.
21Securities issued against the loans were largely used by the banks as collaterals in the repo market.
22Banks were having excess lending capacity because of the large liquidity gluts created by securitisation.
They were looking for the extra borrowers to use this surplus capacity.
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banking system by creating imbalances in the credit markets, thereby increasing the fragility
of the financial system (Altunbas, Gambacorta, & Marques-Ibanez, 2009).
Nijskens and Wagner (2011) find that some banks may become less risky because of the
securitisation but they make a significant contribution to the systematic risk in the financial
system through risk transfer. Banks may shed their individual idiosyncratic risk related to
their lending activities but the increase in risk takes place in a systemic manner for two main
reasons.23 First, banks also take exposures in securities issued by other banks. Second, banks
also buy Credit Default Swap (CDS)24 to protect themselves against undiversified positions
and simultaneously sell CDS in the market to other banks.25 This ends up in a greater
correlation between them. Hence, the risk is amplified in the financial system because of this
high correlation resulting from the race for risk transfer (Acharya & Yorulmazer, 2007).
The question about the impact of securitisation on the risk profile of the bank is extremely
important as securitisation affects risk sharing between banks and the market. Securitisation
may motivate banks to take more risks — thereby putting the stability on stake (Gibson,
Habib, & Ziegler, 2014). The effect of securitisation on financial stability is an important
question for regulators, who have introduced strict regulations for securitisation focusing on
a higher level of transparency in this process and eliminating the opaqueness as mentioned
by Buchanan (2014). However, the risk should not be viewed in an isolated manner for each
institution. Regulators are required to keep in consideration the contagion effect. They should
pay more attention to the contribution of a bank to the overall risk in the market and not to
the individual bank risk only (Battaglia & Gallo, 2013).
5.2.2 Covered Bonds and Bank Stability
Covered bonds are highly secured bonds for investors. Investors only face credit risk in the
event of bankruptcy of the issuer— otherwise bondholders enjoy multiple layers of protection
including over-collateralisation and dynamic cover pool.26 However, the issuance of covered
bonds may result in a higher risk retention on the issuer’s balance sheet. The dual recourse of
23This issue has also been raised by Adrian and Shin (2009). Banks were purchasing each other’s securities
with borrowed money. Hence, the risk was not dispersed evenly in the economy but concentrated in the banking
system.
24A CDS is a form of financial derivative that is designed to transfer credit risk between two parties. The
buyer of the swap makes the payments to sellers until the maturity of contract and the seller agrees to compensate
for the loss of interest and principal payments in case of default.
25This is known as the synthetic form of securitisation.
26Investors become prone to credit risk if the issuer faces a bankruptcy and the cover pool is not sufficient to
meet the claims of CB holders. Their claims are shifted to other assets of the bank and it may not be satisfied
completely in this situation.
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bondholders can amplify the risk for the issuing institutions and for other creditors of the bank
as well. A higher issuance of covered bonds may lead to higher ring-fencing of high-quality
assets, resulting into high asset encumbrance.27 According to Arif and Anees (2012), a bank
should respond to a liquidity crisis by acting on the asset side of the balance sheet in the first
place, but a bank with a large ring-fenced pool, because of the CB issuance, may not be able
to respond as the assets in the cover pool are not touchable.
The securities issued under the process of traditional securitisation have a pass-through
nature. The proceeds generated from the underlying assets are transferred to the holders of
securities. However, CBs do not have this pass-through nature. Investors do not incur any
losses in case of a prepayment event against the assets held in the cover pool, as such assets
are replaced by the issuer and the value of the cover pool remains intact. There is always a
risk of prepayment in mortgage loans and this risk is borne by CB issuers. CB issuers are
accordingly exposed to thinner margins as losses may not be covered by prepayment penalties
(Poulain, 2003). These prepayment penalties vary from country to country and losses for the
lenders may rise significantly in the countries like France where these penalties are capped
by the regulations.28
Angelos (2015) has expressed his concern that covered bonds may increase market insta-
bility in times of stress because of the factors explained below:
1. Banks play the role of market-makers that may generate risk concentration during the
downturn. If many investors decide to sell their CBs, banks (in their role of market-
makers) must be able to respond and be ready to buy them. This situation results in a
higher risk retention on the balance sheet of banks, forcing them to sell on. However, if
other banks in the economy face a similar situation and the economy is in a downturn,
this scenario might have severe implications for financial stability.
2. CBs may have a higher funding liquidity because of the lower haircuts so banks can
obtain more funds from the repo market by using CBs as collateral as compared to ABS.
However, the CB market is relatively less liquid because of their long-term maturity.
Therefore, under strained market conditions, a large part of the liquidity buffer available
in the form of CBs may become unusable.
27According to definition of asset encumbrance provided by European Banking Authority (EBA), “An asset
shall be treated as encumbered if it has been pledged or if it is subject to any form of arrangement to secure,
collateralise or credit enhance any transaction from which it cannot be freely with-drawn”.
28The maximum prepayment penalty charged by a French bank should be 6-month interest on prepaid amount
that should not exceed 3% of outstanding balance.
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3. The asset encumbrance does not allow the banks to deleverage when required by a
financial crisis. This may result in restricting a banks’ activities and raising concerns
among the investors about its financial health.
The over-collateralisation feature of CBs requires issuers to maintain the notional value
of the cover pool under all circumstances. This requirement makes the cover pool dynamic
instead of static. A large-scale issuance of CBs is likely to result in a higher risk retention on
the issuer’s balance sheet, as it must continuously replace the deteriorating assets with other
high-quality assets. The over-collateralisation and dynamic cover pool features of the covered
bonds surely provide a safeguard to the bondholders against moribund collateral. However,
this over-collateralisation has, at least, two important implications for the issuing institutions.
First, large-scale issuance of CBs results in bigger cover pools, thereby leaving fewer
assets for the unsecured creditors of a bank. The unsecured creditors are left with lower-
quality assets only. This situation gives rise to fear among the unsecured creditors that they
must face losses if the bank goes bust. As a result, the unsecured creditors will demand higher
risk premia as a compensation for the elevated risk being taken by them (Haldane, 2012).
Hence, unsecured financing will become more expensive for the banks and it may freeze as
well during the market downturns. Thus, the over-reliance on CBs may result in funding
problems and escalation in funding cost if the CB issuance ability is hampered by the market
or bank conditions.
Second, a larger pool of ring-fenced assets might result in more jittery creditors. The
unsecured creditors may receive a noisy signal about the returns generated by the assets other
than those ring-fenced and they may either decide to run or roll over on the basis of this
signal (Gai, 2013). A panic may arise if many unsecured creditors decide to run. A financial
crisis is triggered in a situation when there is a bank run by unsecured creditors. The case of
Northern Rock stands as a testament to this proposition.29 Hence, the large issuance of CBs
may result in creation of systemic risk for the issuing institutions. This situation stipulates
that CB issuance should remain within the limits that such a signal is not generated in the
market.
The ring-fencing of high quality assets also increases the risk for taxpayers as they ulti-
29Northern Rock was a UK mortgage bank that failed in 2007. It was the fifth biggest mortgage lender and
the first bank run since 1866 in the UK. The panic about the bank was created among the depositors by an
announcement made by the Bank of England about providing liquidity support to the stricken Northern Rock.
Long queues of depositors were seen outside the bank demanding their money after this very announcement and
the bank was not able to sustain this situation. Although Northern Rock was following a risky business model,
the reaction of depositors was based on the noisy signal generated by the Bank of England. See Shin (2009b)
for further details.
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mately provide a guarantee to deposits (Nomura, 2015) through Deposit Guarantee Schemes
(DGS).30 DGS were introduced to provide a sense of safety to unsecured depositors of banks.
The ring-fencing of high-quality assets because of a CB issuance leaves fewer and low quality
assets for unsecured creditors including depositors. Therefore, the risk increases for taxpay-
ers who ultimately sponsor these DGS. However, not all depositors are eligible for DGS.31
Therefore, some of the depositors may remain jittery even in the presence of DGS.
A proposed way to deal with the problems explained above is to impose limits on the level
of asset encumbrance. However, ECBC (2013) opposes imposing such limits and emphasises
the importance of increasing the transparency in CB issuance. Anand et al. (2012) argue
about imposing variable limits on asset encumbrance depending on the economic conditions.
However, this proposal is difficult to implement in practice for two main reasons. First,
economic downturns are hard to predict. Second, CBs are issued with defined maturity and
assets already encumbered cannot be reversed during an economic downturn.
5.2.3 Systemic Risk
The financial innovation has intensified the challenge of measuring systemic risk as traditional
measures may not provide much insight in this world of financial derivatives (Brunnermeier,
Gorton, & Krishnamurthy, 2012). IMF (2009) has defined systemic risk as a “disruption
to the flow of financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the
financial system, and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real
economy”. Schwarcz (2008) has provided a working definition of systemic risk. According
to him, systemic risk is “the risk that (i) an economic shock such as a market or institutional
failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets
or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in
increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial
financial-market price volatility”. Brunnermeier et al. (2012) define systemic risk as “the risk
that shocks affect the financial sector and trigger an endogenous adverse feedback significantly
amplifying these shocks, causing further deterioration in the financial sector, and leading to
significant output losses”.
According to these definitions, the risk lurking in a financial system may create system-
wide problems and affect the flow of funds as a result of a shock. The failure of one institution
30The failure of a bank may put pressure on taxpayers as they have to sponsor these Deposit Insurance
Schemes.
31See Article 5 of EU Directive 2014/49/EU for eligibility of deposits under DGS.
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may trigger systemic risk in other institutions that can lead to a full blown systemic crisis
because of the contagion effect. The complex interconnectedness of FIs has amplified this
problem. These webs of connections were identified more than two decades ago by Minsky
(1977). Banks have been widely using Value at Risk (VaR) to measure their risk before
the GFC. However, this measure does not account for the tail risk and the contribution of a
financial institution to systemic risk. Therefore, this measure was widely criticised.
Many of the previous studies are focusing on the firm’s stock Beta, by following Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), as a measure of systemic risk (Battaglia et al., 2014; Nijskens
& Wagner, 2011; Uhde & Michalak, 2010; Wu, Yang, & Hong, 2011). However, Beta
has several limitations as a measure of systemic risk and it is often criticised for its lack of
informativeness. This criticism stems from twomain reasons. First, the value of Beta depends
on the time period of data used in its calculation. There are different opinions about this time
period used for the Beta calculation. Second, Beta is based on historical co-variance of a stock
with the market. Therefore, it does not have a forward-looking capability. There are several
other measures proposed after the GFC. Many of the studies argued about using Conditional
Value at Risk (CoVaR) as a measure of systemic risk, as it provides a better insight about
the tail risk (Drakos & Kouretas, 2015; López-Espinosa, Moreno, Rubia, & Valderrama,
2012). Other important measures of systemic risk include the Expected Shortfall (ES) and the
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010),
as well as SRISK of Brownlees and Engle (2012).
Beta and MES are based on market information. These market-based measures have been
criticised for the lack of expediency and informativeness (Zhang, Vallascas, Keasey, & Cai,
2015). The regulatory surcharge should not be based on thesemeasures, as it may createwrong
incentives for the banks (Löﬄer & Raupach, 2013). Brunnermeier et al. (2012) recommend
that a risk measure should integrate the market and firm-specific information along with the
macroeconomic state of the economy. Most of the previous measures of systemic risk do not
follow such an integrated approach. Themarket measure does not account for the firm-specific
information. Moreover, a good measure of systemic risk should not measure the stand-alone
risk, rather it should reflect the market conditions as well.
Another important issue that obtained attention in the literature after the GFC was the
identification of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) and their contribution
to the systemic risk of the financial system (Banulescu & Dumitrescu, 2015; Bongini, Nieri,
& Pelagatti, 2015; Fiordelisi, Galloppo, & Ricci, 2014). SIFIs are usually large financial
institutions that are highly leveraged and have a larger market share. These institutions
provide a major contribution to the aggregate risk of the financial system. The risk measures
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focusing on a single type of information (e.g. the Beta) do not account for SIFIs. These
measures are only useful in evaluating the stand-alone risk as they do not account for the
contribution of an institution in the aggregate risk. Hence, a good risk measure should
account for the contribution of an FI to the aggregate risk, along with the stand-alone risk.
In light of the definitions of systemic risk provided by Schwarcz (2008), IMF (2009)
and Brunnermeier et al. (2012) along with criticism on previous risk measures given above,
a good measure of the systemic risk should account for market shocks and feedback of
these shocks, potential losses to the FIs, changes in cost of capital or its availability, SIFIs,
and the contribution of financial institutions to the aggregate risk. Keeping in view these
considerations, this study uses LRMES and SRISK as measures of systemic risk.
Long Run Marginal Expected Shortfall (LRMES)
MES has been very popular among many researchers as a measure of systemic risk after
the GFC (see e.g. Battaglia & Gallo, 2013; Derbali & Hallara, 2016; Weiß, Neumann, &
Bostandzic, 2014; Yun & Moon, 2014). Acharya et al. (2010) believe that MES is a better
measure of systemic risk as it provides information about the contribution of each FI to the
systemic risk of the financial system. They argue that MES should also be used as a basis
for the regulatory surcharge to penalise FIs for their contribution to systemic risk. However,
Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012) express the concern that MES is a short-run indicator.
They propose the use of LRMES to overcome this problem. LRMES is a more forward
looking measure of systemic risk as compared to MES. LRMES is measured as:
LRMESi,t = Et(Ri,t+1:t+h|Rm,t+1:t+h <C) (5.1)
where Ri,t+1:t+h is the multi-period return of bank i between period t+ 1 and t+ h and
Rm,t+1:t+h < C is the systemic event. The systemic event is defined as a decline in market
return below a threshold C (that depicts a crisis situation) over a time horizon h. The crisis
is referred to the most pessimistic situation in the market. Following Acharya et al. (2012),
a crisis scenario is considered when the index falls by 40% over the next six months. More
specifically,C = 40% and h = 180 days.
According to Acharya et al. (2012), a crisis is a situation of under-capitalisation of the
financial system. A second definition of crisis, apart from the 40% criterion mentioned above,
is given by:
E <
k
1− kD (5.2)
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where E is the sum of all equities in the financial system, D is the cumulative book value
of debt and and k is the prudential capital fraction that is taken as 8%. LRMES would be
evaluated on the basis of scenarios satisfying equation (5.2). The GARCH−DCC method
has been recommended by Brownlees and Engle (2015) to measure LRMES.32
SRISK
SRISK gained significant attention in the recent literature (Beccalli, Anolli, & Borello, 2015;
Iqbal, Strobl, & Vähämaa, 2015; Laeven, Ratnovski, & Tong, 2015). SRISK follows a hybrid
approach, as it combines the market-based (sophisticated) and accounting-based (simple)
measures. SRISK, as shown in equation (5.3), can be defined as a function of bank size, its
leverage and the expected devaluation in equity conditional on the market decline.
Zhang et al. (2015) proved empirically that SRISK has a better ability to generate an
early warning about the vulnerability of a FI to a systemic shock. They argue that ex-ante
regulatory interventions should be devised for FIs to forestall the erosion of their capital
adequacy. Pankoke (2014) in his study on comparing different risk measures also found that
SRISK is the most suitable measure among all modern alternatives to signal the possible
contribution of a financial institution to systemic risk.
The SRISK calculation is akin to stress testing in banking but it is done with the simple
publicly available information.33 It is defined as:
SRISKi,t =Wi,t [kLVGit− (1− k)LRMESi,t−1] (5.3)
where Wi,t is the market value of equity, k is the prudential capital fraction, LVGi,t
is quasi-leverage (that shows the level of capitalisation)34 and LRMESi,t is the Long-Run
Marginal Expected Shortfall (that shows the expected loss in capital conditional on the market
decline).35 LVG is measured as:
LVGi,t =
Di,t+Wi,t
Wi,t
(5.4)
32See Brownlees and Engle (2015) for measurement of LRMES
33Stress testing is an analysis performed by banks to evaluate if the FI has enough capital to withstand the
impact of adverse market conditions during an economic downturn. These tests are either performed by banks
as part of their risk management framework or by regulatory authorities. The purpose of these tests is to identify
weak spots so that remedial measures are taken by banks or regulators at an early stage.
34A high value of LVG shows that a bank is thinly capitalised. A bank may face adverse consequences when
it has a high leverage because there is not enough capital to absorb the shocks.
35LRMES shows the volatility of the bank capital with respect to the market. A high value of LRMES shows
that the bank capital is highly sensitive to market shocks.
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where Di,t is the book value of debt andWi,t is the market value of equity. The financial
distress of the system with N banks operating in it can be measured as:
SRISKt =
N
∑
i=1
(SRISKi,t)+ (5.5)
The plus sign in equation (5.5) shows that only positive values are taken to calculate the
aggregate risk of the system that shows the amount of the capital required to bail-out the
financial system conditional on the systemic shock. Brownlees and Engle (2015) recommend
using a percentage version of SRISK to get a greater insight, as it shows howmuch contribution
ismade by each bank to the aggregate risk. Acharya et al. (2012) have also argued that systemic
risk should not be described in terms of an institution’s failure, but of its overall contribution
to system-wide risk. The percentage version of SRISK captures this contribution, measured
as:
SRISK%i,t =
SRISKi,t
SRISKt
i f SRISKi,t > 0 (5.6)
SRISK shows the EURO amount of the capital that a bank needs if the market index falls by
40% over a period of six months. This measure captures the sensitivity of a bank to a decline
in the market index. In what follows, I divide the SRISK by total assets of the bank. This
normalization ensures that the results are not driven by the size of the bank, as large banks
usually have a higher SRISK. Following Langfield and Pagano (2015), I label this variable as
Systemic Risk Intensity (SRI).
5.3 Research Methodology
This section explains the economic intuitions behind the relationship of ABS and CBs with
bank stability. These economic intuitions provide the foundation for the empirical model
being tested. This section also provides the details of empirical methods being followed.
5.3.1 Economic Intuitions
Many researchers have previously argued that securitising banks follow an aggressive business
strategy that stems from their response to the benefits received from securitisation.36 The
stability implications are derived from the response of the bank that is visible in the form of an
36See Battaglia et al. (2014); Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014); Carbó-Valverde et al. (2012);Wagner (2007)
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increase in lending, a reduction in monitoring and screening efforts, and a higher leverage.37
Therefore, the relationship of securitisation with the risk transfer is not linear as it depends
on how much risk a bank has taken because of the securitisation. The risk level of newly
created assets determines the overall risk profile of the bank. The higher liquidity injections
through the securitisation process is a potential factor for the creation of new assets that might
be riskier.
Banks use ABS and CBs to mitigate their funding and liquidity risks. These two risks are
always systemic in nature. ABS and CBs might help banks meet these objectives, resulting
in a reduction in the systemic risk at an initial stage. When banks increase their reliance on
one instrument, that is where the rubber hits the road. In the case of ABS, it results in three
main effects. First, banks reliance on traditional liquid assets is decreased and securitisation
becomes a mean of liquidity generation for the banks. A concentration risk is created here.38
Second, a liquidity glut is created, or in the words of Acharya and Naqvi (2012), banks are
flushed with liquidity. The surplus liquidity must be used somewhere. Hence, the growth in
the assets side directs the banks to look for some new borrowers.39 When all prime borrowers
in the market already have loans, further lending is made to the subprime borrowers. The
issuance of large-scale leveraged loans may also take place. The third problem is linked with
the second one. Banks heavily involved in the ABS issuance are not able to cut back the size
of their balance sheets during a crisis. This is because of the generation of long-term assets
that are financed by short-term liabilities. Hence, the systemic risk of FIs increases as a result
of new risks taken by them.40 Hence, the problem might not be securitisation per se, but the
out of bounds securitisation gives rise to the problems for banks.
In the case of CB issuance, the over-reliance also results in at least three problems. The
first problem is analogous to securitisation. A bank issuing CBs may face difficulties in
deleveraging when it is needed, because of the high asset encumbrance. The assets that are
already ring-fenced cannot be liquidated when a bank needs to deleverage. Second, a higher
asset encumbrance resulting from CB issuance makes the balance sheet of a bank vulnerable
to the market and economic shocks — mainly for two reasons: (i) high-quality assets are
used for CB issuance and the remaining assets are riskier ones, (ii) the dynamic nature of
37See Acharya and Naqvi (2012); Adrian and Shin (2010); Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004); Jiangli and Pritsker
(2008); Keys et al. (2012); Morrison (2005); Wagner (2007)
38Traditional liquidity is replaced by the loan liquidity. Banks decrease their reliance on traditional sources of
liquidity. Holdings of liquid assets on the balance sheets are significantly reduced, as banks are able to generate
liquidity when required through securitisation. These banks face liquidity problems when their securitisation
ability is hampered, due to the collapse of the securitisation market. See Loutskina (2011) for further details.
39See Schwarcz (2013c); Shin (2009b)
40See Shin (2009a)
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the cover pool requires banks to replenish it in case of any deterioration. The susceptibility
of unencumbered assets is increased at the time of economic shock. This situation leads to
two potential effects, i.e. (i) the price of unsecured funding might increase because of the
susceptibility of unencumbered assets, and (ii) unsecured creditors might receive a signal at
the time of an economic downturn that unencumbered assets will also be encumbered. They
might decide to roll-over or run on the basis of this signal. Third, CBs serve as a source of
cheap funding for banks, but the issuance of large covered bonds ties up a larger share of
capital that may increase the funding cost.41 Hence, it is possible to argue that the potential
costs of CB issuance may outweigh its benefits for the issuer after a certain stage. However,
the European Covered Bond Council (ECBC) calls it a myth that an increase in CB issuance
might lead to a higher asset encumbrance that may destabilise the system (ECBC, 2013).
The above discussion explicates that the problem starts when a bank increases its focus
on one particular funding source. Pacces (2010) is also of the view that the problem in
securitisation is that it went beyond what financial markets could stand. I call it “scalability”
aspect. The relationship of SB with bank stability may not be a distinct one rather determined
by their respective volumes. The problem does not lie in the securitisation or CBs per se but in
the way these instruments are used (Chiesa, 2008, 2015). The complexity and multiple forms
of securitisation also added to the problem. However, this study does not focus on multiple
forms of securitisation. I assume that a large amount of securitisation represents multiple
forms of securitisation as well.
Based on the above discussion, it is argued here that the issuance of SB might initially
help the banks reduce their systemic risk by providing multiple benefits related to liquidity,
funding cost and risk transfer. However, the nature of the relationship may change when the
bank increases its focus on one particular instrument. An increase in systemic risk beyond
this level can be observable because of the problems explained above (aggressive business
strategy, problems in deleveraging, high asset encumbrance etc.). A hypothetical graph of the
relationship between SB and systemic risk is provided in Figure 5.1.
The above discussion implies that the function expressing the relationship between SB
and systemic risk is a non-linear one. The slope of the function varies with the volume of
the SB issuance. This study empirically investigates this relationship. The analysis will help
evaluate the proposals for limits on the issuance of SB.
41The assets backing the issuance of CBs are retained on the balance sheet of the issuing bank. Therefore,
banks are required to hold capital against them.
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Figure 5.1: Hypothetical Relationship of Risk and SB
R
is
k
Securities and Bonds 
5.3.2 Data and Sample
Most of the previous studies related to securitisation have focused on the US market, whereas
Europe is still under-investigated. Moreover, the CBs market is well-established in most
European countries, whereas it is in its nascent stages in the US.42 The CBs market has deep
roots in Europe, especially in Germany, France and Spain, and operates under well-defined
regulations.43 For these reasons, this study targets the European market. The focus is on
the largest players in both markets i.e. Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain.
The data come from multiple sources. A total of 1,041 securitisation transactions from
the ABS-Alert and 2,588 transactions of CBs are identified from the Bloomberg terminal and
ECBC Label. Data for SB are available with respect to the date of the transaction, and have
been transformed into yearly data. Bank level data, comprising of the information from the
financial statements, are obtained from Bankscope (Bureau van Dijk). Data regarding SRISK,
LRMES and market volatility is collected from V-lab maintained by the NY Stern Business
School.44 The data frequency is yearly, covering the time period from 2000 to 2014. Non-
42The first covered bond issuance in US took place in 2007. Although many banks started issuing CBs
afterwards, the market is still not well-established. Investors in the US market are still hesitant to invest in CBs
because of the lack of a well-defined regulatory framework for CBs and the little knowledge about this market.
43CBs are mainly subject to prudential treatment by two sets of European directives i.e. Undertakings for
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) and CRD.
44The values of ABS and SRISK were in US $ and converted to Euro by using the currency converter available
at Statistical Data Warehouse of the ECB. http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/curConverter.do
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listed banks and banks who never issued ABS or CBs during the sample period are excluded.
Banks with missing information about total assets, loans, and net income are also excluded.
These adjustment provide with a final sample of 46 banks.
Table 5.1: Description of Variables
Variable Description Sources
SRISK% This is the percentage version fo SRISK. The cal-
culation is provided above.
V-Lab
SRI Systemic Risk Intensity: SRISK normalized by the
total assets of the bank.
V-Lab
LRMES Long Run Marginal Expected Short Fall V-Lab
Z-Score Modified Version of Altman Z-Score Bankscope, Author’s Calculation
ABSTA Asset Backed Securities issued during the time t
divided by Total Assets at the beginning of time t
AB-Alert, Bankscope, Author’s Calcula-
tion
SABSTA Square of ABSTA Author’s Calculation
CBTA Covered Bonds issued during the time t divided by
Total Assets at the beginning of time t
Blooberg, ECBC, Bankscope, Author’s
Calculation
SCBTA Square of CBTA Author’s Calculation
Vol Volatility of the Bank V-Lab
T1Cap Tier 1 Capital Ratio Bankscope
DTA Deposits to Total Assets Bankscope
LTA Loans to Total Assets Bankscope
NIM Net Interest Margin Bankscope
Size Natural Log of Total Assets Bankscope, Author’s Calculation
GFC Global Financial Crisis Dummy, equal to 1 if year
is between 2007-2009, 0 otherwise
-
SDC Sovereign Debt Crisis Dummy, equal to 1 if year
is after 2009, 0 otherwise
-
The study uses three measures of systemic risk, i.e. SRISK%, SRI (SRISK divided by
total assets), and LRMES. To add robustness to the obtained results, the study also uses an
accounting measure of bank soundness, i.e. the Z-Score as defined in section 5.4.4. The
securitisation and CB issuance are captured by ratios of ABS (ABS Ratio) or CBs (CB Ratio)
issued during time t to total assets at the beginning of time t. A set of control variables is being
considered to reduce the omitted-variable bias, consisting of bank-specific attributes. The
most important bank-specific variable affecting systemic risk is size of the bank. A number
of previous studies have found that larger banks make a greater contribution to systemic risk
(Battaglia &Gallo, 2013;Wu et al., 2011). Moreover, these banks are also likely to issue more
SB. Therefore, taking size as a control variable helps disentangle the size effect from the SB
effect. Other bank-specific control variables include Volatility (Vol) of a bank’s stock, Tier
1 Capital Ratio (T1Cap) to account for the available capital buffer, Deposit to Total Assets
(DTA), Loans to Total Assets (LTA), the ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets (LIQ), the Net
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Interest Margin (NIM) to capture profitability of the bank, and the Cost to Income (C/I) ratio.
Details on these variables are provided in Table 5.1. All ratio variables are winsorised at the
1% level to prevent the problem of any potential outliers.45
Table 5.2 reports descriptive statistics. The table shows the different trends of ABS
and CBs issuance and different risk levels in European countries. The maximum values of
SRISK% show that most of the contribution in the overall systemic risk is made by certain
big banks. The variance of ABS issuance is quite large but CB issuance does not exceed a
certain level (9% in most cases). This is in line with arguments stated earlier that the inherent
limitations of CBs do not let banks issue CBs beyond a certain threshold. The table also shows
that Italy, Netherlands and Spain are market leaders in the European securitisation market.
Despite a high issuance of ABS, their banks are not found riskier than banks operating in
other jurisdictions. Austrian banks have minimal presence in the securitisation market, but
these banks are not found less risky than others. Banks in Portugal, Italy, Spain and Germany
have a high presence in the CBs market.46 The correlation matrix is reported in Table 5.3.
5.3.3 Empirical Model
This study is aimed at identifying the relationship between SB issuance and bank stability.
Unlike previous studies, it focuses on two instruments i.e. ABS and CBs, and investigates the
possible non-linearity in the target relationship between SB. The idea is that the relationship
may vary with the level of involvement of a bank in the issuance of these instruments. I start
the analysis with the estimation of a simple polynomial (quadratic) model, given by:
yi,t+1 = α+β1zi,t+β2z2i,t+∑γXi,t+ εi,t (5.7)
where yi,t denotes the measure of systemic risk for bank i at time t+1, zit is the ratio of
ABS (ABS Ratio) or CBs (CB Ratio) during time t to total assets at the beginning of time t,
z2it is the square of this ratio and Xi,t represents a K×1 vector of additional controls. εit is the
error term and α , β1, β2, and γ are the parameters to be estimated.
45Winsorisation amounts to limiting extreme values in the data to prevent the possibility that results are driven
by outliers. All outliers in the data are set to a specific percentile of data. All the data below the Nth percentile
are replaced with it. Winsorisation at 1% level implies that all the data below the 1st percentile are replaced with
the 1st percentile.
46Germany has been themarket leader inCBmarket of Europe. However, during the last fewyears, the issuance
of CBs has significantly decreased in Germany. Many other banks who were not issuing CBs previously, started
issuing these bonds after the GFC e.g. banks in Italy.
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The systemic risk of the bank varies with the issuance of ABS and CBs if β1 6= β2.
The model given in the Equation (5.7) is fitted to the data using the Fixed Effect (FE)
estimator. Heteroskedasticity is addressed by clustering the standard errors at the bank level.
The Modified Wald test for the group-wise heteroskedasticity rejects the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity (p < 0.01). Driscoll-Kraay standard errors method is also applied and
the associated results remain consistent with earlier estimations. Moreover, the multiway
clustering method of Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) is also used and standard errors
are clustered at the bank and time level. However, results are found consistent with earlier
estimations when standards errors were clustered at bank level only. The Sargan-Hansen test
is used to check whether FEs should be preferred to the Random Effects (REs) as the standard
Hausman test is not suitable for models with clustered standard errors. This test is also known
as generalized Hausman test (Arellano, 1993). The null hypothesis that the regressors are
uncorrelated with individual specific errors is rejected here (p< 0.01),47 thereby supporting
the use of FEs.
After estimating the quadratic model, I extend the analysis to a non-parametric approach
Non-parametric methods are consistent under less restrictive assumptions than parametric
estimators. However, a fully non-parametric approach has limited applicability because of
the curse of dimensionality. A possible way to deal with this problem is the partially linear
model, given by:
yi,t+1 =Θ(zi,t)+ γXi,t+ εi,t (5.8)
The vector of controls Xi,t appears in a linear specification, but zi,t enters through an
unknown smooth function Θ(.). The partially linear model is being estimated here using the
GAM. GAM provides a framework to extends the standard linear model through the non-
linear functions of each of the variables, but it maintains the additivity. A linear model can
be extended as follows:
yi = β0+β1zi1+β2zi2.....++βqziq+ εi (5.9)
Each linear function β jzi j in the equation (5.9) with a smooth non-linear function f j(zi j)
to allow for the non-linear relationship between each feature and response. The model is
47E(Xit ∗ui 6= 0)
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rewritten as:
yi = β0+
q
∑
j=1
f j(zi j)+ εi (5.10)
It is called an additive model because a separate f j is calculated for each of Z j and then
added together. The estimation of Θ, given in equation (5.8), through GAM is done by
choosing a basis function that is treated as a known function. If bi(x) is the ith basis function,
then Θ can be represented as:
Θ(zi,t) =
q
∑
i=1
bi(zi,t)β (5.11)
where β is a vector of unknown parameters. Equation (5.11) can be changed to equation
(5.8) as:
yi,t+1 =
q
∑
i=1
bi(zi,t)β + γXi,t+ εi,t (5.12)
5.4 Results
The section presents the empirical results of several tests including the findings of the robust-
ness checks.
5.4.1 Estimation of the Quadratic Model
The quadratic model is fitted separately for ABS and CBs. Results are reported for ABS
and CBs in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 respectively. Table 5.4 reports the results of FE with robust
standard errors for ABS. The coefficients of the ABS ratio in models 1 and 2 are negative
and significant, showing a negative relationship of ABS Ratio with LRMES. The square
term of ABS ratio is positive and significant in both models 1 and 2. These results suggest
that issuance of ABS initially helps bank control their systemic risk, but this relationship is
reversed when the bank increases its ABS issuance. These coefficients have similar signs
for SRI and SRISK% but they are not significant here. These results may suggest that the
relationship of ABS with systemic risk of the bank does not follow a linear trend but changes
with the scale of ABS issuance.
Among the control variables, size has a significant and positive relationship with SRI and
LRMES, highlighting that larger banks have a greater exposure to the risk. Another important
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Table 5.4: Asset-Backed Securities and Systemic Risk - Fixed Effect Estimations
Note: This table provides the results of the quadratic model estimation for ABS and Systemic Risk Measures
through Fixed Effects. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent and are reported in parenthesis. Two
models are estimated for each of risk measure. One model includes dummies for the GFC and the SDC, while
other model does not include them. All standard errors are clustered with respect to the bank.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LRMESit+1 LRMESit+1 SRIit+1 SRIit+1 SRISK%it+1 SRISK%it+1
ABS Ratio -1.273*** -0.902** -0.432 -0.178 -0.562 -0.861*
(0.441) (0.375) (0.323) (0.272) (0.513) (0.507)
Sqaure of ABS Ratio 0.0618*** 0.0498** 0.00414 -0.00341 0.0295 0.0383
(0.0221) (0.0183) (0.0189) (0.0158) (0.0274) (0.0276)
Volatility 0.131*** 0.105*** 0.0518*** 0.0207** 0.0236 0.0618*
(0.0365) (0.0328) (0.0139) (0.00972) (0.0370) (0.0328)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.382** 0.144 0.00275 -0.133** -0.424* -0.266
(0.179) (0.166) (0.0545) (0.0605) (0.217) (0.179)
Deposit to Total Assets 0.0810 0.0316 -0.0156 -0.0311 0.0162 0.0324
(0.0804) (0.0647) (0.0230) (0.0195) (0.0833) (0.0866)
Loans to Total Assets -0.159 -0.118 -0.0671 -0.0495 0.158 0.138
(0.125) (0.114) (0.0525) (0.0460) (0.195) (0.177)
Liquid Assets to Total Assets -0.230* -0.212** -0.0514 -0.0451* 0.166* 0.160*
(0.123) (0.0870) (0.0366) (0.0249) (0.0919) (0.0816)
Net Interest Margin -1.487 -1.403 -1.666** -1.750*** -4.603 -4.488
(2.195) (2.036) (0.657) (0.628) (3.491) (3.348)
Cost/Income -0.0238 -0.0365 -0.0110 -0.0168 0.0301 0.0366
(0.0236) (0.0247) (0.0117) (0.0101) (0.0254) (0.0267)
Size 12.56*** 7.680** 3.998*** 0.278 -0.328 4.100
(2.317) (3.152) (0.760) (0.688) (4.475) (4.954)
Global Financial Crisis 3.498 4.543*** -5.596*
(2.135) (0.726) (3.178)
Sovereign Debt Crisis 8.494*** 5.419*** -6.345
(2.874) (0.805) (4.051)
Constant -94.14*** -39.57 -28.42*** 13.10* 15.82 -33.59
(30.19) (35.04) (8.433) (7.385) (53.64) (58.04)
Standard Errors Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
No. of Observations 381 381 381 381 381 381
No. of Groups 39 39 39 39 39 39
R-squared 0.477 0.520 0.461 0.578 0.058 0.082
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01,
variable is volatility which has a positive relationship with systemic risk in 3 models out
of 6. Liquidity has a negative coefficient for LRMES and SRI which is significant in three
models. These findings may suggest that liquid banks are less likely to face a greater amount
of systemic risk. A bank can control its systemic risk exposure by not compromising on
liquidity. A similar situation is visible here for DTA and NIM, showing that banks with a
good depositor base and higher profitability can better control their systemic risk.
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The estimation of models 2, 4 and 6 allows to investigate if the results differ when the GFC
and the SDC are taken into account. The inclusion of these two important events enables us to
evaluate whether a crisis situation decreases the systemic risk. This possible decrease can be
ascribed to the increase in the awareness about the risk implied in various funding instruments.
However, the risk might also increase as it might become harder to manage during the the
turbulent times. Table 5.4 provides some interesting results. The GFC and the SDC have
positive and significant coefficients for LRMES and SRI. These positive coefficients point
towards the increase in the systemic risk during the crisis situation. However, the signs of
coefficients of the ABS Ratio and Square of the ABS Ratio do not change in these models.
This shows that the potential effects of the securitisation activity on systemic risk are still
present in the crisis situation. However, the coefficient of both crises become negative in the
case of the SRISK%. As explained earlier, the SRISK% shows the contribution of each bank
to the overall systemic risk and the descriptive statistics reported in Table 5.2 show that most
of the contribution to the overall systemic risk is made by a few large banks. These results
suggest that on the one hand awareness among big banks about the risk involved in various
funding instruments increases, and on the other, the risk is more evenly distributed on the
market as other banks are also hit by the crisis situation that leads to an increase in their
systemic risk. Models 2 and 4 in Table 5.4 also show a greater impact of the SDC on the
systemic risk of banks as compared to the GFC.
Table 5.5 reports the FE estimation of the quadratic model for CBs. The CB Ratio has a
significant positive coefficient only in model 1 that becomes insignificant when effects of the
GFC and the SDC are taken into account inmodel 2. The square of the CBRatio has a negative
coefficient in models 1 to 4, but it is insignificant. These results, on the one hand, negate
the presence of a non linear relationship and, on the other hand, do not support the idea that
CBs help banks control their risk. The coefficients of most other control variables are similar
to earlier estimations for ABS. Volatility has a significant and positive relationship with SRI
and LRMES. This is in line with earlier results that banks having a high stock volatility face a
higher systemic risk. The size variable has a consistently positive relationship with systemic
risk. LTA, LIQ and NIM are found to have a negative relationship with systemic risk. The
GFC and the SDC also have a significant impact on systemic risk of banks in models 2 and 4.
In addition to the FE estimation, Tobitmodel for panel data is applied, followingBrownlees
and Engle (2015). Bank fixed effects are included separately in these estimations. The Tobit
model is relevant in this case as SRISK is not always positive and since non-positive values
of SRISK do not contribute to the systemic risk, I truncate SRISK% and SRI at 0. Tobit is
useful in this condition as it allows to explain the capital shortfall resulting from SRISK when
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Table 5.5: Covered Bonds and Systemic Risk - Fixed Effect Estimations
Note: This table provides the results of the quadratic model estimation for CBs and Systemic Risk Measures
through Fixed Effects. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent and are reported in parenthesis. Two
models are estimated for each of risk measure. One model includes dummies for the GFC and the SDC, while
other model does not include them. All standard errors are clustered with respect to the bank.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LRMESit+1 LRMESit+1 SRIit+1 SRIit+1 SRISK%it+1 SRISK%it+1
CB Ratio 2.605** 1.713 0.488 0.259 -2.314 -1.999
(1.199) (1.051) (0.333) (0.298) (1.690) (1.505)
Sqaure of CB Ratio -0.256 -0.155 -0.0585 -0.0395 0.334 0.308
(0.163) (0.157) (0.046) (0.042) (0.255) (0.240)
Volatility 0.116*** 0.0884** 0.0411*** 0.0144* 0.0108 0.0477
(0.039) (0.039) (0.010) (0.007) (0.035) (0.032)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.404** 0.194 0.0209 -0.0928 -0.365 -0.209
(0.195) (0.176) (0.060) (0.057) (0.231) (0.210)
Deposit to Total Assets 0.118 0.0787 -0.0116 -0.0184 0.00336 0.0127
(0.085) (0.070) (0.023) (0.019) (0.105) (0.108)
Loans to Total Assets -0.233* -0.139 -0.121** -0.0826** 0.0431 -0.00979
(0.126) (0.131) (0.048) (0.038) (0.221) (0.195)
Liquid Assets to Total Assets -0.313** -0.239* -0.0772** -0.0392 0.0882 0.0357
(0.142) (0.123) (0.031) (0.026) (0.161) (0.157)
Net Interest Margin -1.065 -1.482 -1.501** -1.768*** -4.127 -3.760
(2.009) (1.890) (0.598) (0.554) (3.527) (3.284)
Cost/Income -0.00645 -0.00159 -0.0214** -0.0137 0.0609 0.0503
(0.043) (0.039) (0.011) (0.009) (0.039) (0.036)
Size 11.49*** 5.856* 4.327*** 0.728 1.384 6.341
(1.892) (2.986) (0.761) (0.684) (4.874) (5.637)
Global Financial Crisis 4.980** 4.327*** -5.961*
(1.965) (0.575) (3.046)
Sovereign Debt Crisis 8.240** 4.705*** -6.480
(3.149) (0.649) (3.988)
Constant -83.03*** -24.12 -34.11*** 3.872 2.722 -49.60
(26.955) (33.043) (7.463) (7.182) (58.909) (64.112)
Standard Errors Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
No. of Observations 389 389 389 389 389 389
No. of Groups 38 38 38 38 38 38
R-squared 0.471 0.505 0.496 0.626 0.051 0.074
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01,
it is above 0. The results of Tobit estimation for ABS are reported in Table 5.6. A similar
relationship between ABS and systemic risk is observed for SRI and SRISK% as observed
for LRMES in Table 5.4. The ABS Ratio has a negative and significant coefficient for both
risk measures, while the Square of the ABS Ratio has a positive and significant coefficient in
all models (except model 2). These results suggest the existence of a U-shaped relationship
between ABS and the systemic risk of banks as shown in Figure 5.1. The coefficients of the
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Table 5.6: Asset-Backed Securities and Systemic Risk - Tobit
Note: This table provides the results of the quadratic model estimation for ABS and Systemic Risk Measures through
Tobit. Bank effects are included in the estimations. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Two models are estimated
for each of risk measure. One model includes dummies for the GFC and the SDC, while other model does not include
them.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SRIit+1 SRIit+1 SRISK%it+1 SRISK%it+1
ABS Ratio -1.048*** -0.407* -1.500** -1.652**
(0.258) (0.228) (0.655) (0.659)
Square of ABS Ratio 0.0532*** 0.0178 0.0852* 0.0897**
(0.0174) (0.0144) (0.0446) (0.0444)
Volatility 0.404*** 0.153** 0.0494 0.0657
(0.0707) (0.0602) (0.0429) (0.0451)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio -0.139 -0.322*** -0.632*** -0.535***
(0.103) (0.119) (0.178) (0.191)
Deposit to Total Assets -0.0199 -0.0789 0.00921 0.0207
(0.0424) (0.0550) (0.0819) (0.0828)
Loans to Total Assets -0.199*** 0.132 0.0565 0.0472
(0.0716) (0.109) (0.120) (0.120)
Liquid Assets to Total Assets -0.0888 0.111 0.129 0.126
(0.0698) (0.112) (0.109) (0.108)
Net Interest Margin -2.452*** -1.245 -7.605*** -7.499***
(0.929) (0.819) (1.835) (1.825)
Cost/Income -0.0572 -0.0735* 0.0174 0.0216
(0.0448) (0.0433) (0.0345) (0.0345)
Size 4.844*** -1.662 3.242 5.521**
(1.273) (1.478) (2.229) (2.763)
Global Financial Crisis 11.34*** -2.532
(2.222) (2.310)
Sovereign Debt Crisis 24.24 -3.498
(426.0) (2.506)
Constant 2.879*** 2.291*** 11.84*** 11.76***
(0.268) (0.210) (0.477) (0.476)
Observations 381 381 381 381
AIC 465.2 419.6 2638.6 2640.6
Log likelihood -186.6 -161.8 -1272.3 -1271.3
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01,
control variables are not different from the earlier estimations through FEs.
Table 5.7 reports the results of Tobit estimations for CBs. The coefficient of the CB ratio
is positive for SRI but insignificant. The same coefficient is significant and negative in model
3 for SRISK%, but becomes insignificant in model 4. A situation similar to the one reported
for ABS in Table 5.6 is only visible for SRISK% in model 3 of Table 5.7. These results
suggest that CBs might help large banks to reduce their systemic risk through the perceived
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Table 5.7: Covered Bonds and Systemic Risk - Tobit
Note: This table provides the results of the quadratic model estimation for CBs and Systemic Risk Measures through
Tobit. Bank effects are included in the estimations. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Two models are
estimated for each of risk measure. One model includes dummies for the GFC and the SDC, while other model does
not include them.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SRI SRI SRISK% SRISK%
CB Ratio 0.351 0.117 -2.847* -2.553
-0.252 -0.222 -1.558 -1.625
CB Sqaure Ratio -0.0452 -0.0242 0.455* 0.425
-0.0437 -0.0378 -0.269 -0.276
Volatility 0.0328*** 0.0104* 0.0338 0.054
-0.00705 -0.00622 -0.0433 -0.0455
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.0761** -0.0194 -0.540*** -0.434**
-0.0325 -0.0287 -0.2 -0.21
Deposit to Total Assets -0.0126 -0.0175 -0.0411 -0.0328
-0.0153 -0.0131 -0.0944 -0.096
Loans to Total Assets -0.0739*** -0.0399** -0.0705 -0.102
-0.0199 -0.0174 -0.124 -0.127
Liquid Assets to Total Assets -0.0563*** -0.0244 0.0409 0.00986
-0.0187 -0.0159 -0.115 -0.116
Net Interest Margin -0.898*** -1.124*** -6.370*** -6.065***
-0.3 -0.253 -1.858 -1.849
Cost/Income -0.0181*** -0.0112** 0.0441 0.0386
-0.00677 -0.0057 -0.0416 -0.0417
Size 3.700*** 0.445 5.648** 8.680***
-0.387 -0.411 -2.376 -2.993
Financial Crisis 3.662*** -3.493
-0.315 -2.296
Sovereign Debt Crisis 4.108*** -4.148
-0.363 -2.651
Constant -23.97*** -0.2 -26.52 -48.99*
-3.611 -3.541 -22.1 -25.8
Observations 389 389 389 389
AIC 1583.4 1454.8 2790.5 2791.8
Log likelihood -742.7 -676.4 -1346.3 -1344.9
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01,
benefits of increasing liquidity and reducing funding cost. Large banks have enough assets on
their balance sheet, so are less affected by the asset encumbrance resulting from the issuance
of CBs. Small banks may not enjoy the benefits of CBs because of their small balance sheets.
The coefficient of Square of the CB Ratio has a positive coefficient for SRISK%. Here the
situation becomes similar to the case of ABS. The differences in the results for SRISK% and
other measures point towards the presence of a potential bank size effect.
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Although the coefficients of the CB Ratio and the Square of the CB Ratio are insignificant
for SRI, their signs suggest that small issuances of CBs may cause an increase in the risk,
whereas larger issuances may help these banks control their systemic risk. This may highlight
another perspective of CBs that can again be linked with the larger banks. Investors might be
more interested in jumbo covered bonds that are issued in a larger size.48 Non-jumbo CBs
may not have the same market liquidity. Therefore, the issuance of non-jumbo bonds may not
provide the intended benefits to banks.
5.4.2 The Partially Linear Model
The partially linear model specified in Equation (5.8) is estimated using the GAM approach.
The main advantage of GAM is that it allows to fit non-linear functions to different variables
and multiple transformations on these variables are not required. This non-linear fit obtained
through GAM can provide accurate predictions for y, that are impossible for a linear model.
Because of the additive nature of this method, it is possible to evaluate the impact of each
variable individually on y while holding all the other variables fixed (James, Witten, Hastie,
& Tibshirani, 2013).
Since this study investigates if the risk level of a bank varies with the level of ABS and
CB issuance, the variables of ABS Ratio and CB ratio enter the model with a non-linear
settings, while control variables enter in a linear fashion. Table 5.8 reports results of the
GAM estimation for ABS and systemic risk. Most of the R-Square values reported here are
higher than the ones reported in Table 5.4. This shows that the partially linear model provides
a better fit compared to FE estimations. This table reports the coefficients of the parametric
part of the model. The coefficients of the control variables reported in the Table 5.8 are not
very different from the ones reported in Table 5.4. Volatility, DTA, LTA, LIQ, NIM and size
are found to significantly affect the systemic risk of the bank. Most of the coefficients are
consistent across different models.
The graphical representation of the relationship between ABS and the systemic risk
measures is presented in Figure 5.2. The solid line shows the pattern of the relationship
between ABS and the relevant risk measure. The dotted lines here represent confidence
intervals. The significance of the relationship can be determined on the basis of the distance
48A German syndicate of banks introduced Jumbo CBs in 1995. These CBs are issued with a minimum size
of 1 billion Euros. These bonds are intended to increase market liquidity, and have attracted foreign investors
along with domestic ones. Apart from the size of the issuance there are some other requirements for jumbo
bonds. These bonds must be plain vanilla bonds, officially listed on an organised market and there should be at
least 3 market makers quoting bid/ask prices to maintain liquidity in the market.
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Table 5.8: Asset Backed Securities and Systemic Risk — Generalized Additive Model
Note: This table provides the results of GAM estimations for ABS and Systemic Risk Measures. Individual bank
effects are included in the estimations. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Two models are estimated for
each of risk measure. One model includes dummies for the GFC and the SDC, while other model does not include
them.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LRMESit+1 LRMESit+1 SRIit+1 SRIit+1 SRISK%it+1 SRISK%it+1
Volatility 0.121*** 0.062** 0.04 -0.034 -0.058 0.0004
(0.030) (0.030) (0.079) (0.083) (0.052) (0.055)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.471*** 0.249*** 1.072*** 0.937*** 0.068 0.258*
(0.080) (0.080) (0.210) (0.225) (0.139) (0.147)
Deposit to Total Assets 0.042 0.009 0.782*** 0.764*** 0.154** 0.183***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.094) (0.094) (0.061) (0.060)
Loans to Total Assets -0.037 -0.082 -1.082*** -1.153*** -0.138 -0.1
(0.057) (0.054) (0.150) (0.151) (0.097) (0.097)
Liquid Assets to Total Assets -0.174*** -0.110* -1.019*** -1.012*** -0.143 -0.194*
(0.063) (0.060) (0.167) (0.167) (0.109) (0.109)
Net Interest Margin -4.091*** -2.380*** -7.543*** -6.151*** 4.547*** 3.041**
(0.854) (0.835) (2.237) (2.326) (1.469) (1.515)
Cost/Income -0.008 -0.015 0.061 0.058 0.047 0.055
(0.025) (0.024) (0.067) (0.067) (0.044) (0.044)
Size 4.458*** 3.450*** -5.342*** -6.059*** 7.305*** 8.275***
(0.471) (0.461) (1.239) (1.287) (0.789) (0.830)
Financial Crisis 6.411*** 11.917*** -6.327**
(1.515) (4.231) (2.739)
Sovereign Debt Crisis 11.314*** 5.393 -9.244***
(1.511) (4.213) (2.697)
Constant -6.371 4.225 * 115.543** 125.220** -71.838** * -82.422**
(8.236) (7.860) (21.681) (21.938) (13.981) (14.174)
edf s(ABS Ratio) 2.967*** 2.65*** 2.027*** 2.06*** 0.000 0.05
Observations 381 381 381 381 381 381
No. of Groups 39.00 39.00 39.00 39.00 39.00 39.00
R-Square (Adj.) 0.452 0.52 0.403 0.413 0.258 0.277
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01,
of dotted lines from the solid line showing the relationship. Figures 5.2a and 5.2b show that the
issuance of ABS first helps banks reducing their systemic risk. However, this relationship is
reversed at one point and further issuance of ABS leads to an increase in bank’s systemic risk.
Models 3 and 4 in figures 5.2c and 5.2d show that the slope of the relationship between SRI
and ABS swiftly changes after a certain level and keeps on increasing afterwards. However,
no change in the relationship is observable in models 5 and 6. These results reinforce the
initial findings of FE and Tobit estimations, reported in Tables 5.4 and 5.6.49
49The estimates of coefficients for the non-parametric part are available upon request.
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Figure 5.2: Asset Backed Securities and Systemic Risk — Generalized Additive Model
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Table 5.9 reports the results of GAM estimation for CBs. This Table shows that the effects
of control variables are consistent with Table 5.5. Although the coefficients of some variables
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Table 5.9: Covered Bonds and Systemic Risk — Generalized Additive Model
Note: This table provides the results of the GAM for CBs and Systemic RiskMeasures. Bank effects were included in
the estimations. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Two models are estimated for each of the risk measures.
One model includes the dummies for GFC and SDC, while other model does not include these dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LRMESit+1 LRMESit+1 SRIit+1 SRIit+1 SRISK%it+1 SRISK%it+1
Volatility 0.095*** 0.058* 0.028 -0.058 -0.025 0.014
(0.031) (0.032) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.052)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.646*** 0.512*** -0.477*** -0.727*** -0.139 -0.019
(0.090) (0.092) (0.150) (0.152) (0.143) (0.149)
Deposit to Total Assets 0.079* 0.057 0.011 -0.009 0.203*** 0.220***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.078) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076)
Loans to Total Assets -0.037 -0.048 -0.401*** -0.461*** -0.081 -0.066
(0.064) (0.063) (0.104) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
Liquid Assets to Total Assets -0.143** -0.091 -0.027 0.028 0.026 -0.018
(0.064) (0.064) (0.105) (0.102) (0.103) (0.104)
Net Interest Margin -0.168 0.861 -3.122** -1.307 2.955** 2.027
(0.854) (0.860) (1.395) (1.390) (1.362) (1.396)
Cost/Income 0.016 0.011 0.119** 0.111** 0.05 0.054
(0.029) (0.028) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
Size 6.843*** 6.401*** 11.990*** 11.582*** 7.725*** 8.133***
(0.486) (0.483) (0.836) (0.812) (0.776) (0.787)
Financial Crisis 3.937** 12.133*** -4.822*
(1.565) (2.558) (2.553)
Sovereign Debt Crisis 7.647*** 12.826*** -6.975***
(1.551) (2.721) (2.521)
Constant 45.779*** -42.819*** -96.654*** -93.813*** -81.970*** -84.817**
(8.974) (8.772) (14.935) (14.473) (14.337) (14.287)
edf s(CB Ratio) 0.7597* 1.059** 6.627*** 4.381** 0.912* 0.488
No. of Observations 389 389 389 389 389 389
No. of Groups 38 38 38 38 38 38
R-Square (Adj.) 0.514 0.487 0.347 0.425 0.321 0.329
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01,
are not significant here, their signs are consistent with the earlier estimations in FEs and Tobit.
The results of non-parametric part are reported in Figure 5.3. The results for CBs are mixed
here across various models. Figures 5.3a and 5.3b show that the issuance of CBs leads to
a consistent increase in the system risk. However, confidence intervals go on getting larger
here. Model 3 and 4 in Figures 5.3c and 5.3d show that CBs have a positive relationship
with SRI in the beginning but this relationship becomes negative when a bank increases the
issuance of CBs. The confidence intervals become smaller when effects of crises are taken in
account in model 4. The effect of CBs as well remains insignificant for SRISK% in models 5
and 6, as shown in Figures 5.3e and 5.3f.
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Figure 5.3: Covered Bonds and Systemic Risk — Generalized Additive Model
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5.4.3 Further Findings For Size Effects
This study has performed some further analysis to test for the potential bank size effects on
the relationship of ABS and CBs with the systemic risk. Two dummy variables are generated
for the size variable named as ‘dsize75a’ and ‘dsize75b’. The variable dsize75a is equal to
1 if bank size is above 75 percentile and 0 otherwise. The variable dsize75b is equal to 1 if
bank size is below 75 percentile and 0 otherwise. Interaction terms of these dummy variables
were generated with the ABS Ratio and the CB Ratio. These interaction terms were replaced
with the ABS Ratio and the CB Ratio in model given in equation (5.8). A quadratic model is
tested through FE estimations with these interaction terms.
The effect of ABS were found similar in the case of bigger or smaller banks and no notable
differences were found in these estimations. These results suggest that ABS has a uniform
effect across various classes of banks with respect to their size. However, notable differences
were seen in the case of CBs. Results of the quadratic model are reported in Tables E.3 and
E.4. The coefficient of the CB Ratio is positive and significant here. This reinforces the earlier
finding that small issuance of CBs increases bank risk. However, Square of the CB Ratio has
a negative and significant coefficient here for the smaller banks. The coefficients of CB Ratio
and Square of the CB ratio are not significant for the bigger banks. A possible explaination
of these results is that smaller banks are not able to reap the benefits of the CB market with
small issuance of these bonds, as investors might be concerned about their ability to deal with
the problem of asset encumbrance. However, these concerns can be addressed when these
banks enter into jumbo CBs transactions, as these bonds are issued as part of a syndicate and
investors might be less concerned about the individual bank’s ability to deal with the problem
of asset encumbrance. Therefore, these jumbo CBs are more liquid. The analysis with these
interactions terms was also performed through FE and Tobit and qualitatively similar results
were found.
5.4.4 Robustness Check
After the quadraticmodel estimations and theGAM, further robustness checkswere performed
using an accounting measure of bank stability i.e. the modified version of the Altman Z-score.
The Z-score reflects a bank’s distance to default and it is measured as:
Zit =
µit+ kit
σit
(5.13)
where µ is the Return on Average Assets before Taxes (ROAA), k is the ratio equity capital
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to total assets and σ is the standard deviation of ROAA. Thus, the value of the Z-score
is determined by the level of capitalisation and the stability of a bank’s profitability. The
denominator is the standard deviation of the bank’s profitability and the numerator includes
the bank-level capital. Therefore, the Z-Score shows how much capital is available to a bank
to bear a shock of earnings volatility. In other words, how many standard deviations are
required to deplete the equity of a bank. Therefore, a higher (lower) value of Z-score shows
a higher (lower) stability of the bank and a lower(higher) probability of default. Hence, ABS
and CBs should exhibit the opposite pattern with Z-score with respect to systemic risk.
The twomodels estimated earlier forABS andCBswere estimated for Z-Score aswell. The
results of the quadratic model estimated with FEs for ABS showed a positive and significant
coefficient of the ABS ratio and a negative and significant coefficient of the Square of the
ABS Ratio. These results suggest that the issuance of ABS may increases bank stability in the
beginning but this relationship turns into a negative one when the ABS issuance is increased
by the bank. These results reinforce the earlier findings for the measures of systemic risk.
The results are reported in Table E.1.
A similar model is tested for CBs. The results here reinforce the findings reported in
Models 1 and 2 of Table 5.5. The coefficient of the CB Ratio is negative at the beginning but
the square of the CB Ratio has a positive coefficient. These results again suggest that smaller
issuance of CBs does not provide the intended benefits. Only CBs issued in the large quantity
increase bank stability. These results are reported in Table E.2. The analysis with the Z-score
was also extended to GAM for both ABS and CBs, and the results were qualitatively similar
to the ones obtained using the quadratic model.50
Furthermore, the GAM models is also tested with the loess curve. The earlier GAM
estimations weremadewith a smoothing spline. Loess is also known as local regression. It fits
the non-linear function by computing the fit at a target point z0 using the nearby observations.
Weights are assigned to different points in the neighbourhood and these weights are later on
use for the estimation of the fit. The results are reported in Tables E.5 and E.6 and Figures E.1
and E.2.The results here are consistent with the earlier GAM estimations reported in Tables
5.8 and 5.9 and Figures 5.2 and 5.3. These multiple robustness checks ensures that results are
not driven by a particular model and settings.
50Complete results are available upon request.
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5.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The extensive empirical analysis performed in this study provides important insights about
the securitisation and the CB market. The study examines the impact of these instruments
on systemic risk and bank stability. Contrary to other studies, this study investigates the
possibility of the existence of a non linear relationship of these instruments with the bank’s
risk and stability. The empirical analysis suggests the presence of a U-Shaped relationship
between systemic risk and securitisation. The implications of the ABS issuance on the bank
stability stem from the level of a bank’s reliance on this funding tool.
Initially, the ABS issuance help banks control their funding cost and provide liquidity
benefits. However, these positive effects are reversed when a bank increases its reliance on
ABS. On the one hand, over-reliance creates a concentration risk and banks face funding
and liquidity problems when this market is frozen. A shift back to other funding sources at
this points might increase the funding cost. On the other hand, high level of involvement in
securitisation increases the bank’s risk appetite because of the liquidity gluts created by the
continuous securitisation. The materialization of these risks increases the systemic risk of the
bank and adversely affects stability. The empirical results in this study endorse the view of
“securitisation-scalability” introduced earlier in this chapter. The ratio of ABS to total assets
where its relationship with bank stability is reversed varies from 6% to 9% across various
models used in this study.51
The empirical results did not suggest a similar relationship between CBs and systemic
risk and bank stability. The initial results show that a small scale issuance of CBs leads to an
increase in systemic risk, but a large scale issuance of CBs helps control this risk. I attribute
these findings to the issuance of Jumbo CBs, as these bonds are highly liquid compared to
traditional CBs. Further analysis performed to test the bank size effect shows that smaller
banks are adversely affected by the issuance of CBs, possibly because of two reasons. First,
small banks are not able to issue Jumbo CBs, because of the large size of these bonds. Second,
these banks have limited assets and the encumbrance of some assets creates problems for them,
as explained earlier in Section 5.3.1. On the contrary, bigger banks have a larger number of
assets and are less prone to the adverse effects of asset encumbrance. In a crisis situation, the
large stock of unencumbered assets can be used to meet the liquidity and funding needs.
The analysis also shows that the issuance of CBs never crosses a certain threshold. This
is because of the inherent limitations of CBs, whereas the issuance of ABS varies a lot across
51These figures are estimated by taking the first derivative of the quadratic model and graphs obtained through
GAM.
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banks and no such limit is observable for ABS. Most of legal frameworks across various
jurisdictions for CBs feature risk cushions. These legal frameworks are characterised by the
strict supervision, eligibility criteria for assets to be used in the cover pool and continuous
monitoring of the cover pool. The strict eligibility criteria and continuous monitoring of the
cover pool are important factors that do not allow FIs to encumber assets beyond a certain
threshold that might imperil their stability.
Based on the empirical results presented in this chapter, the following financial and regu-
latory implications are derived. Changes in the systemic risk of a bank due to securitisation
have important implications for the investors who need to reassess their portfolios. Prior to
increasing the issuance of ABS, financial managers should consider the implications of ABS
on systemic risk, along with the availability of other funding sources. Before CB issuance,
banks should consider the size of their balance sheets and the amount of unencumbered assets
following the issuance of CBs.
This study proposes separate policy implications with respect to ABS and CB. Concerning
CBs, the study does not support the imposition of a uniform limit on their issuance. If
imposition of such a limit is deemed necessary, the bank size should be considered while
devising such limits. Concerning ABS, the regulatory mechanism is required to be framed
to restrain the unbounded securitisation. A strict regulatory framework for securitisation,
without considering the relative size of the ABS issuance, may deprive banks from realizing
the economic benefits of this important funding tool.
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Chapter 6
Critical Review of Regulations for
Securitisation and Covered Bonds
6.1 Introduction
Regulations for securitisation have been criticized both before and after the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC). Before the GFC, regulators were blamed for creating perverse incentives for
banks as securitising banks were allowed to hold less capital. As a result, securitisation was
heavily regulated on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the regulations devised after the GFC
are also criticised by various market participants for further shrinkage of the already comatose
securitisation market. It was realised that securitisation can play a vital role in the economic
growth by increasing the credit flow in the economy. The stringent and somewhat punitive
treatment of securitisation is considered as an impediment to the revival of the securitisation
market. Banks may not have an incentive to securitise and the investors find it too expensive
to invest in these securities. On the other hand, the relatively favourable regulatory treatment
given to Covered Bonds (CBs) raised concerns among the market stakeholders that the market
shift may get directed towards a single market instrument.
In response to this criticism, regulations have been revised on a blistering pace that also
created a challenging situation for the securitisation industry and gave rise to the uncertainty
in the market. The initial regulations concerning ABS after the GFC were strict and some-
what punitive towards securitisation. Though many of these regulations make sense, their
uncertainty and complexity has created many challenges for the industry. These regulations
are mostly focused on the ‘investors’, rather than focusing on ‘securitisers’. The main aim
of these regulations is to revive the investors’ confidence to restart this market. However, in
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the quest of reviving investors’ confidence, securitisation might become more expensive for
the ‘issuers’. Even if these regulations are successful in reviving investors’ confidence, it is
hard to restart the market if banks find it expensive to get funding through the generation of
Asset-Backed Securities (ABS).
The European Commission (EC) proposed some new regulations for Simple, Transparent
and Standardised (STS) securitisation that will be eligible for a favourable treatment in regula-
tions in the recent proposal (hereinafter referred as the STS proposal) (European Commission,
2015a).1 This proposal is welcomed by many participants and it is considered a step in the
right direction (AKA, CCFA, SMMT, & VDA, 2013; Bryan & Ingram, 2015), but there are
still various issues that need to be addressed.
The draft report issued by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)2 in
response to the STS proposal has attempted to resolve some of the ambiguities but it has given
further rise to some complications at the same time. The ECON report has recommended
some overly zealous amendments, for instance increase in Risk Retention Regulations (RRR),
in an attempt to control the risk of this market.3 The STS proposal was an attempt to revive
the securitisation market and was widely welcomed by the market participants. However, the
amendments proposed by ECON are not aligned with this objective and are again focused on
controlling risk in the securitisation market like regulations devised after the GFC.
The findings in the previous chapters of the study suggest that securitisation per se may
not be the source of problems. However, most of the problems stem from the large scale
securitisation. A higher involvement of a bank in this market may increase the risk. This
chapters reviews the regulations for both markets (ABS and CBs) and addresses the concerns
about their differentiated treatment on the basis of the empirical findings of the analysis
performed earlier in chapter 4 and 5. This chapter provides some recommendations on the
basis of the empirical findings. The detailed description of these regulations can be found in
chapter 3.
This chapter targets the key regulatory sections which are most relevant with the findings
of the study. The large scope of the recent regulations make it impossible to review all
1See section 3.2.2 and footnote 21 in Chapter 3 for details about the ordinary legislative procedures followed
by the STS proposal.
2The ECON is responsible for the economic andmonetary policies of the Union, the functioning of Economic
and Monetary Union and the European monetary and financial system. It also deals with the free movement of
capital and payments and with rules on competition and state aid. See http://www.eppgroup.eu/econ for
further details.
3The amendments proposed by ECON are not binding and the European Council has to review them. The
text of the final set of rules for the STS securitisation is still to be finalized and negotiations have been started
between the European Commission, the Parliament and the Council (European Commision, 2017).
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regulations in a single study. Therefore, most relevant regulations are discussed here, includ-
ing risk retention regulations, capital regulations, liquidity requirements and due diligence.
The chapter attempts to highlight that regulators should focus on limiting the securitisation
within the bearable capacity of the banking system and economy. But at the same time cost
element of compliance with the introduced regulations should be considered. The economic
considerations are important in order to restart the market.
6.2 Key Regulatory Areas
The post-crisis regulations for the securitisation are mainly focused at increasing the align-
ment of the interest between investors and originators (through risk retention), increasing
transparency of the transactions (through disclosure requirements) and controlling risk of
Financial Institutions (FIs) (through due diligence, capital and liquidity requirements). Some
of the key regulations have been targeted in this section and they have been evaluated in light
of the analysis performed in earlier chapters of the study.
6.2.1 Risk Retention Requirements
According to the new Risk Retention Regulations (RRR), originators of the securitisation
transactions are required to retain an un-hedged position in these transactions.4 The positions
should be not less than 5% of the total amount of the transaction.5 The motive of these
requirements is twofold. First, the risk retention will maintain the interest of originators
in the securitisation that can help align originators’ interest with that of investors. Second,
this retention is supposed to provide confidence to investors that they are not bearing all the
risk associated with securitisation,6 as a market shock will also affect the originators thereby
keeping originators’ interest intact in these transactions till thematurity. RRR is not applicable
to CBs, as CB issuers retain full risk on their balance sheet.
The new STS proposal brought two main changes in the RRR. First, a direct approach
has been introduced this time. Earlier, investors were obliged to check if the originator
4The restriction on hedging is an important element of the RRR. The originator is not allowed to use any
hedging technique for the retained portion of the risk. The purpose of the risk retention is to ensure that
originators has a continuous interest the securitisation transaction. This objective cannot be achieved if the
originator hedges the risk of this retained position.
5See Article 405(1) of the Regulation EU No. 575/2013
6It is misconstrued in the market after the GFC, that securitising banks do not retain a risk after the
securitisation and all risk related to these transactions is borne by investors.
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is maintaining a risk in the securitisation transaction.7 The failure to comply with these
requirements was resulting in high penalties in the shape of high capital risk weights.8
Usually, it is a difficult task for an investor to make this assessment because of the lack of
proper information. Moreover, banks might not have any incentive to retain this position
when their investor base is outside the EU.9 Therefore, indirect approach has been replaced
with the direct one10 and sanctions are recommended for originators as well in case of non-
compliance with the RRR.11 Second, earlier it was not clear who should be responsible for
the risk retention, as there are number of parties involved in the securitisation transactions.
Hence, it was important to specify which of these parties should be responsible for the risk
retention.12 Therefore, now these requirements are imposed on originators.
Many theoretical and empirical studies along with the empirical findings in the chapter
4 of this study do not support the imposition of these requirements.13 A comparison of
securitising banks with CB issuing banks shows that securitising banks do not take a high risk
after the issuance of ABS. However, results show that CB issuing banks might have a tendency
to take higher risk in the long run. Hence, on-balance sheet risk retention might not help in
keeping banks from the risk taking.14 Results in chapter 4 also show that banks in Europe do
not securitise for credit risk transfer. For these reasons, pre-existing market-based forms of
risk retention might be sufficient. This is especially true when Originate-to-Distribute (OTD)
model never flourished in the European securitisation market.15
The draft report ECON creates some further ambiguities and introduced even overly-
zealous RRR. The STS proposal clarified that the originators of the securitisation transaction
should be responsible for the risk retention. Earlier, it was ambiguous who should be
7See Article 406(1a) and Article 410(2a) of the Regulation (EU) No. 575/213 and Article 4(1) of the STS
proposal
8This was termed as an “indirect approach”.
9The local legislations of non-European investors might not require them to assess the risk retention by the
originators. Therefore, originators will not have any interest in making a compliance with the RRR in this
situation.
10See Article 3(1b), Article 4(1) and Article 9(1) of the STS proposal
11See Article 17(1a) of the STS proposal.
12According to EBA (2014), the entity retaining this risk should have real substance andmust hold an economic
capital before the use of the assets for securitisation.
13The securitising banks retain risk in one form or another. The way these transactions are structured does
not allow banks to close their eye on the performance of these securities. See section 2.1.2 and Chiesa (2008,
2015); Gorton and Metrick (2013) for further details.
14The usefulness of the RRR become questionable if full risk retention in case of CBs is not able to keep
banks away from higher risk taking.
15Many non-banking institutions entered into the credit market under the OTD model. Hence, banks started
competing with non-banking institutions. However, credit issuance remained within banking system in Europe
and OTD model did not get popular here.
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responsible for this risk retention as a number of parties were involved in the securitisation
transactions. Especially, the RRR may not provide the intended benefits if the risk is retained
by a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) as it does not have any economic substance.16 To
circumvent this issue, the Article 4(1) §2 of the STS proposal explicitly state:
For the purposes of this Article, an entity shall not be considered to be an
originator where the entity has been established or operates for the sole purpose
of securitising exposures.
This paragraph is deleted in the ECON report thereby giving rise again to the ambiguity.17
The deletion of this paragraph might be interpreted as a permission given to SPVs to retain
the required risk in securitisation transactions. Retention of the risk by the SPVs, on one
hand, will not be considered of any economic substance and, on the other hand, investors
might see it as a return of bad practices, as alleged before the eruption of the GFC. Therefore,
the desired objective of the RRR will not be achievable.
The ECON committee has proposed to increase the RRR from 5% to 20% in its recent
report issued in response to the STS proposal.18 This is a substantial economic increase
and burden of risk retention will be commercially significant for originators. It might help
increasing investors’ confidence in the securitisation market, but it may not help restarting the
market, as securitising banks might take it as an additional barrier to securitisation. A higher
retention burden on originators will reduce the capital relief obtained through securitisation.
Therefore, the objective of increasing lending in the economymay not be achieved. Although,
the European Banking Authority (EBA) has been given the power to reduce this requirement
through Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) for some specific securitisation transactions,
it is unclear which transactions will be eligible for such grandfathering provisions. Hence,
the uncertainty still prevails in the market.
There is another potential problem in the risk retention requirements. Investors are
required to check the risk retention compliance before making the investment and they may
feel that their capital is not prone to penalization because they have taken an exposures in
a risk retention compliant securitisation. However, their investment can prove to be non-
risk retention compliant at a later stage. This situation may occur either because of the
downgrade of securities or under-performance of the underlying assets in the collateral pool
16An SPV does not have any net worth, assets, net income and capital. Therefore, it is virtually nothing
and risk retention by an SPV means nothing. The risk retention can be only helpful when it is retained by an
organisation having a significant economic substance.
17See Amendment 41 in the ECON report.
18See Amendment 40 in the ECON report.
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that may result into a partial or complete depletion of the retained tranches. This retention is
usually made from the junior tranches which are the first ones to absorb losses in case of any
downgrade or under-performance of the collateral. The investment of the institutions holding
these securities will become non-risk retention compliant after the depletion of the securities
retained by the originating institution. This may result in making their holdings illiquid in the
secondary market. The originators should be required to maintain their risk retention position
till the maturity of the issued ABS.
It is argued in the explanatory memorandum (paragraph 3) of EC’s proposal for amend-
ments in the Capital Requirement Regulations (CRR)19 that impact assessment of proposed
amendments in the CRR and standards for the STS securitisation shows that investors would
be encouraged to re-enter the market, as it will send a signal that risks are better calibrated
now. However, the impact assessment has ignored the cost implications of compliance with
these proposals. Although it is claimed in the paragraph 3 of the explanatory memorandum of
the CRR proposal that this proposal will reduce the operational cost for issuers and investors,
it is unclear that how this cost will be reduced when burden of retention is increased for the
issuers and granular due diligence requirements are in place for investors.
One may argue that in the presence of the stigma attached to the securitisation after the
GFC, it is imperative to impose RRR for the revival of investors’ confidence.20 Investors
might not believe in pre-existing market-based forms of risk retention and remain concerned
that they will be bearing the entire risk related to these transactions. Nonetheless, a uniform
flat-rate RRR may not be appropriate, potentially for the reasons outlined below.
• Many originators may find RRR unnecessary in the presence of pre-existing forms
of risk retention. It might be considered as a punitive treatment of securitisation by
originators, especially in case of those banks which are not securitising their assets
on a large scale and the ones which are securitising their high quality assets. These
regulations might be taken as mimicking the US regulations, where the OTD model
was widespread. The absence of the OTD model in the European securitisation market
exacerbate the concerns that these regulations might not be able to correct anything in
19Proposal for a “REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL Amend-
ing Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms”.
Brussels: European Commission, No. COM(2015) 473, 30-09-2015.
20ABS of AAA rating were considered having a probability of 0.1% of default before the GFC. However,
these securities defaulted in 16% cases (European Commission, 2015a). As a result of sizeable losses across
the globe, investors lost confidence in these securities. A wide-spread perception was that banks do not have
enough ‘skin in the game’ in securitisation transactions. Therefore, the RRR is introduced to give confidence to
investors about bank’s ‘skin in the game’ that might help reviving investors confidence in this market.
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the European market.
• The ratio of 5% might prove trivial for the banks which securitise at a large scale and
especially which are securitising their bad quality loans. In case of bad loans, equity
tranche can exhaust quickly and losses may quickly extend to other tranches beyond
the limits of 5%. This might not help in increasing the marketability of the securitised
instruments. On the contrary, the limit of 20% —as amended by the ECON —might
prove to be too high for the banks that securitise at a lower scale. As a result, banks
may not be interested in securitising their assets because of the significant burden of
retention.
• The high burden of the risk retention might keep smaller banks away from this market.
The capital relief through securitisation in the presence of high retention requirements
may not be attractive for the smaller banks to securitise. This might deprive them from
the funding and liquidity benefits of this market.
• Regulators emphasize that securitisation transactions should be backed by a homoge-
neous pool of assets.21 However, these pools are required to be homogeneous in terms
of their asset types,22 not in terms of the risk classification of these assets. Some of
these assets can be of higher risk and vice versa. Therefore, a uniform risk retention of
5% might be overly zealous when assets used for securitisation are of high quality and
it may not be sufficient in an alternative situation.
• Different classes of ABS performed differently before, during and after the GFC.
Therefore, a flat rate RRR may not be suitable for all classes. It can be too strict for the
high performing ABS and vice versa (Guo & Wu, 2014).
Kiff and Kisser (2014) suggest linking the RRR with the state of the economy. These
requirements should be higher in a bad state of economy and vice versa. This proposal is
practically difficult to implement as sudden shocks can make it harder for regulators and
banks to respond quickly. Monitoring of loans is actually performed before the loan sale
for securitisation purpose. If poor quality loans are already issued and securitised, this
situation cannot be reversed at the time of a shock. Moreover, banks are under the pressure
of deleveraging in a bad state of economy and their ability to buy back some of the floating
securities in the market will be questionable.
21See Article 8(4) of the STS proposal
22See the amendment of Article 8(4) of the STS proposal in the ECON report
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The empirical findings in chapter 5 of this study show that the relationship of securitisation
with the systemic risk of banks is not a flat one. Rather, this relationship changes with the
level of a bank’s involvement in the securitisation activity.23 Therefore, in light of these
empirical findings and above discussion, it would be more appropriate to devise incremental
risk retention requirements.24 These incremental requirements can be linked to three particular
aspects of securitisation.
1. The risk classification of the assets being securitised should be considered. Currently,
the STS proposal is based on the way transactions are structured and not on the credit
quality of the underlying assets. This might be interpreted as ignoring the economic
substance of the securitisation and focusing on the legal form. This approach might
undermine the use of high quality assets in securitisation and banksmay feelmotivated to
securitise their bad quality loans. Regulators have attempted to counter this situation by
putting the disclosure and due diligence requirements.25 However, characteristics of the
underlying pool might change and disclosure or due diligence may become ineffective
in such a situation. The 5% risk retention may not suffice in this situation. Therefore,
risk retention should be linked with the credit quality of the assets. Banks using higher
quality assets in securitisation should face a lower risk retention requirements and vice
versa. This will promote the use of high-quality assets in the securitisation.
2. The RRR should be directly proportional to the level of a bank’s involvement in securiti-
sation. The RRR should be higher for banks who are involved in securitisation at a large
scale and vice versa. However, banks having marginal presence in this market should
face less stringent RRR. Such a policy will have twofold benefits. First, it will limits
banks’ involvement in securitisation and it will not go out of bounds. The likelihood of
distortion of monitoring incentives is higher when banks securitise without any bound.
Second, it will facilitate the entry of smaller banks in this market which can also reap
the benefits of cheap funding through this market.26 This is in line with the findings of
chapter 5 of this study.
3. The RRR should be based on the historical performance of the class of assets being
23See Sections 5.4 and 5.5 for the detailed results and discussion of empirical findings.
24Regulations should become more strict when a banks increases its involvement the securitisation market.
25The originators are required to provide the information about the risk level of the assets and measures taken
to manage the involved risks. The investors are required to show their compliance with granular due diligence
requirements while taking an exposure in securitisation.
26A higher RRR may exclude many small banks as it reduces the capital relief after the securitisation. Hence,
these banks may not securitise as intended benefits are no longer achievable.
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securitised. The classes with a high past performance should be subject to lower RRR
and vice versa. This will help in promoting high quality securitisation.
The incremental RRR will not only help revive investors’ confidence in the securitisation
market but it will also control the problem of out of bounds securitisation.27 The high retention
applied to the high volume of securitisation will ensure that banks have enough retention even
in a situation where market shock deteriorates the underlying exposures. On the other hand,
low level of the retention will encourage smaller banks to securitise who might be of the view
that they might not be able to achieve the intended capital arbitrage benefits because of the
higher retention requirements.
6.2.2 Capital Requirements
Capital requirements for securitisation have been a subject of criticism in the market after
the GFC. There have been numerous calls to revise these regulations. Ironically, regulations
are forcing investment out of the securitised assets at a time when many commentators are in
favour of reviving this market. In terms of relative value, there is a strong case for securitised
assets, showing their value to investors as a form of diversification. Mark Hutchinson, Head
of Alternative Credit at M&G Investments, one of the larger securitisation managers, says:
There are many instances where we have spoken to potential investors on the
insurance side and taken them through the stress resilience tests and it has been
acknowledged that spreads look favourable compared to corporates, unsecured
financial debt and CBs. However, in most cases they point to the brutal capital
charges under Solvency II versus those of other markets. If the Solvency II capital
charges for ABS recognised the strong credit performance of the asset class, I
would think you would see much more participation in the markets from insurers.
(cited by AFME, 2014)
The revised Basel III securitisation framework identifies that risk weights in the Basel
II were not calibrated properly. Risk weights assigned to high-rated (low-rated) securities
were excessively low (high). This poor calibration of risk weights resulted in ‘cliff effects’
in the banking system.28 The revised framework attempts to enhance the risk sensitivity of
27See section 5.3.1 in chapter 5 for the detailed discussion about out of bound securitisation.
28A small downgrade in the rating of an exposure may result in rapid deterioration of the bank capital. This
phenomenon is known as ‘cliff effect’.
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the framework to avoid the circumstances seen during the GFC. The new Basel III introduced
internal risk based rating mechanism that is on top of the hierarchy of approaches for risk
weighting. All the securitisation exposures that cannot be rated by any of the three approaches
recommended in Basel III Framework will be assigned a risk weight of 1,250%. Under the
standardisation approach, the lowest risk weights are assigned to securitisation exposures
backed by the residential loans.29
Strict capital regulations have been introduced to avoid the situation when capital base of
a bank erodes as a result of downgrades in its exposure because of the credit deterioration
of the underlying assets. The risk weights have been recalibrated to ensure that a bank has
enough capital to avoid the effects of credit deteriorations. However, it is noteworthy that
the main problem in the European market was not deterioration of the credit, rather some of
the securities became illiquid in the market during the GFC and rapid fall in their prices led
to high marked-to-market losses (Blommestein et al., 2011). These marked-to-market losses
mounted exponentially for the banks who had larger exposures in the securitised products.30
Nonetheless, many classes of the securities remained significantly liquid even during the GFC.
Hence, high capital requirements for those classes of ABS which remained highly liquid may
not be justifiable.
The current regulations perceive that Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS)
outperform all other classes of ABS. This perception about superiority of RMBS is also visible
in the capital regulations, as they receive the lowest risk weights. Perraudin (2014a) shows
that some of the non-residential mortgage backed securities outperformed RMBS. Therefore,
the historical performance of various classes of ABS should be taken into account while
assigning risk weights to them. Moreover, residential loans backed securitisation has never
been popular in Europe with an exception of Netherlands and Spain. Residential mortgages
were subject to 50% risk weight in Basel II. These high risk weights, on one hand, precluded
banks from issuing these loans and, on the other hand, it was more difficult to securitise these
loans because of their high risk weights.
The recent CRR proposal by the EC has proposed some revisions in the capital regulations
already in force through CRR directive.31 It is realised in the CRR proposal that the STS
proposal per semay not help revive the European securitisationmarket. A prudential treatment
reflecting the specific features of the transaction under the new framework should also be
29See BCBS (2016) and chapter 3 for details about the approaches of risk weights calculations
30This assertion is supported by the empirical findings in chapter 5 of this study.
31CRR proposal was issued along with the STS proposal as it was realised by the EC that STS may not be
able to achieve the desired objectives unless capital regulations already in place in the CRR directives are also
not calibrated with the STS securitisation.
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introduced. The capital charges for the securitisation transactions meeting the requirements
in the STS proposal are lowered in the CRR proposal. This proposal has introduced many
provision that should be welcomed by the industry. A positive aspect of this proposal is the
introduction of the ‘capital neutrality’ or ‘look through’ approach, as advocated by some of
the market participants (Federation Bancaire Francaise, 2014). An FI is not required to apply
higher risk weights to a senior positions in securitisation than the risk weight applicable to
the underlying assets had they not been securitised.
The risk floor (the lowest risk) for the STS-compliant securitisation has been reduced to
10% from 15% in the CRR proposal.32 This will help create a level playing field. This
proposal seems to be a step in the right direction. However, AKA et al. (2013) argue that this
risk floor is still higher than the pre-existing one i.e. 7%. Securitisation transactions meeting
the STS criteria will be most senior securitisation transactions. The granular disclosure and
due diligence requirements along with the RRR is likely to result in a very high-quality
securitisation. Therefore, reducing their risk weight to the current level in order to keep the
interest of investors alive in this market might make some sense. Moreover, the CRR proposal
stipulates that the aggregate exposure value of all exposures to a single obligor should not
exceed 1% of the total outstanding exposures of the pool of underlying assets.33 The 1% level
is too strict. It might cause the exclusion of many of the otherwise eligible assets from the
securitisation pool. This limit should be increased.
Cerasi and Rochet (2014) suggest that capital regulations should be linked with the
macroeconomic conditions, similar to the proposal of Kiff and Kisser (2014) about the RRR.
However, this proposal is also practically difficult to implement for the same reasons as
explained above for the RRR. The sudden changes in macro economic conditions can make
it difficult for banks to make the necessary adjustments in their capital structure promptly.
Banks might not be able to raise new capital or cut back their level of securitisation exposures.
It would also be difficult for regulators to respond promptly in this situation and revise the
capital requirements as per the intensity of the shock.
An important development in the the Basel III framework is that it draws the attention
towards the tranche thickness of non-senior tranches.34 The thickness of a tranche in the
32Risk floor is the lowest risk weight that can be assigned to a particular security. The minimum capital
required against the holding of a particular security is determined on the basis of the risk floor. The risk floor of
10% for ABS implies that even the highest class of ABS will receive a minimum risk weight of 10%.
33See Article 243(2b) of the CRR proposal
34Thickness of a tranches is defined by its attachment and detachment points. The attachment points shows
the amount of subordination enjoyed by the relevant tranche, whereas detachments points is representative of
the maximum sustainable loss of the tranches. Tranches thickness is measured by subtracting the attachment
point from the detachment point. Supposedly, there are two tranches of same class (e.g. Mezzanine tranches),
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calculation of risk weights should be taken in account. Thus, Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) recommends a differentiated treatment of non-senior securitisation on
the basis of tranches thickness. Table 2 of the Basel III Framework provides the risk weights
against different ratings of securitisation exposures. The thickness of the tranche is taken into
account as:
RWs = [risk weight after adjusting for maturity]× [1 - min(T; 50%)]35 (6.1)
where RWs is the risk weight for the securitisation exposure and T represents the tranche
thickness. Along with the recalibration of risk weights in light of the recommendations given
by AKA et al. (2013); Federation Bancaire Francaise (2014), I introduce the incremental risk
weights for the securitisation exposures. These incremental risk weights can be calculated as
follows:
RWs =
N
∑
i=1
{
(RWi)× (1+Si)
}
(6.2)
where RWi is relevant risk weight for the rating class of the ith exposure of the FI, N is the
number of exposures and Si is the securitisation factor of the ith exposure that is given by:
q
S
s=0
= f
{
Securitisation Exposure
Total Assets
}
(6.3)
The lower limit of the securitisation factor is 0 and the upper limit is a random value q.
The securitisation factors should be introduced after a certain level of securitisation exposure
taken by the bank and it should increase with an increase in the securitisation exposure of
the bank. I believe these incremental weights are more suitable than flat rates applicable for
all banks. They will not only help reviving investors’ confidence but also help control the
detrimental affects of the high securitisation exposures. The suitability of these incremental
risk weights stems from the following arguments.
First, many of the investors are not willing to return to the securitisation market because
of higher risk weights requiring them to retain higher capital against their securitisation
exposures. This is especially true for smaller institutional investors who have a lower capital
Tranches A and Tranche B, having attachment points of 4% and 8% and detachment points of 10% and 20%,
respectively. It implies that investors in tranche A will start suffering after the 4th default and entire class will
be lost after the 10th. However, the loss for the investors in tranche B will start after the 8th default and entire
tranche will be lost after the 20th. Hence, tranche B is safer than tranche A as it is enjoying a higher level of
subordination because of higher thickness.
35The risk weights are taken from the Table 2 in the Basel III document at p. 23.
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base and have problems in raising new capital. The recalibrated rates with a 0 securitisation
factor or a lower securitisation factor will attract a large number of investors in this market,
especially small institutional investors. As the pre-existing rates will be applicable up to
certain limits of the securitisation exposure, this strategy will help overcome their concerns
about higher weights.
Second, the incremental weighting methodology will refrain investors from taking exces-
sive exposures in securitisation. This will also discourage originators to securitise excessively
because investors will not be willing to cross a certain threshold while taking exposures in
the securitisation market. The cliff effects highlighted in Basel III were mainly visible be-
cause of banks’ large exposures in the securitisation market. I believe that small downgrades
in the securitisation exposures eroded banks’ capital base largely because the size of their
securitisation exposure was very high.
The study does not support the assertions that the higher issuance of CBs can lead to
higher risk for banks. According to the results reported in the chapter 5, the issuance of
ABS helps banks control their systemic risk but after a certain threshold this relationship is
reversed.36 However, such situation is not observed in case of CBs. The issuance of CB does
not cross a certain threshold.37 It is recommended in the above sections that ABS should not
be given a flat treatment but incremental regulations are proposed here. Regulators should
provide a differentiated treatment to ABS on the basis of the issuance size and the class of
issued securities. However, because of the differences in behaviour of these two instruments
(as reported in empirical findings of chapters 4 and 5) and issuance trend, a differentiated
treatment for CBs akin to the one recommended for ABS may not be suitable.
The empirical findings in the chapter 5 suggest that small issuance of these bonds by the
smaller banks might increase the risk level, while bigger banks might not get affected. CBs
only reduce the bank risk when they are issued in large quantity i.e. jumbo CBs. The level
of unencumbered assets should be taken into account while assigning Risk Weights (RWs)
to CBs, as the underlying pool can be affected by the quality and quantity of unencumbered
assets. These results imply that CBs are not the right instruments for every bank. Only banks
with a large asset base should enter into thismarket. Therefore, instead of putting differentiated
capital regulations for CBs, I support the licensing mechanism. Some countries are already
following this mechanism and only the credit institutions having the licence to issue CBs can
issue these bonds. Moreover, the Article 129(7) of the CRR provides a preferential treatment
to CBs on the basis of transparency requirements. Among other transparency requirements,
36See sections 5.4 and 5.5 in Chapter 5 for detailed results and discussion.
37See Table 5.2 and accompanying discussion.
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I also recommend that credit institutions should be asked to disclose the details about the
unencumbered assets after the issuance of CBs.
6.2.3 Liquidity Requirements
The long term need for a stable liquidity was never felt before the GFC when banks faced
serious liquidity problems. It was generally assumed—before the eruption of the GFC— that
funds were always available with a bank. Therefore, proper liquidity management systems
were not well developed in the banking system — as opposed to the capital planning. The
GFC unravelled how quickly liquidity can dry up and how much time it can take to return to
the banking system (BCBS, 2014a). The BCBS introduced liquidity standards as part of their
Basel III framework (BCBS, 2013). The purpose of these standards was to ensure that banks
remain liquid at all times. Under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) framework, banks are
required to maintain High-Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) that should be enough to survive
over a period of 30 days under a stressed situation.
LCR is an important regulatory development after the GFC. The liquidity standards intro-
duced by the BCBS were followed by the EU in the CRR directive and delegated regulations
were introduced for LCR requirements later on (European Union, 2014). According to the
LCR requirements, the available liquidity should be equal or greater than the required liquidity,
given as:
LCR(%)=
Liquidity Buffer
Net Liquidity Cash Outflows (over a 30 calendar day stress period)
(6.4)
The recital 10 of the LCR regulations, realises that scope of the securitised instruments
included in the earlier LCR framework introduced byBCBS and the onementioned in the CRR
Directive is quite limited. Some other ABS, especially auto loan ABS, showed a consistent
performance during the shocks of the GFC that is comparable to RMBS. This in line with
the concerns of AKA et al. (2013) who argue that Auto ABS have the lowest spread among
all classes of ABS. European Auto ABS exhibited resistance during the GFC and investors
did not face losses similar to other classes of securitised products. Moreover, ABS backed
by Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) loans should also be given consideration subject to
their compliance with the high quality requirements. Many of these recommendations are
included in the revised LCR framework.38
38See Table 3.1 for details of assets included in the LCR framework and Chapter 2 of the Regulation (EU)
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Despitemany improvements in the revised LCR framework, there is still need to reconsider
some of the provisions in this framework. The current framework is not consistent with the
STS securitisation and this is also realised by the EC in the paragraph 6 of the explanatory
memorandum of the CRR proposal. Currently, all securitised products are placed in the last
category of HQLA i.e. level 2B Assets. As a result, securitised products are subject to higher
haircuts. Though, many of the current provision are sensible — especially, limits imposed
on the level of various classes are justifiable in light of empirical findings of this study. The
treatment of ABS should be made comparable with some of the similar securities.
The current LCR framework includes CBs in all levels of HQLA, even in level 1 along
with bank notes and reserves from central bank.39 ABS are part of level 2B Assets of the
LCR framework i.e. the last category of HQLA. ABS are receiving a disfavoured treatment
as compared to some high quality corporate debt securities as well. I believe that high
quality securitised instruments should also to be upgraded to the upper levels of HQLA. The
treatment should be comparable to CBs with respect to RWs and Credit Quality Step (CQS)
of the underlying assets. The ABS meeting the STS criteria and backed by a pool with a low
Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio (at least 60%) should make a place in level 1 assets. The inclusion
of high quality ABS in all levels of LCR will certainly improve the liquidity profile of banks
and provide greater flexibility to banks. However, regulators may decide to apply a higher
haircut as compared to CB depending on the risk classification of the ABS. Moreover, limits
should be placed on the amount of these ABS and holding of ABS in any category should not
go beyond a certain threshold.
A differentiated treatment for various classes of CBs is visible in the LCR. This differen-
tiated treatment is mainly based on RWs of CBs, CQS of underlying assets and size of the
CB issuance. This treatment of CBs is supported by the empirical findings of this study, as
smaller issuance of CBs is found contributing towards risk creation and (jumbo) CBs issued
in larger size have been more liquid than other (non-jumbo) CBs. The pattern of the treatment
should be similar for ABS with respect to CQS and risk weights. However, this pattern should
be opposite with respect to the issuance size. A differentiated treatment to various classes
of ABS should be given on the basis of their historical performance. Regulators can apply
lower haircuts to ABS with strong historical performance and vice versa. Failure to amend
the regulatory framework to reflect the historical evidences would make many classes of ABS
ineligible for the LCR.
There are three important concerns related to the current LCR framework that need to be
2015/61
39CBs included in level 1 assets are subject to haircut of 7%.
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addressed.
1. The risk might get pushed towards smaller banks (House, Sablik, & Walter, 2016).
CBs included at all levels of the LCR are subject to the higher issuance limits. Many
of the CBs issued by smaller banks remain excluded from the LCR and holders of
these bonds cannot use them under the LCR framework. Consequently, smaller banks
cannot improve their liquidity profile through including CBs because of the large size
of eligible CBs. This provision coupled with inclusion of ABS in the last category
of HQLA provides these banks with limited options. Therefore, these banks should
be given the option to use ABS in the LCR framework, even with some incremental
haircuts.
2. The allowed limit of CB is higher than ABS (40% vs 10% respectively). In my view,
there is nothing inherently wrong in this higher limit for CBs. However, an important
element should be taken into account about this difference in the limit of these two
instruments. The CB issuance in the economy cannot cross a certain limit because of
the inherent limitations of CBs. Therefore, some bank might not be able to exhaust this
allowed limits. Hence, they will have to move towards other instruments to meet the
LCR and some of them can be expensive for banks.
3. Many investors are concerned that ABS are still disfavoured to many other market
instruments in the LCR framework. The objective to revive the securitisation market
may not be achievable unless these concerns are addressed by the regulators.
Differentiating between different classes of ABS is recommended for the following rea-
sons.
1. The inclusion of high performing classes of ABSwill ensure the integrity of the liquidity
buffer.
2. Small banks — who cannot use CBs in the LCR because of the large size of eligible
CBs — will be able to improve their liquidity profile by using ABS, whereas in the
mean time limits placed on ABS will restrain them from hoarding ABS.
3. The inclusion of the STS securitisation in the upper levels of HQLA will address the
concerns of investorswho are of the view that compliancewith the granular requirements
of STS securitisation does not provide the proportional benefit. Hence, this recalibration
of LCR can play a vital role in restarting the securitisation market.
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4. The inclusion of multiple categories of ABS across different levels of HQLA will
provide a flexibility to investors and they will be attracted to other classes of ABS.
5. The right treatment given to the well-performing classes of ABS will keep the market
of these securities alive. Such treatment will help stimulate the growth of the sectors
which are financed by these securities.
6. Higher haircuts on lower classes of ABS refrain investors from investing in low quality
securitisation.
6.2.4 Due Diligence
The recent securitisation regulations emphasize on the due diligence of investors. As per the
Paragraph 2(d) of Article 3 of the STS proposal, an investor must be able to demonstrate
that he has performed the due diligence while taking a position in securitisation. However,
it is not specified that how regulator can ensure the compliance with granular due diligence
requirements. The proposal does not clarify what kind of documentation can be provided by
the investors to buttress their claim of due diligence. The STS proposal may not provide the
intended benefits in the absence of a monitoring mechanism.
The due diligence requirements are imposed in case of securitisation exposures only,
while it is believed that investors are already supposed to perform due diligence in all forms of
investment. Many investors might be unwilling to take the pain of meeting the requirements
of STS when they can have other lucrative investment options getting a relatively better
treatment in regulations. Therefore, regulations for different classes of securities should be
made comparable in order to create a level playing field. This might be especially true when
ABS are subject to higher risk weights in the capital regulations and higher haircuts in the
LCR framework. This discriminatory treatment of ABS vs CBs will give rise to concerns that
ABS are treated punitively in regulations.
The due diligence might not be required in case of CBs because the regulators are strictly
monitoring the cover pools that kept investors confidence intact in this asset class even at the
time of the turbulence during theGFC.Therefore, instead of placing a heavy burden of granular
due diligence requirements, it might be more useful that regulators should devise a monitoring
system for ABS akin to CBs. This will not only simplify things for originators and investors,
but investors’ confidence will also be revived in the market. The burden of due diligence will
be reduced and monitoring by supervisory authorities will provide a greater confidence to
investors who are concerned about the self-certification. This monitoring mechanism will be
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considered more trustworthy than the STS notification issued by the originators.
If due diligence requirements are deemed necessary, such requirements should also be
introduced for CBs. The investors should evaluate the level of unencumbered assets on
the bank balance sheet after the issuance of CBs, as they result in encumbrance of some
high quality assets. This is specifically important when a bank takes exposures in CBs
issued by smaller banks. The evaluation of unencumbered assets might be necessary as the
replenishment of cover pool can be affected when a bank has small amount of unencumbered
assets.40
Exercising the required due diligence by the investors is heavily dependent on the avail-
ability of the data. Most of these data are provided by originators. An investor might not be
able to perform the required due diligence when appropriate data are not made available by
the originators. There are many disclosure requirements in the STS proposal to overcome this
issue. I would like to make two recommendations for the disclosure requirements. First, the
originators should disclose the amount of securitised assets relative to its total assets generated
during a year. This will help investors evaluate the level of an originator’s involvement in the
securitisation. Investors will be in a better position to evaluate the risk implications of this
involvement of the originator in the securitisation activity. Second, the disclosure should also
be made about the remaining unencumbered assets after the issuance of CBs. The investors
will be better able to evaluate the risk characteristic of their CBs exposures. The quality
of these unencumbered assets will help them evaluate the effects of a crisis situation on the
underlying cover pool and ability of the originator to replenish this cover pool.
6.3 Quantity vs Quality — The Right Question
Most of the post crisis regulations for securitisation market are premised on the view that
problems in this market are linked with the complexity of securitisation. Investors were not
able to understand the risk embedded in the complex securities and price them accordingly
(Krainer & Laderman, 2014). Many of the traditional models were not able to evaluate
the risk of these complex securities (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). Moreover, most of the
information related to the issued securities and underlying pools of assets were not disclosed
by the originator (Cheng et al., 2011; European Commission, 2015c). Therefore, the problem
of “selling lemons” was also pervasive because of the wider information asymmetry (Z. Chen
40Banks are required to replenish the cover pool at continuous basis. The non-performing assets in the cover
pool are replaced with the performing ones. The small amount of high quality unencumbered assets might make
this replenishment difficult for the bank at the time of a crisis and increase risk for CB holders.
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et al., 2017; Farruggio & Uhde, 2015). Hence, regulators have emphasized on a greater
level of transparency and structuring of standardized and simple securities. The recent STS
proposal is aimed at achieving this objectives. It is believed that more transparency will
result in a higher quality securitisation and risks can be better managed with the high level of
information.
It might be true to some extent that complexity of the securitised instruments resulted in
an inability of investors to properly evaluate the risk of these securities. However, it is also
pertinent to note that the losses resulting from the collapse of securitisation market during
the GFC mounted inordinately because of the large exposures of these institutions in the
market. The ‘cliff effects’ were catastrophic because of the size of these exposures. However,
the scale of a bank’s involvement in securitisation has not received proper attention in the
regulatory framework and focus is visible on the due diligence, transparency and disclosure.
The compliance with all these requirements might not help in avoiding astronomical losses if
the issue of large exposures is not addressed. A situation may arise where neither the investors
nor the originators are at fault. For instance, interest rate risk or currency risk may no longer
remain hedged if a counter party stop operating or get downgraded (Slaughter andMay, 2015).
The investors might face significant losses in this situation as the value of their investment
might fall. However, it is uncertain if they can take an action against the securitising parties.
These losses can be astronomical in case of large exposures in securitisation transactions
regardless of the quality of the securitised products.
The rising trend of CBs gave rise to concerns that CBs can be the next “next thing”.
These concerns called for imposing limits on the issuance of these bonds. Some countries
already started following these recommendations and they capped the issuance of CBs at 8%
of total assets of an FI. However, the case of CBs is a bit different from the case of ABS.
The underlying pool of assets in case of CBs does not leave the balance sheet of the issuing
institutions. Therefore, the issuer is required to hold capital against these assets. This is
a major reason for which CB market cannot grow out of bounds like securitisation. CBs
floating in a economy cannot surpass the capital constraints of the financial system. The
empirical results presented in the chapter 5 do not support the assertions related to imposing
limits on CB issuance.41 However, it is noteworthy that apart from the capital holdings
requirements, some other inherent limitations of CBs are most probably playing a role in the
positive performance of CBs. These limitations include strict eligibility criteria for the cover
pool assets and constant monitoring by supervisor authority. If these limitations are removed
41See Table 5.2
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then situation might become different.
The situation might vary for small banks and the bigger ones in case of CBs. Smaller
banks have limited assets and they might not be able to deal with the negative effects of
asset encumbrance because of their balance sheet size. Therefore, it is important to evaluate
the capacity of a bank to withstand the asset encumbrance resulting from the CB issuance.
Smaller banks must follow a specific limit for the unencumbered assets of the bank. The
banks meeting the requirement of unencumbered assets should be allowed to issue CBs. In
this way, I support the licensing mechanism followed by many countries for issuing CBs. The
licensing will ensure that banks having sufficient capacity to issue CBs enter this market.
Contrary to CBs, the extensive involvement of banks in the securitisation market has
been visible. This is because of the capital relief provided by the securitisation through the
transfer of assets out of the balance sheet. This feature of securitisation incited banks to
securitise without any limits. I believe that this limitless securitisation has been the culprit
and not the securitisation per se. Hence, a flat stringent treatment of securitisation may not be
justified. The regulators need to control the limitless securitisation instead of increasing the
regulatory burden for all types of securitisation transactions. Currently, the regulations are
only focusing on controlling the risk in the securitisation market, mainly through RRR and
strict LTV requirements. However, this objective is competing with the objective of reviving
this market. Therefore, a differentiated approach is more plausible. The high performing
classes of ABS and low issuance of ABS should be subject to lax regulations and vice versa.
This will not only help in resuscitating the securitisation market but strict requirements for the
higher size of securitisation exposure and issuance will discourage the limitless securitisation
in the market.
6.4 Concluding Remarks
Pressure on European banks increased over the time to de-lever. The reliance on banks
during these times may not provide the requisite capital to the economy. Securitisation in this
situation can be an important source of the capital provision. It can stimulate the economic
growth of banks, especially when banks are under the pressure of deleveraging. The lending
capacity of the banks was severely affected after the GFC and banks are still struggling to
increase their lending capacity. At this time, securitisation can be a stimulant to increase the
lending capacity of the banking system.
A number of regulations are introduced for the securitisation market after the GFC. Many
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of the regulations for CBs were also updated during this period. Most of the regulations
are introduced in response to the post crisis criticism on securitisation. However, once the
dust of the GFC was settled, it was felt that many of these regulations are overly zealous
and securitisation market will be marginalised as a result of these regulations. Hence, the
regulations have been repeatedly revised during the last few years. Regulators are trying
to meet two competing goals: (i) making banks less risky and (ii) maintaining the credit
flow in the economy. Getting the balance right is difficult, but apparently, in the pursuit
of the former goal, the latter is being jeopardised. Moreover, a third goal is being ignored
here i.e. controlling the cost of securitisation transactions for the issuers and investors. The
securitisation market cannot be restarted until it is not very cost effective for the issuers. Even
the revival of investors’ confidence in this market may not help restarting it, as issuers might
find it expensive to securitise. The achievement of all these goals is imperative for restarting
the securitisation market and building a stable banking system.
The STS proposal has been welcomed by many participants in the European securitisation
market. However, the proposal itself is not simple and transparent. It has many vague provi-
sions that are open to different interpretations. STS proposal does not provide any information
on how this proposal will help diversify the risk and make the financial system more stable.
A mere compliance with STS proposal may not help banks control the risk. Moreover, in
the presence of credit enhancement and tranching, securitisation can by anything but simple
transparent or standardized. The real benefits of the STS securitisation may not be achievable
under the circumstances explained above, rather the cost can be significant. Therefore, only
the promulgations of STS securitisation may not help restarting the securitisation market.
Currently, measures are focused on making the securitisation transactions safer. However,
the element of high administrative and market cost associated with these (safe) transactions
is ignored. The costly compliance with these regulations may cause a loss of issuers’ and in-
vestors’ interest in these securities. After the compliance with these regulations, securitisation
might become a more expensive funding source for banks as compared to other options. The
STS proposal also envisages severe sanctions in case securitisation is not compliant with the
STS proposal. In presence of ambiguities in the proposal, investors will be reluctant to enter
the securitisation market as non-compliance may result in severe sanctions. The proposed
procedures to determine the non-compliance by the competent authorities leads to a high level
of uncertainty among originators. These sanctions appear to be more severe when many of
the provisions in this proposal are open to different interpretations. Even the violation of one
requirements will lead to strict sanctions.
In order to revive the securitisation market in Europe, it is imperative to make it economic
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for originators to issueABS and for investors to hold them. Punitive and inequitable regulatory
treatment of securitisation in the EU is preventing the resumption of this market. One might
argue thatmany of the post-crisis regulationsmake sense, as complex and opaque securitisation
played a significant role in the onset of the crisis. However, it is important to understand the
differences in various markets and identify the actual sources of risk. The regulators should
align the regulations accordingly. This alignment is necessary if regulators want to reverse
the shrinkage of securitisation in Europe after the GFC.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion, Policy Implications and
Recommendation for Future Research
This chapter comprises of three parts. The first part concludes the study, the second part sum-
marises and enlists the policy implications, and the third part provides some recommendations
for the future research.
7.1 Conclusion
European economy is facing a hefty challenge of stimulating its growth and increasing em-
ployment. Threat of deflation is also hovering around that needs to be dispelled. To meet
these goals, a financial system with a good capacity of delivering capital is needed. Europe is
still heavily reliant on the banking system for funding, even during the times when banks are
deleveraging. This situation is generating funding gaps for many companies.1 The initiative
of the Capital Market Union (CMU) has also been taken in order to meet this challenge. This
initiative is expected to increase the integration of capital markets in Europe and breakdown
the cross border barriers. CMU aims at providing new funding sources to businesses, reducing
the cost of new capital, supporting long term projects, and stabilising the financial system of
the EU. CMU is focused on shifting the financial intermediation to the capital markets.
Securitisation is a key funding tool in Europe and a channel for borrowers to access capital
markets. Traditionally, it has contributed to funding real economy assets such as residential
mortgages, auto loans and Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) lending. At a time when
businesses and households across the EU are experiencing difficulties in accessing finance,
1See AFME (2014)
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securitisation can improve the availability of credit; both directly by providing new sources
of cash to finance growth and investment, and indirectly by allowing banks to recycle and
reallocate capital for further lending. A recovery in the securitisation market should play an
important role in unlocking credit markets and supporting a wider economic recovery across
Europe.
Although dust of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has settled down but fingers are still
pointed towards securitisation. Regulations devised after the GFC are greatly influenced by
the criticism and blames placed on securitisation. As a result, the new regulatory regime
is imperilling the region’s already struggling securitisation market and further constricting
credit supply to the economy. The preferential treatment given to some other instruments like
Covered Bonds (CBs) is another element that might be discouraging investors to re-enter the
securitisation market.2 The preferential treatment given to the CBs might make some sense
because of the good performance of these bonds. However, the gap between the regulations for
CBs and Asset-Backed Securitiess (ABSs) needs to be reduced.3 The higher discrimination
can be a potential barrier in restarting the securitisation market, as investors might remain
inclined to other productswith lax regulations. Although, ABSs offer higher yield as compared
to CBs but this feature might become unattractive because of the accompanying higher capital
requirements. I do not argue about giving a similar treatment to ABS as given to CBs, but the
regulations for these two instruments should be made comparable given their yield and capital
cost. This is based on the different behaviour of these two instruments and their implications
for the banking system, as seen in the empirical findings of chapters 4 and 5.4
Currently, regulators in Europe have realised that securitisation can play a vital role in the
economic growth and they are aimed at building a sustainable securitisation market. Efforts
are being made to restart the market. The recent Simple, Transparent and Standardised (STS)
proposal and the proposal for amendments in the Capital Requirement Regulations (CRR) by
the European Commission (EC) are steps in this direction.5 However, many of the regulations
are still considered punitive for securitisation and they serve as a barrier to the investors
2See Section 3.4 for details about the preferential treatment given to CBs.
3The empirical findings of chapter 4 suggest that CB issuance might not keep banks from risk taking and
ABS issuance might not precipitate risk taking. See sections 4.4 and 4.5 for detailed results and accompanying
discussion.
4CBs have different implications on banks with respect to the size of bank. See section 5.4.3 for detailed
results. However, effects of securitisation changewith a change in banks’ involvement in this activity, irrespective
of the bank size. A non-linear relationship between systemic risk and ABS issuance is suggested by the results.
See sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 5.5 for detailed empirical results and accompanying discussion.
5See Footnote 14 and subsection of ‘Capital Regulations’ under the section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3 for details
about the EC’s proposal for amendments in the CRR Directive.
192
willing to enter this market. For instance, many of the securitisation transactions might not
be able to meet the criteria of STS proposal. Especially, many of the market segments who
performed quite well during the GFC either remain excluded from the STS or are subject to
strict criteria.
Initial analysis of the recent regulations concerning ABS and CBs shows that many of the
premises of these regulations may not be justifiable. Many of them stand in contrast not only
with the theoretical understanding of the securitisation process but also with the historical
performance of the securitisation market in Europe. The flaws identified in these premises
highlight that these regulations may not have been properly calibrated on the actual problems
in this market and many of them might be motivated by the market criticism and political
reactions towards this market. Moreover, the current European regulations also do not take in
account the realities of the European market and influence of the situation in the US market
is quite visible.
The empirical analysis strengthens the legal analysis. A major blame placed on secu-
ritisation is that it leads to lax lending standards. Banks feel motivated to issue more risk
loans as they issue these loans with a view to securitise them at a later stage. The empirical
analysis performed in this study does not support this perception. The idea that securitising
banks take more risk because of the ‘no skin in the game’ is not supported by the the positive
impact of CBs on the credit risk taking behaviour of banks in the long run.6 CBs are issued
against specific loans that are generally less riskier. Banks using CBs to meet their liquidity
requirements might feel motivated to issue some riskier loans in order to get a larger market
share, as their market share remains limited priorly because of the requirements for the assets
eligible for CB issuance. Hence, even a strong ‘skin in the game’ in case of CBs is not able
to refrain these banks from issuing risky loans.
The issuance of loans is pro-cyclical in its nature. When there is an economic upturn and
default probabilities are lower, banks loosen their lending standards, and vice versa. There
is high demand for loans in the market and every bank tries to capture the largest market
share. This competitive pressure causes the risk appetite of the banks to increase. Many
of the loans they issue may be risky because of lax lending standards. However, capital
regulations constrain banks’ ability to issue loans beyond their capital limitations. The more
covetous of those banks might use securitisation to deal with capital constraints, since loan
securitisation leaves them with more free capital. Hence, securitisation becomes a secondary
factor that contributes to the issuance of risky loans. Securitisation should not be blamed
6See chapter 4.
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for the issuance of risky loans. It only adds fuel to the pre-existing fire. The securitisation
also becomes pro-cyclical here. The ‘cliff effects’ become drastic because of this pro-cyclical
nature of the securitisation activity.
Up to this point, the study argues about the flaws in the premises of the regulations. These
premises are important in order to understand the problems in the regulations. However,
the question arises if the premises are not correct, then what is the actual problem in the
securitisation market. The chapter 5 answers this question. This chapter argues that the
relationship of the ABS or CBs with bank stability may not be a linear one. The nature of
the relationship might change with the level of a bank’s involvement in any of these markets.
Initially, the issuance of such instruments might support the banks and help in improving
their risk profile. However, after a certain level this relation might be reversed. This can be
referred to the concentration risk. This idea is inspired by the proposal of European Banking
Authority (EBA) to impose limits on issuance of CBs. Some countries like Australia and
Belgium have already introduced such regulations.
The empirical analysis in the chapter 5 supports the idea that problems start because of
the pro-cyclicality of the securitisation activity. The initial issuance of the ABS helps banks
control their systemic risk. However, a high level of the ABS issuance might reverse the
situation for them, mainly because of two factors. First, banks become flushed with the
liquidity. This liquidity has to be used somewhere and banks start using this liquidity to create
long term assets and some of these assets can be risky. Second, securitisation becomes a
replacement for the traditional on-balance sheet liquidity. Instead of managing liquid funds
on the balance sheet, banks use securitisation as a liquidity generating vehicle. Whenever,
there are liquidity needs banks securitise some of their loans. However, this reliance on
securitisation for liquidity might become a slayer for the banking system. A liquidity crisis
becomes inevitable when the securitisation market is frozen.
On the other hand, CBs exhibit a different behaviour. Small issuances of these bonds are
not able to provide the intended benefits. This behaviour is mainly ascribed to the issuance of
Jumbo CBs. These jumbo bonds are bigger in size and investors show a greater confidence in
them. As a result, these bonds are more liquid than the traditional CBs. Small banks might
not be able to enter the jumbo market because of their balance sheet constraints. Moreover,
small banks might face difficulties in dealing with effects arising out of the resulting asset
encumbrance after the CB issuance and dynamic cover pool. This situation highlights that
this market has its own dynamics and cannot be considered as a replacement to the traditional
securitisation. Many CB issuing banksmight also feel that they are left behind the competition
because their loan generation is limited to particular sectors. This might increase their risk
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appetite in the long run.
IOSCO (2011) argues about regulating ABSs and CBs in similar way because of their
similarities. Although, these instruments share some common characteristics and they can
be regulated similarly in many ways, a complete similar treatment may not make sense. The
regulations for securitisation in certain areas can be made comparable to CBs, but many areas
require differentiated treatment of these securities. For instance, issuance of CBs requires
banks to hold capital against them, unlike securitisation. Therefore, banks who are poorly
capitalised are not able to issue these bonds, at least they cannot issue more liquid Jumbo
CBs. Moreover, bank size plays an important role in determining the impact of CB issuance
on its stability. Hence, where size of the bank must be accounted while regulating CBs, no
such requirements are needed for the securitisation market.
The economics of securitisation need to be restored. For issuers, the yield on highly
rated securitised tranches must be economic compared with other sources of both secured and
unsecured funding. Key investors are unsure about remaining in the market, raising serious
doubts about which part of the investor community will be capable of filling the void. In
light of this, it is important for policy-makers to support the sector through sensibly calibrated
regulatory measures. Securitisation itself should not be considered as a risk creating activity
for banks. However, the over use of securitisation should be discouraged. The regulators
need to control the cyclicality of the securitisation instead of securitisation itself. Moreover,
because of some poor performing classes of ABS, all classes of ABS should not be penalised.
In light of the empirical and legal analysis and discussion, the study concludes that no
instrument can be considered as a panacea for the financial system. It is impractical to regulate
away all risk in ABS or CBs. Every instrument has certain benefits but these benefits come
with an associated cost. The real challenge is to reap those benefits while controlling the
cost. The regulators need to create a balance between the costs and benefits. The risk arising
out of the issuance of ABS and CBs needs to be controlled but this should not be done
at the cost of marginalisation of any of these markets. The diversity within these markets
must be considered while devising the regulations and regulations should be more aligned
with the historical performance and structure of the securities. A differentiated treatment of
various classes of ABS can make more sense, especially when such a differentiated treatment
is already given to CBs.
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7.2 Policy Implications
The policy implications in the light of the discussion made in the chapter 6 are summarised
and listed below.
1. There are various classes of securitised products. The characteristics of these prod-
ucts varies in terms of underlying assets, over-collateralisation requirements, payment
structure and risk classification. These classes also performed differently during the
shocks of the GFC. Therefore, a uniform treatment of all securitised products may not
be suitable. The classes with a good historical performance might be getting a punitive
treatment and others might be getting an undesirably favourable treatment. Hence, the
historical performance of various classes of ABS should be taken into account and a
differentiated regulatory framework should be developed.
2. The current regulations focus on the ways these securitisation are structured and risk
weights are assigned on the basis of this structuring. Many of the safety provisions
provided during the structuring of the securitisation transactions might change at a
later stage. The rapid adjustments of risk weights might be a challenge for banks and
regulators as well. The intended benefits achieved through structuring these transactions
in specific ways as advocated in the recent STS proposal may not be achievable. Hence,
the risk classifications of the underlying assets should also be taken into account.
3. The premises of the new regulations should be reviewed and regulations should be
recalibrated in the light of this review. The regulations should not be driven by the
market criticism and stigma attached to the securitisation market. Regulators should
focus more on the historical performance of various classes of ABS.
4. The capital requirements should be lowered for the high performing classes of ABS and
vice versa. A flat treatment given to all classes might prove too punitive for some high
performing classes and vice versa.
5. The regulators should consider introducing incremental capital regulations. The in-
cremental capital regulations can help in controlling the element of pro-cyclicality. It
might also help in achieving the objective of restarting the securitisation market as
banks with a level of securitisation activity will be comfortable entering in the market.
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6. The regulatory burden of diligence requirements should be reduced on investors. These
regulations are disincentivising for many investors who might be otherwise willing to
return to the securitisation market.
7. The high performing classes of ABS should be given a treatment that is comparable to
CBs. The discrimination needs to be reduced otherwise investor might remain inclined
to other securities as the relative higher yield might not be attractive for customer
because of the high associated capital cost, comparative to CBs.
8. There might be no need to restrict the issuance of CBs through placing a limit on the
issuance of these bonds. However, regulators should specify the banks who are allowed
to issue CBs. Smaller banks may face difficulties after issuing the CBs because of the
resulting asset encumbrance. The licensing mechanism for issuance of CBs followed
by some countries seems a plausible system as it provides an opportunity to regulators
for evaluating the capability of a bank to issues CBs and withstand the resulting asset
encumbrance before issuing the license to issue CBs.
7.3 Recommendations for Future Research
There are many aspects of the securitisation and covered bonds markets. The current study
could not take care of all these aspects. Some recommendations for the future research are
provided below.
1. Future research should focus on the different types of ABS. An analysis of various
classes of ABS can provide greater insights about the contribution of these classes to
the systemic risk of the banking system.
2. A differentiated analysis of jumbo and non-jumbo CBs can also help in better under-
standing the dynamics of this market.
3. A cross country analysis should also be performed in order to evaluate the role of local
legislations in the stability of these markets.
4. A comparative empirical study of US and Europe can also provide greater insights and
help in comparing the regulations on both sides of the Atlantic.
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Summary
Regulations for securitisation have been subject to criticism before and after the Global Finan-
cial Crisis (GFC). It was widely blamed for spawning the GFC that led to strict regulations for
this market. As a result, this market was frozen and banks were not able to issue Asset-Backed
Securities (ABS) to access non-depository funds and they moved to alternate instruments.
Covered Bond (CB) was an important instrument used by the European banks for this purpose.
Preferential regulatory treatment given to CBs also played an important role in focusing on
this market. However, once the dust of the GFC was settled, many questions were raised on
the blames placed on securitisation. It was realised that securitisation plays an important role
in the economic growth and strict regulatory treatment should not be given to this market.
Regulators are currently trying to restart this market but strict regulations are hindering the
resumption. It is still an open question as to how this market should be regulated optimally?
This study attempts to contribute in finding the answer of this question.
This study makes a comparison of ABS with CBs as they are close counterparts, but
blames that are placed on ABS cannot be applied to CBs. Banks transfer their assets out
of their balance sheet during the securitisation process and it is perceived that they do not
have the so-called ‘skin in the game’ after this transfer. For this reason, securitisation is
mainly blamed for creating the problems of moral hazards that allegedly led to the issuance
of large scale risky loans. However, such a transfer of underlying asset does not take place
in case of CB issuance and banks are supposed to have a strong ‘skin in the game’. Hence,
the allegations on securitisation should not stand true if CB issuing banks also face similar
problems.
The initial legal analysis in this study highlight three elements. First, some questions are
raised on the premises of the regulations devised for securitisation after the GFC. It seems
that many of these regulations are influenced by the market criticism and political reactions
towards the securitisation market. Second, the European regulations are highly influenced by
the situation in the US market and not based on the European realities. Many complex forms
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of ABS that were omnipresent in the US market were not commonly issued in the European
securitisation market. Moreover, the Originate-to-Distribute (OTD) model of securitisation
that has been subject of mass criticism was also not present in the European market. Third,
CBs are given a favourable treatment as compared to ABS that also plays a role in hindering
the efforts to restart this market. The investors might feel that CBs are better instruments,
even they offer a lower yield as compared to ABS, because of the high capital requirements
in case of exposures in ABS. An empirical analysis has been performed to deeply study these
concerns about the regulations.
Chapter 4 of this study compares the impact of ABS and CBs on credit risk taking
behaviour of banks by using the data of 253 banks from 7 European countries for the period
2000-2014. This analysis helps evaluate the regulations inspired by the perception that
securitising banks take more risk. The study uses the Covariate Balancing Propensity Score
(CBPS) with Difference-in-Differences (DID) for the analysis. Initial results suggest that
European banks do not securitise for the credit risk transfer, rather main motive behind
securitisation and CBs is liquidity generation. I examine effects of securitisation and CBs on
credit risk-taking behaviour in the short and long run. The results suggest that securitisation
may not have a positive impact on credit risk-taking behaviour of banks. The findings do not
support the perception that securitising banks under-price their risk. However, results indicate
that CBs may have a positive impact on credit risk-taking in the long run. These results are
attributed to the recourse provided in securitisation transactions, competitive pressure and
asset encumbrance in case of large scale CB issuance. The ‘skin in the game’ in form of
on-balance sheet retention may not help in reducing credit risk-taking.
Chapter 5 of this study goes a little deeper and empirically investigates how the relationship
of securitisation and CBs with bank stability varies with the level of variations in banks
involvement in any of these two instruments. The study uses here the data from 46 securitising
and CB issuing listed banks in Europe for 2000-2014. The initial results show that some
banks have been heavily involved in the securitisation activity, while CB issuance does not
go beyond a certain limit. The results obtained using a quadratic model and a generalized
additive model suggest a U-shaped relationship between securitisation and systemic risk of
the banks. However, this relationship is reversed for CBs. Small issuance of these bonds
fail to provide the intended benefits and increase the banks’ risk. Further investigation reveal
the presence of a strong size effect. The systemic risk of smaller banks increases after the
issuance of CB, while larger banks remain unaffected. The study does not support imposing
uniform limits on the CB issuance; instead such limits should be linked with the bank size.
However, some framework is needed to limit the banks’ involvement in securitisation.
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The empirical analysis suggests that securitisation per se does not lead to high risk taking,
rather the problem starts when banks increase their level of securitisation. In the light
of these findings, the study suggests that flat regulatory treatment given to all securitising
banks may not be suitable. The revival objective of the securitisation market may not be
achievable in the presence of strict treatment given to all forms and levels of securitisation.
The study recommends differentiated treatment of different classes of ABS and incremental
capital regulations. The capital regulations should be relaxed for banks having a reasonable
presence in the securitisation market but they should increase when a bank accelerates its
securitisation activity. A differentiated treatment with respect to the classes of ABS and a
bank’s involvement in this market will encourage those banks which have a lower presence in
this market and discourage banks to extensively involve in the securitisation activity.
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Appendix B
Pre-Treatment Covariates
Table B.1: Pre-Treatment Covariates for Calculating Propensity Scores
Acronym Variable Name Description
DETERMINANTS OF SB ISSUANCE
Credit Risk
RWATA Risk Weighted Asset Ratio Risk Weighted Assets / Total Assets
NPLs Non-Performing Loans NPLS / Total Loans
LLP Loan Loss Provision Loan Loss Provision / Total Loans
Profitability
NIM Net Interest Margin Net Interest Income / Total Earning
Assets
ROA Return on Assets Operating Income / Total Assets
ROE Return on Equity Net Income / Total Equity
Funding Structure and Cost
LFD Loans Funded by Deposits Loans / Customer Deposits%
FTD Funding Through Deposits Customer Deposits / Total Funding excel
Derivatives%
LFST Loans Funded by Short Term
Funding
Net Loans / Short Term Funding
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Acronym Variable Name Description
LFLT Loans Funded by Long Term
Funding
Net Loans / Long Term Funding
FCTL Funding Cost for Total Liabilities Total Interest Expense / Total Liabilities
FCTD Funding Cost for Total Deposits Interest Expense on Deposits / Total
Deposits
Liquidity
LAFST Liquid Assets Funded by Short
Term Funding
Liquid Assets / Short Term Funding
LAFLT Liquid Assets Funded by Long
Term Funding
Liquid Assets / Long Term Funding
Liq. R Liquidity Ratio Cash + Securities / Total Assets
Capital Ratios
ER Equity Ratio Total Equity / Total Assets
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio (Tier 1 Capital + Tier 2 Capital) / Risk
Weighted Assets
LOAN PORTFOLIO
LBR Loans to Banks Loans to Banks / Total Loans
RMLR Residential Mortgage Loans Ratio Residential Mortgage Loans / Total
Loans
OMLR Other Mortgage Loan Ratio Other Mortgage Loan / Total Loans
CRLR Consumer & Retails Loans Ratio Consumer & Retails Loans / Total Loans
CCLR Corporate & Commercial Loans
Ratio
Corporate & Commercial Loans / Total
Loans
OLR Other Loans Ratio Other Loans Ratio / Total Loans
LR Loan Ratio Total Loans / Total Assets
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Income and Cost Structure
C/I Cost / Income Operating Cost / Operating Income
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Acronym Variable Name Description
LInc.R Loan Income Ratio Interest Income on Loan / Total Loans
LIIR Loan Interest Income Ratio Interest Income on Loans / Total Interest
Income
OIR Other Interest Ratio Other Interest Income / Total Interest
Income
IEDR Interest Expense on Deposits Ratio Interest Expense on Deposits / Total
Interest Expense
OIER Other Interest Expense Ratio Other Interest Expense / Total Interest
Expense
Solvency
D/E Debt to Equity Ratio Total Liabilities / Total Equity
D/A Debt to Assets Ratio Total Liabilities / Total Assets
ICR Interest Coverage Ratio EBIT / Total Interest Expense
Other Institutional Characteristics
AG Assets Growth Growth of Total Assets%
LG Loan Growth Growth of Gross Loans%
DPO Dividend Payout Total Dividends Paid / Net Income
Size Size of Bank Ln (Total Assets)
Rep Reputation of Bank Letter of Guarantees / Total Assets
COR Charge Off Ratio Net Charge Offs / Total Loans
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Sample Details - Chapter 4
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Table C.1: Sample Details
Frequency Percent
Country
Austria 39 15.4
Germany 64 25.3
Spain 36 14.2
France 26 10.3
Italy 40 15.8
Netherlands 24 9.5
Portugal 24 9.5
Status
Active 228 90.1
Dissolved 25 9.9
Listing Status
Non-Listed 191 75.5
Listed 62 24.5
Specialisation
Commercial Banks 98 38.7
Real Estate & Mortgage Banks 31 12.3
Bank Holding Companies 23 9.1
Cooperative Banks 34 13.4
Saving Banks 38 15
Investment Banks 10 4
Specialized Governmental Credit Institutions 19 7.5
Total 253 100
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Appendix D
Robustness Tests - Chapter 4
D.1 ANOVA and Tuckey’s HSD
Table D.1: One Way ANOVA—Weighted
This table provides the results of one way ANOVA. The grouping variable here is treatment and
dependent variables are already mentioned in the table. The provides the F-statistics and p-values
for equality of means. The null hypothesis tested here is: Means values of dependent variables are
equal across treatment groups.
F-Statistics p-Value
∆RWATA(t+1) 5.073 0.006**
∆RWATA(t+3) 1.098 0.334
∆LLP(t+1) 20.53 0.000***
∆LLP(t+3) 3.669 0.026*
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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Table D.2: Tuckey’s HSD —Weighted
This table provides the results of Post-Hoc Tuckey Test. The results have been produced after estimation
of ANOVA in free software R. Computed Tuckey’s HSD are based on One-Way ANOVA, provided in
Table D.1. The null hypothesis tested here is: Means values of dependent variables are equal across
treatment groups.
ABS -None p-ValueÂ CB-None p-Value CB-ABS p-ValueÂ
∆RWATA(t+1) -0.0094 0.5604 0.0029 0.9372 0.0123 0.5702
∆RWATA(t+3) 0.0057 0.7995 0.0048 0.828 -0.0008 0.9972
∆LLP(t+1) 0.0225** 0.0011 0.0023 0.9189 -0.0202** 0.0422
∆LLP(t+3) -0.0105 0.297 0.0013 0.9801 0.0118 0.4228
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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D.2 Generalised Boosted Models (GBM)
Table D.3: Weighted Least Square Estimations (GBM) — Outcome: ∆RWATA(t+1)
This table provides the results of Weighted Least Square (WLS) after getting the weights from the Generalised
Boosted Models (GBM). Estimations include the economic covariates, country dummies, year dummies and in-
teraction terms of the selected economics covariates. These four types of variables have been sequentially added
to the model. The outcome variable here is ∆RWATA(t+1).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset-Backed Securities 0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.003
Covered Bonds 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013***
Risk Weighted Asset Ratio −0.026 −0.047** −0.049*** −0.050***
Loan Loss Provision 0.037 −0.02 −0.049 −0.062
Net Interest Margin −0.236 −0.139 −0.181 −0.166
Return on Equity 0.029 0.019 0.006 0.006
Loans Funded by Deposits −0.002* −0.002* −0.002** −0.002**
Funding Through Deposits 0.013 0.015 0.018* 0.019*
Loans Funded by Short Term Funding 0.0003 0.001 0.001 0.0005
Funding Cost for Total Liabilities −0.119 0.001 −0.034 −0.033
Liquid Assets Funded by Short Term Funding 0.002 0.0002 −0.001 −0.002
Liquid Assets Funded by Long Term Funding 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012
Liquidity Ratio 0.003 0.007* 0.006* 0.006*
Capital Adequacy Ratio −0.01 −0.006 −0.009 −0.011
Residential Mortgage Loans Ratio 0.040*** 0.032** 0.034** 0.033**
Consumer & Retails Loans Ratio −0.013 −0.027 −0.03 −0.031
Corporate & Commercial Loans Ratio −0.013* 0.002 −0.001 −0.003
Cost / Income 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.007
Loan Interest Income Ratio −0.019*** −0.011 −0.008 −0.008
Interest Expense on Deposits Ratio 0.002 −0.002 −0.003 0.0001
Debt to Assets Ratio −0.032 0.012 −0.03 −0.033
Interest Coverage Ratio 0.017** 0.012 0.01 0.009
Loan Growth 0.002 −0.002 −0.006 −0.007
Dividend Payout −0.004 −0.004 −0.002 −0.003
Size of Bank 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Reputation of Bank 0.070** 0.054* 0.042 0.034
Charge Off Ratio 0.161 −0.087 −0.178 −0.157
Germany −0.002 −0.007 −0.004
Spain 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.034***
France −0.015* −0.016* −0.012
Continued on next page
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Table D.3: – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Italy 0.019** 0.019** 0.021**
Netherlands 0.009 0.008 0.009
Portugal 0.005 0.004 0.003
2002 −0.007 −0.006
2003 0.0005 0.001
2004 0.006 0.007
2005 0.014* 0.015*
2006 −0.006 −0.006
2007 −0.014 −0.019*
2008 −0.011 −0.019*
2009 0.002 −0.004
2010 −0.01 −0.01
2011 −0.015 −0.021**
LFD * FC 0.0004
LFST * FC 0.002
CCLR * FC 0.012
IEDR * FC −0.011
LG * FC 0.048***
Constant 0.02 −0.025 0.027 0.033
Observations 1.210 1.210 1.210 1.210
R2 0.085 0.106 0.121 0.131
Adjusted R2 0.064 0.081 0.089 0.095
Residual Std. Error 0.075 0.074 0.074 0.074
F Statistic 4.057*** 4.226*** 3.749*** 3.652***
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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Table D.4: Weighted Least Square Estimations (GBM) — Outcome: ∆RWATA(t+3)
This table provides the results of WLS after getting the weights from the GBM. Estimations include the economic
covariates, country dummies, year dummies and interaction terms of the selected economics covariates. These
four types of variables have been sequentially added to the model. The outcome variable here is ∆RWATA(t+3).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset-Backed Securities −0.010** −0.008 −0.007 −0.007
Covered Bonds 0.013*** 0.008 0.010** 0.010**
Risk Weighted Asset Ratio −0.057*** −0.059*** −0.063*** −0.063***
Loan Loss Provision 0.029 −0.034 −0.007 0.002
Net Interest Margin 0.475*** 0.458*** 0.402*** 0.397***
Return on Equity −0.004 −0.01 −0.01 −0.004
Loans Funded by Deposits 0.0002 −0.0001 0.0002 0.0003
Funding Through Deposits 0.005 0.001 0.01 0.011
Loans Funded by Short Term Funding 0.003 0.005* 0.005* 0.005*
Funding Cost for Total Liabilities −0.216* −0.116 −0.062 −0.058
Liquid Assets Funded by Short Term Funding −0.001 −0.004 −0.003 −0.002
Liquid Assets Funded by Long Term Funding −0.008 −0.013 −0.014 −0.014
Liquidity Ratio 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005
Capital Adequacy Ratio −0.01 −0.007 −0.008 −0.008
Residential Mortgage Loans Ratio 0.043*** 0.050*** 0.057*** 0.054***
Consumer & Retails Loans Ratio 0.025 0.053 0.045 0.044
Corporate & Commercial Loans Ratio 0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.006
Cost / Income −0.035*** −0.033*** −0.036*** −0.035***
Loan Interest Income Ratio 0.003 0.0003 0.004 0.004
Interest Expense on Deposits Ratio 0.003 0.013* 0.007 0.012
Debt to Assets Ratio −0.068 −0.09 −0.131* −0.140**
Interest Coverage Ratio −0.015* −0.018** −0.021** −0.021**
Loan Growth 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.004
Dividend Payout −0.012* −0.01 −0.009 −0.009
Size of Bank −0.002** −0.001 0.0001 0.0003
Reputation of Bank 0.113*** 0.108*** 0.095*** 0.089***
Charge Off Ratio −3.147*** −3.082*** −3.136*** −3.191***
Germany −0.011 −0.018** −0.018**
Spain 0.006 0.002 0.002
France −0.019** −0.021** −0.020**
Italy −0.007 −0.01 −0.008
Netherlands −0.040*** −0.039*** −0.042***
Portugal −0.012 −0.016* −0.019*
2002 0.026*** 0.026***
Continued on next page
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Table D.4: – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003 0.028*** 0.029***
2004 0.01 0.011
2005 0.012 0.012
2006 0.016** 0.016**
2007 0.013 0.014
2008 0.001 0.003
2009 −0.006 −0.005
2010 0.011 0.012
2011 0.004 0.005
LFD * FC −0.0004
LFST * FC 0.002
CCLR * FC 0.009
IEDR * FC −0.018
LG * FC 0.003
Constant 0.141* 0.161** 0.184** 0.188**
Observations 1.210 1.210 1.210 1.210
R2 0.089 0.106 0.131 0.133
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.081 0.099 0.097
Residual Std. Error 0.075 0.074 0.074 0.074
F Statistic 4.288*** 4.239*** 4.075*** 3.713***
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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Table D.5: Weighted Least Square Estimations (GBM) — Outcome: ∆LLP(t+1)
This table provides the results of WLS after getting the weights from the GBM. Estimations include the economic
covariates, country dummies, year dummies and interaction terms of the selected economics covariates. These
four types of variables have been sequentially added to the model. The outcome variable here is ∆LLP(t+1).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset-Backed Securities 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.014***
Covered Bonds −0.001 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004
Risk Weighted Asset Ratio 0.022 −0.002 0.003 −0.001
Loan Loss Provision −0.329*** −0.427*** −0.392*** −0.401***
Net Interest Margin −0.055 0.001 0.027 0.046
Return on Equity −0.001 −0.017 0.007 −0.002
Loans Funded by Deposits 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.0003
Funding Through Deposits −0.001 0.003 −0.007 −0.011
Loans Funded by Short Term Funding −0.004* −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
Funding Cost for Total Liabilities −0.189* 0.015 0.094 0.045
Liquid Assets Funded by Short Term Funding −0.0004 −0.002 −0.003 −0.004
Liquid Assets Funded by Long Term Funding −0.012 −0.018* −0.014 −0.014
Liquidity Ratio −0.005* −0.002 −0.003 −0.003
Capital Adequacy Ratio −0.001 0.001 0.009 0.008
Residential Mortgage Loans Ratio 0.002 −0.002 −0.013 −0.007
Consumer & Retails Loans Ratio −0.057** −0.086*** −0.076*** −0.073***
Corporate & Commercial Loans Ratio −0.007 0.001 0.007 0.006
Cost / Income −0.001 −0.0003 0.004 0.004
Loan Interest Income Ratio 0.006 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.021***
Interest Expense on Deposits Ratio 0.002 −0.001 0.005 −0.007
Debt to Assets Ratio −0.129** −0.095* −0.018 −0.015
Interest Coverage Ratio −0.012* −0.019*** −0.014** −0.014**
Loan Growth −0.009 −0.012** −0.008 −0.008
Dividend Payout 0.001 0.003 −0.001 −0.001
Size of Bank 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.0004
Reputation of Bank −0.031 −0.048** −0.033 −0.022
Charge Off Ratio 1.119* 0.717 0.614 0.732
Germany −0.025*** −0.013** −0.014**
Spain 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.037***
France −0.023*** −0.020*** −0.022***
Italy 0.001 0.004 0.001
Netherlands −0.005 −0.004 0.001
Portugal −0.020*** −0.015** −0.01
2002 −0.004 −0.004
Continued on next page
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Table D.5: – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003 −0.009* −0.010*
2004 −0.011* −0.013**
2005 −0.007 −0.009*
2006 −0.004 −0.007
2007 0.003 −0.005
2008 0.034*** 0.024***
2009 0.001 −0.006
2010 −0.004 −0.014*
2011 0.041*** 0.034***
LFD * FC −0.003
LFST * FC 0.001
CCLR * FC 0.012
IEDR * FC 0.048***
LG * FC −0.024**
Constant 0.145** 0.125** 0.038 0.05
Observations 1.210 1.210 1.210 1.210
R2 0.088 0.143 0.222 0.249
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.119 0.193 0.218
Residual Std. Error 0.058 0.057 0.054 0.054
F Statistic 4.245*** 5.951*** 7.723*** 8.012***
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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Table D.6: Weighted Least Square Estimations (GBM) — Outcome: ∆LLP(t+3)
This table provides the results of WLS after getting the weights from the GBM. Estimations include the economic
covariates, country dummies, year dummies and interaction terms of the selected economics covariates. These
four types of variables have been sequentially added to the model. The outcome variable here is ∆LLP(t+3).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asset-Backed Securities −0.010** −0.009** −0.008* −0.008*
Covered Bonds 0.001 0.001 −0.003 −0.004
Risk Weighted Asset Ratio 0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.003
Loan Loss Provision −0.021 −0.027 −0.05 −0.062
Net Interest Margin −0.027 −0.039 0.005 −0.01
Return on Equity 0.021 0.02 0.016 0.009
Loans Funded by Deposits 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003***
Funding Through Deposits 0.007 0.011 0.015* 0.014
Loans Funded by Short Term Funding 0.001 0.0003 0.001 0.002
Funding Cost for Total Liabilities −0.250** −0.229** −0.069 −0.006
Liquid Assets Funded by Short Term Funding 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Liquid Assets Funded by Long Term Funding −0.002 −0.005 −0.002 −0.003
Liquidity Ratio 0.001 0.001 −0.002 −0.003
Capital Adequacy Ratio 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.007
Residential Mortgage Loans Ratio 0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002
Consumer & Retails Loans Ratio 0.093*** 0.079** 0.028 0.032
Corporate & Commercial Loans Ratio −0.0001 −0.001 0.003 0.011
Cost / Income −0.018** −0.020** −0.016* −0.014*
Loan Interest Income Ratio −0.002 0.004 0.003 0.001
Interest Expense on Deposits Ratio 0.002 −0.003 0.004 0.004
Debt to Assets Ratio −0.096* −0.089 −0.083 −0.069
Interest Coverage Ratio −0.008 −0.009 −0.014* −0.012*
Loan Growth −0.006 −0.005 −0.006 −0.007
Dividend Payout 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003
Size of Bank 0.0002 0.0002 −0.001 −0.001
Reputation of Bank 0.015 0.018 0.011 0.016
Charge Off Ratio −1.139 −1.045 −0.601 −0.489
Germany −0.008 −0.006 −0.007
Spain −0.007 −0.005 −0.004
France −0.002 0.001 −0.002
Italy −0.002 0.005 0.005
Netherlands 0.005 0.006 0.006
Portugal −0.004 −0.006 −0.005
2002 0.012** 0.013**
Continued on next page
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Table D.6: – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003 0.01 0.010*
2004 0.017*** 0.018***
2005 0.036*** 0.037***
2006 0.041*** 0.043***
2007 0.001 0.015
2008 0.008 0.018**
2009 0.031*** 0.042***
2010 0.022*** 0.033***
2011 0.027*** 0.038***
LFD * FC −0.003
LFST * FC −0.002
CCLR * FC −0.033***
IEDR * FC −0.002
LG * FC 0.016
Constant 0.109* 0.106 0.088 0.069
Observations 1.210 1.210 1.210 1.210
R2 0.04 0.043 0.098 0.108
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.016 0.064 0.071
Residual Std. Error 0.064 0.064 0.062 0.062
F Statistic 1.840*** 1.595** 2.936*** 2.935***
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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E.1 Use of Accounting Measure — Z-Score
Table E.1: Asset-Backed Securities and Z-Score
This table provides the results of the quadratic model estimation for ABS and Z-Scores. Models 1 and
2 are estimated using fixed effects and all standard errors are clustered with respect to bank. Multi-way
clustering is used in Models 3 and 4 and all standards are clustered with respect to year and bank. All
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Two models are estimated for each of the settings. One model
includes dummies for the GFC and the SDC, while other model does not include them.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score
ABS Ratio 0.888*** 0.783** 0.993** 0.881*
(0.315) (0.315) (0.468) (0.496)
ABS Square Ratio -0.0514** -0.0469** -0.0570** -0.0523**
(0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0236) (0.0251)
Volatility -0.0387*** -0.0298** -0.0444* -0.0337
(0.0139) (0.0150) (0.0253) (0.0253)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio -0.0116 0.0267 -0.00883 0.0318
(0.0423) (0.0449) (0.102) (0.106)
Deposit to Total Assets 0.0454** 0.0519*** 0.0354 0.0422
(0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0531) (0.0543)
Loans to Total Assets 0.0336 0.0386 0.0615 0.0686
(0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0817) (0.0847)
Liquid Assets to Total Assets 0.127*** 0.114*** 0.141** 0.129**
(0.0322) (0.0309) (0.0628) (0.0624)
Net Interest Margin 0.378 0.0854 0.0901 -0.232
(0.492) (0.506) (1.278) (1.331)
Cost/Income -0.0164 -0.0148 -0.0188 -0.0172
(0.0142) (0.0136) (0.0230) (0.0235)
Size 1.441*** 1.604*** 1.544** 1.722**
(0.265) (0.272) (0.675) (0.722)
Financial Crisis -0.636 -0.967
(0.908) (1.525)
Sovereign Debt Crisis -2.036** -2.106
(0.879) (1.295)
Constant -8.015* -9.554** -9.689 -11.45
(4.756) (4.710) (11.04) (11.29)
Standard Errors Clustering Bank Bank Bank, Time Bank, Time
No. of Observations 382 382 382 382
No. of Groups 35 35 35 35
R-squared 0.168 0.180 0.127 0.135
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table E.2: Covered Bonds and Z-Score
This table provides the results of the quadratic model estimation for CBs and Z-Scores. Models 1 and 2
are estimated using effects and all standard errors are clustered with respect to bank. Multi-way clustering
is used in Models 3 and 4 and all standards are clustered with respect to year and bank. All standard
errors are reported in parenthesis. Two models are estimated for each of the settings. One model includes
dummies for the GFC and the SDC, while other model does not include them.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score
CB Ratio -0.908** -0.782* -3.829** -3.513*
(0.436) (0.451) (1.890) (1.960)
CB Sqaure Ratio 0.123 0.107 0.779* 0.742*
(0.0774) (0.0788) (0.409) (0.423)
Volatility 0.00323 0.000165 -0.0414* -0.0277
(0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0240) (0.0265)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.101** 0.105** 0.0111 0.0483
(0.0464) (0.0489) (0.0958) (0.103)
Deposit to Total Assets 0.0333 0.0384* 0.0247 0.0322
(0.0205) (0.0209) (0.0536) (0.0545)
Loans to Total Assets 0.0293 0.0251 0.0869 0.0926
(0.0294) (0.0296) (0.0806) (0.0853)
Liquid Assets to Total Assets 0.0761*** 0.0744*** 0.137** 0.126**
(0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0571) (0.0568)
Net Interest Margin 1.011** 1.002** 0.0965 -0.229
(0.449) (0.450) (1.210) (1.305)
Cost/Income -0.0137 -0.0128 -0.0210 -0.0186
(0.00897) (0.00902) (0.0222) (0.0230)
Size -1.464*** -1.558** 1.676** 1.883**
(0.553) (0.684) (0.689) (0.741)
Financial Crisis 0.538 -1.398
(0.570) (1.305)
Sovereign Debt Crisis -0.131 -2.296**
(0.631) (1.095)
Constant 23.80*** 24.83*** -11.18 -13.38
(6.431) (7.902) (10.82) (11.22)
Standard Errors Clustering Bank Bank Bank, Time Bank, Time
No. of Observations 406 406 406 406
No. of Groups 39 39 39 39
R-squared 0.200 0.206 0.157 0.167
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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E.2 Size Effects — Covered Bonds and Systemic Risk
Table E.3: Covered Bonds and Systemic Risk — FE Estimations for Size Below 75 Percentile
This table provides the results of the quadratic model estimation for CBs and measures of systemic risk.
The variables of CB Ratio and Square of CB Ratio have been multiplied with the size dummy for the banks
below 75 percentile as explained in the section 5.4.3. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent
and are reported in parenthesis. Two models are estimated for each of risk measure. One model includes
dummies for the GFC and the SDC, while other model does not include them. All standard errors are
clustered with respect to the bank.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LRMES LRMES SRI SRI SRISK% SRISK%
CBxSize (Below 75 percentile) 4.139** 3.618** 0.921 0.805 -0.822 -0.556
(1.623) (1.471) (0.659) (0.622) (0.870) (0.980)
Sq. CBxSize (Below 75 percentile) -0.487** -0.437** -0.103 -0.102 0.160 0.141
(0.210) (0.193) (0.0866) (0.0809) (0.132) (0.136)
Volatility 0.123*** 0.0920** 0.0436*** 0.0142* -0.00591 0.0253
(0.0387) (0.0397) (0.0105) (0.00834) (0.0361) (0.0295)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.354* 0.113 0.0207 -0.0940 -0.235 -0.0696
(0.204) (0.182) (0.0590) (0.0697) (0.279) (0.289)
Deposit to Total Assets 0.0876 0.0455 -0.0384 -0.0464* -0.0194 0.00123
(0.0771) (0.0640) (0.0244) (0.0269) (0.109) (0.110)
Loans to Total Assets -0.210* -0.123 -0.121** -0.0844* -0.00380 -0.0600
(0.121) (0.122) (0.0480) (0.0422) (0.190) (0.172)
Liquid Assets to Total Assets -0.299** -0.217* -0.108** -0.0682** 0.0206 -0.0361
(0.132) (0.112) (0.0446) (0.0323) (0.150) (0.159)
Cost/Income -0.000800 0.00227 -0.0273** -0.0215** 0.0246 0.0195
(0.0393) (0.0368) (0.0118) (0.00956) (0.0266) (0.0253)
Equity to Total Assets -0.0597 -0.0851 -0.281 -0.368* -1.664 -1.595
(0.555) (0.467) (0.253) (0.203) (1.032) (1.019)
Size 11.96*** 6.006** 3.823*** 0.0167 -0.193 4.555
(2.175) (2.773) (1.164) (1.323) (4.813) (5.951)
Financial Crisis 5.324*** 4.549*** -5.033
(1.829) (0.609) (3.084)
Sovereign Debt Crisis 8.962*** 5.075*** -6.700
(2.937) (0.768) (4.444)
Constant -89.83*** -27.30 -27.00** 13.73 32.10 -18.30
(28.60) (30.01) (13.01) (15.13) (62.61) (71.69)
Standard Errors Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
No. of Observations 403 403 403 403 403 403
No. of Groups 38 38 38 38 38 38
R-squared 0.457 0.500 0.387 0.530 0.064 0.086
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01,
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Table E.4: Covered Bonds and Systemic Risk — FE Estimations for Size Above 75 Percentile
This table provides the results of the quadratic model estimation for CBs and measures of systemic risk.
The variables of CB Ratio and Square of CB Ratio have been multiplied with the size dummy for the banks
above 75 percentile as explained in the section 5.4.3. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent
and are reported in parenthesis. Two models are estimated for each of risk measure. One model includes
dummies for the GFC and the SDC, while other model does not include them. All standard errors are
clustered with respect to the bank.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LRMES LRMES SRI SRI SRISK% SRISK%
CBxSize (Above 75 percentile) -1.019 -2.616 -0.365 -0.867 -6.058 -5.551
(2.109) (1.868) (0.643) (0.687) (4.018) (3.875)
Sq. CBxSize (Above 75 percentile) 0.547 0.800* 0.121 0.205 1.277 1.192
(0.470) (0.440) (0.154) (0.157) (0.862) (0.832)
Volatility 0.118*** 0.0903** 0.0424*** 0.0143 -0.00305 0.0277
(0.0378) (0.0392) (0.0105) (0.00857) (0.0354) (0.0291)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.530*** 0.243 0.0635 -0.0683 -0.200 -0.0620
(0.183) (0.173) (0.0504) (0.0672) (0.258) (0.277)
Deposit to Total Assets 0.0835 0.0317 -0.0398 -0.0514* -0.0238 -0.0127
(0.0791) (0.0675) (0.0262) (0.0290) (0.102) (0.104)
Loans to Total Assets -0.219* -0.112 -0.122** -0.0790* 0.0224 -0.0220
(0.127) (0.126) (0.0492) (0.0438) (0.179) (0.156)
Liquid Assets to Total Assets -0.341** -0.239* -0.116** -0.0703** 0.0389 -0.00935
(0.147) (0.120) (0.0472) (0.0322) (0.136) (0.140)
Cost/Income -0.00721 -0.000533 -0.0285** -0.0217** 0.0391 0.0317
(0.0405) (0.0363) (0.0119) (0.00932) (0.0284) (0.0260)
Equity to Total Assets -0.241 -0.235 -0.326 -0.404** -1.640 -1.551
(0.491) (0.420) (0.237) (0.189) (1.000) (0.988)
Size 11.84*** 5.815** 3.857*** 0.0159 1.013 5.141
(2.399) (2.828) (1.134) (1.260) (4.658) (5.750)
Financial Crisis 5.437*** 4.563*** -4.973
(1.909) (0.606) (3.038)
Sovereign Debt Crisis 9.766*** 5.329*** -5.670
(3.129) (0.838) (4.005)
Constant -86.34*** -24.32 -26.93** 13.80 15.97 -27.87
(31.09) (30.78) (12.43) (14.10) (58.96) (68.26)
Standard Errors Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
No. of Observations 403 403 403 403 403 403
No. of Groups 38 38 38 38 38 38
R-squared 0.439 0.488 0.376 0.526 0.082 0.099
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01,
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E.3 Generalised Additive Model with Loess Curve
Table E.5: Asset Backed Securities and Systemic Risk — Generalized Additive Model with Loess
Curve (Parametric Part)
This table provides the results of the GAM with Loess Curve for ABS and measures of systemic risk.
Individual bank effects are included in the estimations. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Two
models are estimated for each of risk measure. One model includes dummies for the GFC and the SDC,
while other model does not include them.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LRMES LRMES SRI SRI SRISK% SRISK%
Volatility 0.119*** 0.059** 0.051 -0.024 -0.054 0.006
-0.03 (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.472*** 0.251*** 1.070*** 0.928*** 0.06 0.262*
-0.08 (0.08) (0.21) (0.23) (0.14) (0.15)
Deposit to Total Assets 0.042 0.008 0.783*** 0.765*** 0.145** 0.176***
-0.035 (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Loans to Total Assets -0.038 -0.082 -1.069*** -1.143*** -0.116 -0.07
-0.056 (0.05) (0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10)
Liquid Assets to Total Assets -0.175*** -0.111* -1.005*** -0.996*** -0.126 -0.179*
-0.063 (0.06) (0.17) (0.17) (0.11) (0.11)
Net Interest Margin -4.096*** -2.352*** -7.727*** -6.290*** 4.577*** 2.942*
-0.845 (0.83) (2.23) (2.32) (1.47) (1.52)
Cost/Income -0.008 -0.016 0.065 0.062 0.048 0.055
-0.025 (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)
Size 4.474*** 3.480*** -5.335*** -6.086*** 7.266*** 8.188***
-0.47 (0.46) (1.24) (1.29) (0.82) (0.84)
Financial Crisis 6.388*** 12.099*** -6.934**
(1.51) (4.22) (2.77)
Sovereign Debt Crisis 11.235*** 5.743 -10.047***
(1.50) (4.19) (2.74)
Constant -6.512 3.608 111.963*** 121.805*** -72.803*** -82.499***
-8.236 (7.84) (21.74) (21.92) (14.33) (14.36)
AIC 2894.378 2845.831 3633.833 3629.345 3316.607 3307.116
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Figure E.1: Asset Backed Securities and Systemic Risk — Generalized Additive Model with Loess
Curve (Non-Parametric Part)
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Table E.6: Covered Bonds and Systemic Risk — Generalized Additive Model with Loess Curve
(Parametric Part)
This table provides the results of the GAM with Loess Curve for CBs and measures of systemic risk.
Individual bank effects are included in the estimations. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Two
models are estimated for each of risk measure. One model includes dummies for the GFC and the SDC,
while other model does not include them.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LRMES LRMES SRI SRI SRISK% SRISK%
Volatility 0.095*** 0.059* 0.045*** 0.009 -0.021 0.016
(0.031) (0.032) (0.015) (0.014) (0.050) (0.052)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.623*** 0.487*** -0.028 -0.134*** -0.113 0.006
(0.090) (0.093) (0.043) (0.042) (0.144) (0.152)
Deposit to Total Assets 0.079* 0.058 0.043* 0.035* 0.205*** 0.217***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.022) (0.021) (0.076) (0.076)
Loans to Total Assets -0.046 -0.057 0.065** 0.038 -0.063 -0.040
(0.064) (0.063) (0.030) (0.028) (0.102) (0.103)
Liquid Assets to Total Assets -0.140** -0.093 0.060** 0.090*** 0.011 -0.025
(0.064) (0.064) (0.030) (0.028) (0.103) (0.104)
Net Interest Margin -0.009 1.017 -3.996*** -3.181*** 2.695** 1.783
(0.861) (0.868) (0.405) (0.389) (1.375) (1.417)
Cost/Income 0.017 0.012 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.049 0.051
(0.029) (0.028) (0.014) (0.013) (0.046) (0.046)
Size 6.775*** 6.387*** 0.039 -0.300 7.959*** 8.326***
(0.485) (0.483) (0.229) (0.216) (0.775) (0.788)
Financial Crisis 4.039*** 5.044*** -4.923*
(1.565) (0.702) (2.555)
Sovereign Debt Crisis 7.601*** 5.080*** -6.063**
(1.558) (0.698) (2.543)
Constant -45.465*** -42.831*** 0.751 3.847 -84.500*** -87.571***
(8.940) (8.753) (4.211) (3.923) (14.280) (14.288)
AIC 2992.767 2973.521 2407.116 2349.272 3357.118 3354.814
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Figure E.2: Covered Bonds and Systemic Risk — Generalized Additive Model with Loess Curve
(Non-Parametric Part)
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Summary
Regulations for securitisation have been subject to criticism before and after the Global Finan-
cial Crisis (GFC). It was widely blamed for spawning the GFC that led to strict regulations for
this market. As a result, this market was frozen and banks were not able to issue Asset-Backed
Securities (ABS) to access non-depository funds and they moved to alternate instruments.
Covered Bond (CB) was an important instrument used by the European banks for this purpose.
Preferential regulatory treatment given to CBs also played an important role in focus on this
market. However, once the dust of the GFC was settled, many questions were raised on the
blames placed on securitisation. It was realised that securitisation plays an important role
in the economic growth and strict regulatory treatment should not be given to this market.
Regulators are currently trying to restart this market but strict regulations are hindering the
resumption. It is still an open question that how this market should be regulated optimally?
This study attempts to contribute in finding the answer of this question.
This study makes a comparison of ABS with CBs as they are close counterparts, but
blames those are places on ABS cannot be applied to CBs. Banks transfer their assets out of
their balance sheet during the securitisation process and it is perceived that they do not have
the so-called ‘skin in the game’ after this transfer. For this reason, securitisation is mainly
blamed for creating the problems of moral hazards that allegedly led to the issuance of large
scale risky loans. However, such a transfer of underlying asset does not take place in case of
CB issuance and banks are supposed to have a strong ‘skin in the game’. Hence, allegations
on securitisation should not stand true if CB issuing banks also face similar problems.
The initial legal analysis in this study highlight three elements. First, some questions are
raised on the premises of the regulations devised for securitisation after the GFC. It seems
that many of these regulations are influenced by the market criticism and political reactions
towards the securitisation market. Second, the European regulations are highly influenced by
the situation in the US market and not based on the European realities. Many complex forms
of ABS those were omnipresent in the US market were not commonly issued in the European
securitisation market. Moreover, the Originate-to-Distribute (OTD) model of securitisation 
that has been subject of mass criticism was also not present in the European market. Third, 
CBs are given a favourable treatment as compared to ABS that also plays a role in hindering 
the efforts to restart this market. The investors might feel that CBs are better instruments, 
even they offer a lower yield as compared to ABS, because of the high capital requirements 
in case of exposures in ABS. An empirical analysis has been performed to deeply study these 
concerns about the regulations.
Chapter 4 of this study compares the impact of ABS and CBs on credit risk taking 
behaviour of banks by using the data of 253 banks from 7 European countries for the period 
2000-2014. This analysis helps evaluate the regulations inspired by the perception that 
securitising banks take more risk. The study uses the Covariate Balancing Propensity Score 
(CBPS) with Difference-in-Differences (DID) for the analysis. Initial results suggest that 
European banks do not securitise for the credit risk transfer, rather main motive behind 
securitisation and CBs is liquidity generation. I examine effects of securitisation and CBs on 
credit risk-taking behaviour in the short and long run. The results suggest that securitisation 
may not have a positive impact on credit risk-taking behaviour of banks. The findings do not 
support the perception that securitising banks under-price their risk. However, results indicate 
that CBs may have a positive impact on credit risk-taking in the long run. These results are 
attributed to the recourse provided in securitisation transactions, competitive pressure and 
asset encumbrance in case of large scale CB issuance. The ‘skin in the game’ in form of 
on-balance sheet retention may not help reduce credit risk-taking.
Chapter 5 of this study goes a little deeper and empirically investigates how the relationship 
of securitisation and CBs with bank stability varies with the level of variations in banks 
involvement in any of these two instruments. The study uses here the data from 46 securitising 
and CB issuing listed banks in Europe for 2000-2014. The initial results show that some 
banks have been heavily involved in the securitisation activity, while CB issuance does not 
go beyond a certain limit. The results obtained using a quadratic model and a generalized 
additive model suggest a U-shaped relationship between securitisation and systemic risk of 
the banks. However, this relationship is reversed for CBs. Small issuance of these bonds 
fail to provide the intended benefits and increase the banks’ r isk. Further investigation reveal 
the presence of a strong size effect. The systemic risk of smaller banks increases after the 
issuance of CB, while larger banks remain unaffected. The study does not support imposing 
uniform limits on the CB issuance; instead such limits should be linked with the bank size. 
However, some framework is needed to limit the banks’ involvement in securitisation.
The empirical analysis suggests that securitisation per se does not lead to high risk taking,
rather the problem starts when banks increase their level of securitisation. In the light of
these findings, the study suggest that flat regulatory treatment given to all securitising banks
may not be suitable. The objective of the revival of the securitisation market may not be
achievable in the presence of strict treatment given to all forms and levels of securitisation.
The study recommends differentiated treatment of different classes of ABS and incremental
capital regulations. The capital regulations should be relaxed for banks having a reasonable
presence in the securitisation market but they should increase when a banks accelerate its
securitisation activity. A differentiated treatment with respect to the classes of ABS and a
bank’s involvement in this market will encourage those banks who have a low presence in this
market and discourage banks to extensively involve in the securitisation activity.
  
 
Samenvatting 
 
Zowel vóór als na de wereldwijde financiële crisis is de regelgeving voor securitisatie 
voorwerp van kritiek geweest. Securitisatie werd alom verantwoordelijk gehouden voor het 
ontstaan van de wereldwijde financiële crisis. Deze crisis heeft geleid tot strenge regelgeving 
voor de securitisatie, met als gevolg dat deze stilviel. Banken konden geen door activa 
gedekte effecten (asset-backed securities, ABS) meer uitgeven om toegang te krijgen tot niet 
op deposito’s gebaseerde middelen (non-depository funds) en namen daarom hun toevlucht 
tot alternatieve instrumenten. Een belangrijk instrument dat de Europese banken voor dit doel 
gebruikten, was de gedekte obligatie (covered bond, CB). De preferentiële behandeling die 
in de regelgeving werd gegeven aan gedekte obligaties, speelde ook een belangrijke rol in de 
focus op deze markt. Toen het stof van de wereldwijde financiële crisis was gaan liggen, 
werden echter veel vragen gesteld over de schuld die bij securitisatie werd gelegd. Men 
realiseerde zich dat securitisatie een belangrijke rol speelt in de economische groei en dat de 
securitisatiemarkt niet moest worden onderworpen aan strenge regelgeving. Regelgevende 
instanties trachten momenteel deze markt weer op gang te brengen, maar de strenge 
regelgeving verhindert opleving. De vraag hoe deze markt het beste kan worden 
gereglementeerd, staat nog open. Deze studie tracht bij te dragen tot het vinden van het 
antwoord op deze vraag. 
In deze studie worden door activa gedekte effecten vergeleken met gedekte obligaties, 
omdat ze min of meer tegenhangers zijn, hoewel de schuld die bij door activa gedekte 
effecten wordt gelegd, niet van toepassing is op gedekte obligaties. In het securitisatieproces 
plaatsen banken activa buiten hun balans en de indruk bestaat dat ze na deze overbrenging 
zelf geen zogenoemde ‘skin in the game’ meer hebben. Daarom wordt vooral securitisatie 
verantwoordelijk gehouden voor het veroorzaken van problematische morele risico’s die, 
naar verluidt, hebben geleid tot grootschalige verstrekking van riskante leningen. Een 
dergelijke overbrenging van onderliggende activa vindt niet plaats in geval van de uitgifte 
van gedekte obligaties en banken worden verondersteld in dat geval wel ‘skin in the game’ 
te hebben. Dit betekent dat de beweringen over securitisatie onterecht zijn als banken die 
gedekte obligaties uitgeven met vergelijkbare problemen te maken hebben. 
De initiële juridische analyse in deze studie haalt drie elementen naar voren. Op de eerste 
plaats worden er vragen gesteld over de vooronderstellingen van de regelgeving voor 
securitisatie die na de wereldwijde financiële crisis is opgesteld. Een groot deel van deze 
  
regelgeving blijkt te zijn beïnvloed door de marktkritiek en politieke reacties op de 
securitisatiemarkt. Op de tweede plaats worden de Europese verordeningen sterk beïnvloed 
door de situatie op de markt in de Verenigde Staten en zijn ze niet gebaseerd op de Europese 
werkelijkheid. Veel complexe vormen van door activa gedekte effecten die 
alomtegenwoordig waren in de Amerikaanse markt, werden niet algemeen uitgegeven in de 
Europese securitisatiemarkt. Bovendien kwam ook het verstrekken-verpakken-
verkopenmodel (originate-to-distribute, OTD) van securitisatie, dat zwaar wordt 
bekritiseerd, op de Europese markt niet voor. Op de derde plaats worden gedekte obligaties 
gunstig behandeld vergeleken met door activa gedekte effecten, en ook dit speelt een rol in 
het hinderen van de inspanningen om deze markt nieuw leven in te blazen. De beleggers 
kunnen het gevoel hebben dat gedekte obligaties, ook al bieden ze een lager rendement dan 
door activa gedekte effecten, betere instrumenten zijn vanwege de hoge kapitaalvereisten in 
geval van blootstelling aan door activa gedekte effecten. Er is een empirische analyse 
uitgevoerd om deze regelgevingsaangelegenheden diepgaand te bestuderen. 
In hoofdstuk 4 van deze studie wordt het effect van door activa gedekte effecten en 
gedekte obligaties op het gedrag van banken met betrekking tot het nemen van kredietrisico 
vergeleken op basis van de gegevens van 253 banken uit 7 Europese landen over de periode 
2000-2014. Deze analyse helpt de regelgeving te evalueren die is ingegeven door de perceptie 
dat banken die securitiseren meer risico nemen. In deze studie wordt voor de analyse de 
‘covariate balancing propensity score’ (CBPS) met de zogenoemde verschil-in-
verschillenaanpak (difference-in-differences, DID) gebruikt. De eerste resultaten wijzen erop 
dat Europese banken niet securitiseren om kredietrisico over te dragen, maar dat het 
belangrijkste motief voor securitisatie en gedekte obligaties het genereren van liquiditeit is. 
De effecten van securitisatie en gedekte obligaties op het gedrag met betrekking tot het nemen 
van kredietrisico op de korte en lange termijn zijn onderzocht. De resultaten wijzen erop dat 
securitisatie mogelijk geen positief effect heeft op het gedrag van banken met betrekking tot 
het nemen van kredietrisico. De bevindingen ondersteunen niet de perceptie dat banken die 
securitiseren hun risico te laag beprijzen. De resultaten wijzen er echter wel op dat gedekte 
obligaties een positief effect kunnen hebben op het nemen van kredietrisico op de lange 
termijn. Deze resultaten worden toegeschreven aan de geboden verhaalmogelijkheid in 
securitisatietransacties, concurrentiedruk en bezwaring van activa in geval van grootschalige 
uitgifte van gedekte obligaties. De ‘skin in the game’ in de vorm van op de balans 
aangehouden belang helpt mogelijk niet om het nemen van kredietrisico te beperken. 
Hoofdstuk 5 van deze studie gaat iets dieper en onderzoekt empirisch hoe de relatie tussen 
securitisatie en gedekte obligaties met stabiliteit van banken varieert met veranderingen in 
de omvang van hun betrokkenheid bij een van deze twee instrumenten. In deze studie worden 
  
hiervoor de gegevens over 2000-2014 gebruikt van 46 beursgenoteerde banken in Europa die 
securitiseren en gedekte obligaties uitgeven. Uit de eerste resultaten blijkt dat sommige 
banken zich intensief hebben beziggehouden met securitisatieactiviteiten, terwijl de uitgifte 
van gedekte obligaties beneden een bepaalde limiet bleef. De resultaten die zijn verkregen 
met een kwadratisch model en een gegeneraliseerd additief model, wijzen op een U-vormige 
relatie tussen securitisatie en het systeemrisico van banken. Deze relatie is echter omgekeerd 
voor gedekte obligaties. Kleine uitgiften van gedekte obligaties bieden niet de beoogde 
voordelen en verhogen het risico van banken. Nader onderzoek wijst uit dat het effect sterk 
afhankelijk is van grootte. Het systeemrisico van kleinere banken neemt toe na uitgifte van 
gedekte obligaties, terwijl dat van grotere banken ongewijzigd blijft. De resultaten van deze 
studie ondersteunen het opleggen van uniforme limieten aan de uitgifte van gedekte 
obligaties niet; in plaats daarvan zouden zulke limieten moeten worden gekoppeld aan de 
grootte van de bank. Er is echter wel een kader nodig om de betrokkenheid van banken bij 
securitisatie te beperken. 
De empirische analyse wijst erop dat securitisatie op zich niet hoeft te leiden tot het 
nemen van grote risico’s. Integendeel, het probleem ontstaat wanneer banken hun niveau van 
securitisatie verhogen. In het licht van deze bevindingen wijst de studie erop dat uniforme 
regelgeving voor alle banken die securitiseren mogelijk niet geschikt is. De doelstelling van 
de heropleving van de securitisatiemarkt is mogelijk niet haalbaar bij de huidige strenge 
behandeling die op alle vormen en niveaus van securitisatie wordt toegepast. Op basis van de 
bevindingen van deze studie wordt een gedifferentieerde behandeling van verschillende 
klassen van door activa gedekte effecten en incrementele kapitaalvoorschriften aangeraden. 
De kapitaalvoorschriften zouden moeten worden versoepeld voor banken met een redelijke 
aanwezigheid in de securitisatiemarkt, maar zouden moeten worden aangescherpt voor 
banken die hun securitisatieactiviteiten versnellen. Een gedifferentieerde behandeling die 
rekening houdt met de klassen van door activa gedekte effecten en de verwikkeling van een 
bank in deze markt, zal banken met een lage aanwezigheid in deze markt aanmoedigen en 
zal banken ontmoedigen om zich op grote schaal bezig te houden met securitisatieactiviteiten. 
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